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This dissertation attempts to explain underdevelopment by analyzing
the underdevelopment of the economic system of Southern Italy, the
Mezzogiorno, in the context of Italy's participation in the European
Economic Community (EEC)
.
Underdevelopment is not opposed to development; it is a type of
development. Underdevelopment is opposed to, and organically united
with, its "other": positive, balanced development.
The distribution of power among political actors determines the
consequences of the integration of their economic systems. The strong
benefit at the expense of the weak and determine preponderantly their
destiny. With regard to the development of integrating economic sys-
tems, the systems of the strong experience generally positive, balanced




The unification of Italy under the Kingdom of Sardinia transformed
the organic development of capitalism in southern Italy, under way long
before the country's unification, into the Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment.
The Kingdom of Sardinia's ruling class became Italy's ruling class, iden-
tified its interests territorially with the economic system of north-
western Italy (most of which belonged to the Kingdom of Sardinia) and
placed the Mezzogiorno in a subaltern position in the Italian economy.
The United States, hegemonic over Western Europe, attempts to main-
tain the international balance of power in part by giving political and
economic predominance in the EEC to West Germany and France, Western
Europe's two most important states in the strategic equilibrium between
the United States and the Soviet Union. The predominance of West Germany
and France in the EEC induces Italy's current ruling class, heir to the
Kingdom of Sardinia's, to protect its traditional position of dominance
and its interests by intensifying the Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment to
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PREFACE
This dissertation is the product of two personal experiences: years
of study in the United States and a year and a half of research (from
mid-1982 to the end of 1983) in Italy. Of these experiences, the latter
was by far the more important because it made me aware of the inadequacy
of the former. In the United States, Italy is poorly studied, misunder-
stood and misrepresented. Before attending Graduate School, what I was
able to learn about Italy, I had to learn on my own outside formal aca-
demic confines and in a general environment of ignorance and, therefore,
bias. While attending Graduate School, my study of Italy was based en-
tirely on my personal initiative. Were it not for the cultured domestic
environment created by my parents, I would have been unable to understand
what the formal and informal systems of socialization and education in
the United States intended me to learn about Italy, and why. Nor would
have I had the means to profit from my sojourn in Italy.
I have debts of gratitude to the many people, perhaps too numerous
to recall, let alone mention, who in various ways helped me to realize
this work. Some of these people stand out in my mind for their contri-
butions. My Dissertation Committee (Professors Gerard Braunthal and
Eric S. Einhorn of the Department of Political Science and Roland Sarti
of the Department of History, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst)
provided me useful observations relative to the text and the opportunity
to develop myself. Professors Eileen L. McDonagh, Suzanne Ogden and
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Minton F. Goldman of the Department of Political Science, Northeastern
University, Boston, provided me wise counsel, generous support and their
own example. Mr. Christopher Brown, Reader in Political Science, the
University of Kent, United Kingdom, when a visiting Professor at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, induced me to conceive this work
by introducing to me many development theories and their various concep-
tualizations of underdevelopment. Prof essoressa Vera Zamagni of the
Facolta' di Scienze Politiche "Cesare Alfieri," 1 1 Universita ' degli
Studi di Firenze, helped me to orient myself in my research during my
sojourn in Italy. Last, Ms. Jenny Hopkins and Mr. Wolfgang Knuppel of
the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) , Luxembourg,
and Dottoressa Roberta Faggian of the Servizio Documentazione , Osserva-
torio della Spesa Pubblica, Consiglio Regionale, Regione del Veneto,
provided me the data presented in the Statistical Appendix to Chapter
Six. My silence with regard to the many others who helped me should not
be interpreted as indifference or, worse, ingratitude. It is purely a
matter of convenience.
I take the opportunity to make the customary prefatory statement.





This dissertation attempts to explain underdevelpoment by ana-
lyzing the underdevelopment of the economic system of Southern Italy,
the Mezzogiorno, in the context of Italy's participation in the
European Economic Community (EEC). The historical subjects of this
dissertation are Italy's most powerful social groups and political
organizations [e.g., Italy's industrial leadership, the Christian
Democratic Party (DC), the Italian Communist Party (PCI)], the EEC's
politically dominant member States (West Germany and France) and the
United States (the superpower which has thus far exercized hegemony
over the EEC). The theoretical subjects are the concepts of power,
integration, political development and economic development.
The intellectual debate on underdevelopment has two traditional
sides. The "orthodox" Marxist position (advanced, for example, by
Geoffrey Kay) conceptualizes underdevelopment as a non-problem.
Theories of underdevelopment (those, for example, of Paul Baran,
Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Arghiri Emmanuel and
Samir Amin) distinguish between development and underdevelopment and
ascribe the latter 's causes either to monopoly exchange, production
or pricing.
Thus far the debate has established "what underdevelopment is
not" by eliminating the false answers to the questions posed about
it: each side has pointed up the shortcomings of the other's arguments
1
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Although this may be a necessary and important contribution, the
debate has not yet established "what underdevelopment is." The
desire to understand underdevelopment inspired this work.
One of this study's central conceptual themes is that the devel-
opment/underdevelopment dichotomy is false. Underdevelopment is not
opposed to development; it is a type of development. Underdevelopment
is opposed to, and organically united with, its "other": positive,
balanced development.
This study makes an unorthodox and, it is hoped, an original
and useful contribution to the study of underdevelopment in general
and of the Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment in particular. Nonethe-
less, it owes much to the many works cited in the Notes to the Chap-
ters and in the Selected Bibliography. The reader is left to deduce
and to ponder the many differences and similarities between the ideas
expressed in this work and the ideas expressed in others.
The analysis of the relationships between the historical and the
theoretical subjects under study depends on a political theory, that
is, an interpretative model of analysis which attempts to explain
"why things are the way they are." Only a political theory based
on the most rigorous elaboration of theoretical concepts placed in
the fullest possible historical context has validity because only
such a theory is capable of explaining realistically "why things
are the way they are." In essence, history and political theory
complement each other: history has no meaning without the inter-
pretation provided by political theory and political theory has no
validity outside the context provided by history.
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The present analysis, and the political theory on which it is
based, do not attempt to say everything about everything. They attempt
instead to offer a realistic interpretation of history by integrating
only the historical information and the theoretical concepts fundamental
to the task of explaining "why things are the way they are." For this
reason, the analysis and the theory can seem precipitate or overly
schematic. In fact, they deal only with the sine qua non .
This is the dissertation's outline. Chapter One provides the
dissertation's conceptual base. It contends that the distribution
of power among political actors determines the consequences of the
integration of their economic systems. The strong benefit at the
expense of the weak and determine preponderantly their destiny. With
regard to the development of integrating economic systems, the systems
of the strong experience generally positive, balanced development at
the expense of the weak; the former cause the latter to underdevelop
.
Chapter Two is a digest of the two sets of juridical relation-
ships which affect the Mezzogiorno in the context of Italy's parti-
cipation in the EEC: the relationships between the Mezzogiorno and
the rest of Italy and those between Italy and the EEC. These rela-
tionships neglect the question of the distribution of power among the
political actors (e.g., Italy's subnational administrative regions,
the Italian State and its agencies, the other EEC States, the EEC's
institutions and agencies) which participate in them. Nonetheless,
these political actors base many of their actions on the authority
of these relationships. The remaining chapters of this study examine
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the ways in which these relationships affect the Mezzogiorno by
Placing them in the context of the distribution of power among the
political actors which participate in them.
Chapters Three and Four examine integrative processes from a
historical perspective. Chapter Three examines the Mezzogiorno '
s
integration in the Italian economy. It contends that the unification
of Italy under the Kingdom of Sardinia transformed the organic devel-
opment of capitalism in southern Italy, under way long before the
country's unification, into the Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment. The
Kingdom of Sardinia's ruling class became Italy's ruling class,
identified its interests territorially with the economic system of
northwestern Italy (most of which belonged to the Kingdom of Sardinia)
and placed the Mezzogiorno in a subaltern position in the Italian
economy
.
Chapter Four examines the Italian economy's integration in the
international economy through its participation in the EEC. It con-
tends that the United States, hegemonic over Western Europe, attempts
to maintain the international balance of power in part by giving poli-
tical and economic predominance in the EEC to West Germany and France,
Western Europe's two most important states in the strategic equilibrium
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The predominance of
West Germany and France in the EEC induces Italy's current ruling
class, heir to the Kingdom of Sardinia's, to protect its traditional
position of dominance and its interests by intensifying the Mezzogiorno '
s
underdevelopment to the advantage and benefit of the economic system
of northwestern Italy.
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Chapters Five and Six examine integrative processes in the contem-
porary period from a functional perspective. Chapter Five examines
the consequences of Italy's participation in the EEC for its economy.
It contends that its participation in an EEC dominated politically by
West Germany and France under American hegemony gives to its economy
a subsidiary role in the upper ranks of the international division of
labor. This role manifests itself most clearly in Italy's commercial
exchange, in the exchange relationships between the Lira and other
currencies, and in the movements of capital and labor.
Chapter Six examines the consequences of Italy's participation
in the EEC for the Mezzogiorno. It contends that the participation
of an Italy under its current ruling class in an EEC dominated by other
states exacerbates the area's underdevelopment, more functional than
ever, in economic terms, to the positive, balanced development of north-
central Italy. The Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment manifests itself
most clearly in its "economic development without employment," anomalous
urbanization, anomalous consumerism, hypertertiarization
, emigration
and in the existence of the entrepreneurial mafia and the mafia model
of capitalist accumulation.
Four concepts inform the present analysis and the political theory
on which it is based. First, political actors are self-interested.
Second, power and self-interest are at the base of politics. Third,
political and economic development cannot be understood outside the
context of the distribution of power among political actors. Last,
in politics, it never pays to be weak. The present analysis , and the
theory on which it is based, contend that n-Tot-M History shows these concepts
to be fundamental truths.
CHAPTER I
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Mezzogiorno, Italy and the EEC
This dissertation analyzes the consequences of Italy's partici-
pation in the European Economic Community (EEC) for the Mezzogiorno.
The subject concerns the collective and authoritative decisions
which affect the production and distribution of goods and services
across sovereign boundaries and is, therefore, a study in interna-
tional political economy. In analytical terms, the subject concerns
the consequences of the political and economic relationships estab-
lished between sovereign and non-sovereign political actors for the
functioning of the economic system of a subnational socioeconomic
area and is, therefore, a case-study in international integration.
The consequences of Italy's participation in the EEC for the
Mezzogiorno derive from the political and economic relationships
established between five types of political actors: sovereign
nation-states, principally Italy, France, West Germany and the United
States; Italy's social groups and political organizations (e.g., social
classes and political parties) ; an intergovernmental organization
(IGO) , the EEC; multinational corporations (MNCs) ; and the governments
of subnational administrative regions, principally those of the regions
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which are part of the Mezzogiorno, but also those of regions in other
parts of Italy and the EEC. These relationships are established within,
and are mediated by, concentric power structures, and bring into con-
tact economic systems which have different levels of overall economic
development, together with political actors which have different
amounts of power. This chapter elaborates the framework of politico-
economic analysis which is the conceptual base of this case-study.
Interdependenc e, Power and Political Development
Political and economic relationships, like all relationships,
create interdependence among political actors. These relationships
are like bridges, in that they serve as channels of contact. Through
their relationships, political actors are interdependent, in that a
decision made by one actor creates repercussions in the others.
Interdependence can therefore be defined as mutual or reciprocal
dependence, vulnerability and sensitivity.
1
Among political actors, interdependence, although reciprocal, is
not symmetrical because power is not distributed equally. The overall
repercussions of a decision made by one political actor can be lesser
or greater than the overall repercussions of a decision made by another.
For this reason, political actors are not equally interdependent.
A political actor is any entity which attempts to determine the
consequences of its relationships with other entities by exercising
power. Power is a political actor's ability to determine the
9
consequences of relationships with other political actors.
2
The more
powerful political actor is the one more able than another to deterge
the consequences of their relationships.
A political actor's power is a function of the quantity and
quality of the means available to that actor. These means can be
called "the elements of power."
3
It is perhaps iinpossible tQ make a
definitive list of these elements, and almost certainly impossible -
to create a "formula of power" that may give scientific expression
to the conceptualization of all their possible combinations. None-
theless, some elements of power can at least be identified: manpower,
geographical location, natural resources, military capability, social
cohesion, national psychology, an economic system's level of devel-
opment and technical proficiency, political institutions, and a poli-
tical actor's level of political (i.e., organizational) development.
No single element of power is most important at all times and
under all circumstances. In general terms, however, political or
organizational development is the most important element of power
because organization creates power: through organization the poten-
tial value of a means, or group of means, becomes realizable in
practice. A political actor's level of political development deter-
mines the efficacy with which the political actor utilizes the means
at its disposal. In short, the better organized a political actor
is, the better able it is to act on the world.
Some political actors are more powerful than others for three
reasons. First, a political actor can possess more elements of power
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than another. A MNC, for example, has a labor force and a certain
level of technical proficiency, but does not have an army. An IGO
has a labor force and political institutions, but no social cohesion.
Second, some political actors possess elements of power qualitatively
superior to similar elements possessed by others. Some MNCs are
more technically proficient than others. Some nation-states are mili-
tarily stronger than others or more resolved to achieve the goals of
a certain policy. Last, some political actors are better organized
politically, that is, more developed politically, than others. The
actors more developed politically can utilize better the means at
their disposal and, for this reason, can more effectively determine
the consequences of their relationships with other, potentially
stronger political actors.
The Sovereign Nation-State
The nation-state is the most powerful type of political actor.
First, it can possess, at least potentially, more "elements of power"
than any other type of political actor. Second, and much more impor-
tant, it is the only type of political actor endowed with sovereignty,
the political myth, fundamental to Statehood, defined as "the highest
decision-making authority."^ Nation-states are certainly not all-
powerful, but there is no political authority recognized superior to
that of the nation-state. For this reason, it is the first-order
political actor.
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The authority bestowed by sovereignty is the nation-state's
most important element of power. Through the political use of sov-
ereignty, the nation-state can organize social consensus by creating
the socio-political identity of its citizens and by mobilizing their
allegiance. The organized consent of society permits the nation-
state to make the most effective use of the means at its disposal
by realizing a greater degree of political development than any other
type of political actor.
Political Power and Self-interest
The relationships between political actors can be formal or
informal, direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, hostile
or friendly, and can take many forms: diplomatic, cultural, poli-
tical, economic and military. The consequences of these relation-
ships can be positive or negative for the political actors involved.
Politics can be defined as the use of power in the pursuit of
self-interest. Political actors are self-interested, in that they
want to maximize the positive consequences of their relationships
with other political actors, and to minimize the negative conse-
quences. For this reason, political actors want to acquire and
maintain as much power as possible. The distribution of power
among political actors reflects the distribution of the ability to
determine consequences. In general, barring mistakes and bad fortune,
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the distribution of the ability to determine consequences reflects
the distribution of positive and negative consequences.
Economic Systems, Economic Development and Economic. Growth
An economic system is the complex of relationships established
between the various units which produce and distribute goods and
services in a geographical area characterized by a level of overall
economic development, and by a type of spatial development.
5
An
economic system disposes of human and non-human productive resources
called the means of production (or the forces of production, or the
factors of production) generally classified into four groups: land,
labor, capital and entrepreneurship . The means of production are
interdependent, in that the way in which they are politically organized
establishes the relationships between them, and determines how they
are utilized.
The political organization of the means of production serves
five purposes regarding the functioning of an economic system: first,
it determines the way in which an economic system functions, by
keeping stable and recurring over time the relationships between
the means of production; second, it controls the accumulation of
capital, that is, it determines how capital is accumulated, and from
what sources; third, it controls economic production, that is, it
determines what type of production takes place, and where the produc-
tive facilities are located; fourth, it controls economic distribution,
1 1
that is, it determines where the economic product is sent, so that it
may be consumed or used; and, last, it controls economic consumption,
that is, it determines who has greater access to the available economic
product
.
The political organization of the means of production is deter-
mined by the political and economic relationships established between
the political actors capable of affecting the production and distributer
of goods and services in one or more economic systems. A given economic
system functions according to the given political organization of the
means of production, unless and until a political or economic action
modifies or changes that political organization. Such an action
takes the form of any event which results in the greater or lesser
ability of a political actor, in its relationships with other actors,
to determine the consequences of economic relationships which concern
the accumulation of capital, capital flows, the utilization of tech-
nology, trade, economic growth rates, and monetary and fiscal policies.
7
A political actor's ability results, economically, from the level of
overall development of the economic system, or systems, under its
political jurisdiction and, politically, from the actor's level of
political development.
Economic systems can be compared according to the following
criteria: the technique of production and distribution, the degree
of rationalization of economic enterprises, and the amount of income
o
per earner. The comparison results in the determination of the
relative level of overall development of the economic systems. (All
14
economic systems are internally heterogeneous, in that all units of
production and distribution are not qualitatively similar. This .
results from the £aot that the political organization of the means
of production, and the mobility of capital and labor, are not per-
fect. For this reason, economic systems are not perfectly uniform
with regard to their levels of development, and are characterized
by levels of overall development.)
The concept of economic development refers to the level of labor
productivity of an economic system. Economic development can be
defined as the evolutionary process of change of the political organi-
zation of the means of production which results in the greater produc-
tivity of an economic system.
9
The more developed economic system is
the one whose political organization of the means of production allows
the production of goods, which are more remunerative, through a more
rational and more productive use of the means of production. The
more developed economic system, then, is the one which can accumulate,
utilize and create capital more productively, more efficiently, and
in greater quantity than the other. For this reason, the more
developed economic system is the more powerful.
The development of an economic system can result either from the
direct introduction of technological innovation to the means of pro-
duction or from growth. On the one hand, technological innovation,
which can be introduced by sources internal or external to an economic
system, can cause development by increasing the productivity of the
means of production. On the other hand, growth can lead to economic
1 5
ls, a
development by creating a surplus of investment capital, that U
greater margin of profit not absorbed by current consumption. If
entrepreneurs use this surplus investment capital to change the poli-
tical organization of the means of production in a way which results
in greater productivity (for example, through the development of tech-
nological innovation), then growth will have led to economic development.
Economic growth can be defined as an increase in production or
as a rise in real income within the context of a given political
organization of the means of production. Growth per se is not develop-
ment, because growth does not constitute per se a change in the political
organization of the means of production, nor does growth constitute
per se an increase in the labor productivity of an economic system.
The concept of economic development can be said not only to include the
concept of growth, but to transcend it. The greater productivity which
characterizes develpoment results not only in an increase in the real
income produced by an economic system (as does growth), but in an
increase in the real income produced per productive unit as well. This
is what distinguishes economic development from economic growth.
10
The Inducement of Economic Growth
Economic growth, which makes available a greater amount of invest-
ment capital, is itself caused by greater investment in an economic




Four of these inducements are internal m m,to the economic system, while
the other two are external to it.
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Barring extra-economic intervention in the economic process (or
an externally induced increase in internal demand, or, as has heen
said, greater productivity due to the introduction of technological
innovation), internally induced growth can result from only one sou,
an increase in the saving of real income (that is, the quantity of
goods and services produced by an economic system, and made availabl,
to be purchased or utili Z ed with money income). An increase in the
portion of real income saved (and, therefore, not consumed) makes more
capital available for investment.
The only other way in which economic growth can be internally
induced is through an increase in internal demand. The increase in
internal demand stimulates an expansion of production, which, in
turn, stimulates further investment. However, internal demand cannot
increase without there first being an increase in productivity,
excepting, again, extra-economic intervention in the economic process,
or external inducement. (With regard to external inducement, the
introduction of external capital into an economic system can cause
an increase in internal demand by causing an increase in pro capite
real income.) With regard to extra-economic intervention in the
economic process, economic growth can be internally induced in three
ways: by means of monetary policy (an increase in the money supply),
protectionism (the establishment of government-imposed tariffs, quotas,
or restrictions designed to limit or eliminate imports) , or fiscal
17
policy (government taxing and spending designed to put production and
employment at desired levels).
An increase in the money supply puts more money in clrculatlon>
This stimulates consumption, which, in turn, causes an increase in
internal demand. It should be noted, however, that an increase in
the money supply aimed at causing economic growth is counterproductive
if the growth rate of the money supply exceeds the growth rate of the
economic system. This situation results not only in growth, but also
in inflation.
Protectionism gives an artificial competitive advantage to inter-
nally produced goods. This results in an increase in internal demand.
It should be noted, however, that protectionism has positive and nega-
tive aspects. On the positive side, protectionism can shield internal
producers from the economic pressure of superior external competition
that would drive them out of business (and thus create unemployment)
in an environment of less restricted competition. On the negative
side, protectionism can shield internal producers from the economic
pressure to face external competition at all. Although protectionism
may shield employment, protectionism can also replace the incentive
for an increase in productivity (that is, development) with the incen-
tive for waste, inefficiency, and unnecessarily high production costs
(in purely economic terms).
Fiscal policy is the instrument by which a government attempts
to put economic production and employment at desired levels by regu-
lating the supply and demand of capital for investment and of goods
L8
and services for conation, through the use of the powers of taxation
and spending. Fiscal policy can be an effective instrument by which
a government increases internal demand. However, the conflicting and
contradictory economic and socio-political goals of government policy
often make this task difficult and complicated. Excessive or insuf-
ficient production or consumption creates problems which affect eco-
nomic performance, and have socio-political repercussions.
Externally induced growth can result from an increase in external
demand, or from the introduction of external capital. In the first
case, an increase in external demand for the system's product stimu-
lates an expansion of production, which, in turn, stimulates further
investment. In the second case, the introduction of external capital,
which takes the form of direct or portfolio investments, obviously
causes growth, since this capital is invested in the economic system.
(As has been said, the introduction of external capital can also cause
an increase in internal demand by causing an increase in pro-capite
real income.)
Integration, Economic Power and Practicable Power
Integration can be defined as the process which results in poli-
tical and economic interdependence between two or more economic
12
systems. Economic systems are integrated with others according to
the relationships established between these systems by the political





modification or change of the preexisting political m Ai OLlu fe and economic rela-
tionships between the integrating economic systems and with othe
Integrating systems, according to the degree of integration, an
interdependent among themselves than with others.
Integration creates a greater economic system, that is, a system
of economic systems. It politically reorganizes their means of pro-
duction by redistributing power among the political actors which
manage and influence them. Economic power, sanctioned by practicable
political power, determines the functioning of the greater economic
system, unless and until a political intervention modifies the poli-
tical organization of its means of production.
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The way in which integration redistributes power among the political
actors which manage and influence the various, integrating economic
systems determines each actor's autonomy and each economic system's
function in the greater economic system. The distribution of power
determines each actor's ability to formulate and implement economic
policy. This establishes to whose benefit the decisions are taken
which determine the accumulation of capital, and the production, distri-
bution and consumption of goods and services, in the greater economic
system and, therefore, in each integrating economic system.
Market Policy Integration and The Integration
of Political Authority
There are two categories of integration: market policy inte-
14
gration and the integration of political authority. Market policy
20
integration politically reorganizes the means of production of the
various, integrating economic systems, in that it reorganizes their
markets (that is, their geographic areas of demand for commodities).
It also reorganizes the autonomy of the political actors which manage
or influence these systems, by creating a greater mobility of commerce,
capital or labor between the integrating systems.
There are two sub-categories of market policy integration. Non-
institutionalized market policy integration refers to the establishment
of trade agreements, or capital or labor mobility agreements, between
the competent political authorities, with regard to their respective
economic systems. Institutionalized market policy integration refers
to the establishment of institutionalized limitations on the autonomy
of political actors with regard to their ability to formulate and
implement economic policy.
The integration of political authority reorganizes the means of
production of the integrating economic systems, in that it centralizes
the authority which contributes to the determination of the way in
which these systems function, by transferring this authority to new
or different institutions superior, in terms of political legitimacy,
to those formerly supreme. The integration of political authority
is qualitatively superior to market policy integration because the
first transcends the second by unifying the market policy authority
of the various, integrating economic systems. The integration of
political authority results in the creation of a single political






Integration does not gnarantee per se that the decisions taken
by the authoritative political institutions will be preponderant
determination of the political organization of the means of product!
of the integrating economic systems. Such a preponderance results mor,
from the distribution of power than from the distribution of authority
among the political actors capable of affecting the performance of one
or more economic systems.
The relationship between authority and power is the relationship
between legitimacy and ability. The concept of authority refers to
the right of a political actor to determine the consequences of its
relationships with other actors, but does not refer to the ability of
that actor to exercise its right. The concept of power refers to the
ability of a political actor to determine the consequences of its
relationships with other actors, but does not refer to the legitimacy
of that actor's ability. Authority and power can accompany each other
but it is not necessary that they do. A political actor can have much
authority but little power, or little authority but much power.
Balanced and Unbalanced Integration, Positive Development and
Underdevelopment, Dependence and Center-Periphery Relations
There are balanced and unbalanced types of integration which
affect political and economic interdependence within a greater economic
22
system. Therefore, they affect the type of development and fnnction of
the integrating economic systems and the political actors which manage
and influence them.
Balanced Integration refers to a balanced redistribution, among
the political actors and economic systems involved, of the practicable
power and the economic power which determines the political organiza-
tion of the means of production of the greater economic system. Such
a redistribution of power results in balanced political and economic
interdependence within the greater system and, therefore, in its bal-
anced or positive development. The political actors and economic
systems involved participate equally in determining the political
organization of the means of production of the greater system.
As to the various, integrating economic systems, in the case of
balanced integration, all experience balanced or positive development.
The political actors involved have the power to determine preponder-
antly the use of the real income produced by the economic systems
under their jurisdiction, or to determine equally the use of the
real income produced by the greater economic system, by formulating
and implementing policies which affect the accumulation of investment
capital, the productivity of investments, the spatial distribution
of productive facilities, and the composition of demand. The devel-
opment of an economic system can only be balanced if a part of its
real income is saved for productive reinvestment and if another part
is consumed in a way which increases the demand for a wide range of
internally produced goods and services. In such a case, a growth in
23
real inccne results not in a mere increase in demand, but in a diver-
sification of demand which striates the diversification of internal
production
.
The diversification of demand is a fundamental prerequisite of
balanced or positive development because it stimulates the diversifi-
cation of internal production by ensuring that none of the productive
potential of an economic system may remain unutilized. The diversifi-
cation of internal production ensures that further increases in produc-
tivity may not be limited, as in the case of underdevelopment (des-
cribed below), to a few sectors of the economic system, but may extend
to most or all of them. In fact, this diversification creates its
own diversified, subsequent demand because it addresses itself to the
wide range of needs and preferences of consumers.
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Unbalanced integration refers to an unbalanced redistribution,
among the political actors and economic systems involved, of the prac-
ticable power and the economic power which determines the political
organization of the means of production of the greater economic
system. This unbalanced redistribution of power results in unbalanced
political and economic interdependence within the greater system
because the decisions of the dominant actors involved contribute more
to the determination of the political organization of the means of
production of the greater system than the decisions of the subaltern
actors. For this reason, the dominant actors are at the political
center of the greater system, while the subaltern political actors





Lc system results in the balanced development of the integrating
economic systems under the jurisdiction of the dominant political
actors, and in the greater productivity, without the greater diversi-
fication of internal production, that is, the unbalanced or negative
development, of the integrating economic systems under the jurisdictio
of the subaltern political actors. This last type of development
also be defined as underdevelopment. 16 (Obviously, it makes no sen
to consider the unbalanced development of the greater economic system
to be equivalent to underdevelopment. The former refers to the coex-
istence of balanced development and underdevelopment within the greater
system, while the latter refers to the type of development of the pol-
itically subaltern integrating economic systems.)
As to the various, integrating economic systems, in the case of
unbalanced integration, the dominant political actors determine the
use of the real income produced by all the integrating systems. The
systems under the jurisdiction of the dominant political actors be-
come economically dominant or central, and experience balanced devel-
opment, while the integrating systems under the jurisdiction of the
subaltern political actors become economically subaltern or peripheral,
and experience underdevelopment. Underdevelopment can also be defined
as dependent development, because the development of the peripheral
economic systems depends preponderantly on the decisions taken by
political actors outside the confines of these systems. The dominant
political actors determine how the peripheral systems are joined to




means of products of the peripheral systems , and the ^
these systems in the greater system, by taking decisions which affect
the accumulation of rpmit-ai +-^~ jcapit l, the productivity of investments, the
spatial distribution of productivp faMHH 0 j ,e facilities, and the composition
of demand within the peripheral systems.
17
The productive capacity of the peripheral systems is oriented
toward the needs of the dominant, external actors than toward the need,
of the internal population. An insufficient part of the real income
produced by these systems is saved for internal reinvestment, and that
part which is saved is often not reinvested as productively as possible,
while an excessive part is consumed in a way which does not increase
the demand for a wide range of internally produced goods and services.
Under these circumstances, a growth in real income produced by peri-
pheral economic systems results in an excess of unproductive internal
investments. It results equally in an increase in demand which does
not stimulate the diversification of internal production, but which
stimulates the excessive consumption of imports, and which limits
increases in productivity to export-oriented sectors of the economic
system.
Underdevelopment is the type of development experienced by economic
systems which occupy positions of political, and, therefore, economic
subordination within a greater economic system. Underdevelopment is
not a non-problematic stage of development through which peripheral
economic systems must pass in order to obtain the type of development
realized by central systems, whose systematic, and presumably beneficent,
26
exploitation would ultimately create the periphery in the center's
i-ge. Nor is underdevelopment an inevitable and perpetual condition
of inferiority to which peripheral systems are relegated as a conse-
quence of their contact with central systems, whose systematic, and
often nefarious, exploitation would see, to condemn the periphery
to external subordination. 18 Instead, underdevelopment is a conse-
quence of a power imbalance among political actors, and reflects the
inability of subaltern actors to determine the consequences of the
political and economic relationships established by dominant actors. 19
The economic systems under the jurisdiction of subaltern actors will
experience underdevelopment unless and until these actors acquire suf-
ficient political autonomy to be able to determine the political organi
zation of the means of production of, and the use of the real income
20produced by, their systems.
Power Structures
Political and economic relationships, like all relationships,
are effective only if they are stable and recurring over time. This
stability and recurrence depends upon the stability of the power
structures within which they are established.
A power structure is a systemic distribution of power which
mediates the relationships established between actors by organizing
21them according to "the rules of the game." These "rules," which
are particular to all types of power structures, have the common
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function of determining how actors can acquire, maintain and exercise
power, how conflicts between the, are resolved, and how cooperation
among them is established. Those actors who perceive the rules to be
in their best interest, or who benefit from them, favor the rules,
readily accept them, and attempt to apply or enforce them, while those
actors who perceive the rules to be against their best interest, or
who suffer because of them, reject the rules, grudgingly comply with
them, or attempt to change or evade them, or attempt to apply them in
a beneficial way. The resignation of actors harmed by the rules results
in the stability of a power structure and the relationships established
within it, while the lack of resignation of these actors results in the
instability of a power structure.
The political actors under study establish political and economic
relationships within three types of concentric power structures, whose
focal point, in the context of this study, is the Mezzogiorno. First,
the international system is the global power structure characterized
by anarchy, that is, the absence of a socio-political community whose
institutions have the authority to make decisions which determine the
consequences of the relationships established between the actors within
the system. The international system mediates the relationships estab-
lished between international actors, which include nation-states, IGOs
,
MNCs, terrorist groups and ethnic lobbies. It provides an environment
of pure power relationships, in which "he who can, does." Second, an
IGO is both a power structure and a non-sovereign political actor no
greater than the sum of its parts, in that its non-sovereign authority
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derives from the volition of the sovereign nation-states which contract
to participate in it. The institutions and policies of the EEC mediate
many of the political and economic relationships established between
the Italian State and other international actors. Last, the nation-
state is both a power structure and the sovereign political actor. The
Italian State mediates all the political and economic relationships
established between the sub-national administrative regions which are
part of the Mezzogiorno and all other political actors.
Summary
Integration creates political and economic interdependence betwee
two or more economic systems. It reorganizes their means of productic
according to the distribution of the economic power of the integrating
systems and the practicable political power of the political actors
who manage and influence them.
A balanced distribution of power among the integrating economic
systems and the political actors which manage and influence them re-
sults in the positive, balanced development of the integrating economic
systems. In this situation, all the political actors have an equal
ability to determine the political organization of the means of pro-
duction of these systems.
An unbalanced distribution of power among the integrating economic
systems and the political actors which manage and influence them results






politically dominant actors. It results equally in the underdevelop-
ment of the economic systems of the politically subaltern actors.
Under these circumstances, the politically dominant actors hav<
greater ability to determine the political organization of the
of production of the integrating economic systems. These actors use
their greater power to organize to their advantage and benefit the
means of production of the integrating economic systems. The poli-
tically subaltern actors, for as long as they remain subaltern, must
accept the consequences.
The international system, the EEC and the Italian State are the
power structures which mediate the political and economic relation-
ships established between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of the world.
The consequences of Italy's participation in the EEC for the Mezzo-
giorno derive from the area's integration in the Italian economy
which, in turn, is integrated in the international economy through
the country's participation in the EEC. For this reason, it is nec-
essary to examine the political and economic relationships established
between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy and between Italy and
the EEC in order to understand the consequences of Italy's partici-
pation in the EEC for the Mezzogiorno.
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THE MEZZOGIORNO, ITALY AND THE EEC-
THE JURIDICAL RELATIONSHIPS
Premise
This chapter is a digest of the juridical relationships estab-
lished between the political actors under study. Emphasis is placed
on those relationships which affect the Mezzogiorno. Such a digest
serves two purposes. First, it exposes the structure of authority
within which the various, integrating economic systems function, and
through which the political actors under study exercise their power
to determine the organization of the means of production of the eco-
nomic systems under their jurisdiction and of the other integrating
economic systems. Second, it exposes their professed political and
economic objectives as well as the means by which they attempt to
realize them and upon which they have bestowed juridical legitimacy.
The historical record provides the opportunity to determine whether
or not the political actors' means and professed goals correspond
effectively in reality.
Italy's Regional Institutions of Government
Article 114 of Italy's Republican Constitution of 1948 recognizes







Constitution names 19 regions, but currently there are 20, because tbe
Abruzzo and Molise territories, which used to form a single region,
were separated administratively on 27 December 1963. Each region ha,
a unicameral legislature, the Regional Council, which sits for a f
year term, and which elects, from among its members, both an executive
committee, called the Regional Giunta, and a Regional President.
The Constitution distinguishes between ordinary and special re-
gions which have greater legislative autonomy. There are 15 ordinary
regions: Abruzzo, Basilicata (known also as Lucania)
, Calabria,
Campania, Emilia-Romagna
, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche , Molise,
Piemonte, Puglia, Toscana, Umbria and Veneto. The five remaining
regions are special because their historical relationships with the
Italian State reflect an awareness of regional identity which manifests
itself in a strong desire for regional political autonomy. This aware-
ness of regional identity results from the particular linguistic and
cultural conditions which prevail in Friuli-Venezia Giulia (with its
Slav minority)
, Trentino-Alto Adige (with its Austro-German minority)
and Valle d'Aosta (with its French minority), and from the particular
political and cultural conditions which prevail in Sardegna and Sicilia,
An ordinary region has legislative authority which is both com-
plementary and integrative, with respect to the legislative authority
of the Italian Parliament. Complementary legislative authority refers
to a region's authority to legislate, in its areas of competence,
only within the confines of the laws of the State, that is, the laws
enacted by Parliament. Integrative legislative authority refers to
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a region's authority to adapt the laws of the State to specific re-
gional conditions and needs, according to the norms of procedure
established by Parliament. According to Article 117 of the Consti-
tution, the competencies of an ordinary region are: agriculture and
forestry, artisans, building and maintenance of acqueducts and regional
public works, educational assistance, professional schools and trade
schools, election districts, fairs and markets, fishing in inland
waters, harbors and navigation on lakes, hunting, local libraries
and museums, mineral and thermal waters, problems of urbanization,
public welfare, health and hospitals, quarries and peatbogs, street-
cars and regional buslines, tourism and the hotel industry, and urban
and rural police.
A special region has greater legislative autonomy than an ordin-
ary region in that its legislative authority is not only complementary
and integrative, with respect to the legislative authority of the
Parliament, but supreme and exclusive in the following areas of com-
petence specified in the Constitution: agriculture and forestry,
artisanship, civic customs, communal boundaries, hunting and fishing,
local and regional roads, public works, regional fairs and markets,
regional libraries and museums, tourism, and town planning. Moreover,
in contrast to the ordinary regions, the special regions have com-
plementary legislative authority in the following areas of competence:
commerce, expropriation, fire protection, industry, labor relations,
land reclamation, local and regional banking, mines, public housing,




region, the president of a special region can plead his region's
before the State Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, when it discu,
matters which affect the region's interests. However, the president
of a special region cannot participate in the vote of the Council.
The Parliament established the governments of Sardegna, Sicilia,
Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d'Aosta on 26 February 1948, and that
of Friuli-Venezia Giulia on 31 January 1963, and transferred to them
their competencies on these dates. The Parliament established the
governments of the ordinary regions on 5 June 1970, shared with these
governments their competencies on 1 April 1972, and transferred to these
regions their competencies by enacting Law n. 382, passed on 22 July
1975, and put into effect by the decree of 24 July 1976. All the
regions seem to have successfully appropriated the competence for
regional planning, because the Constitution is silent in this regard,
and the Parliament seems to have given the regions its tacit approval.
Moreover, all the regions have the authority to submit to the Par-
liament legislative proposals which concern regional interests outside
regional legislative competence.
Although all the regions may now legally possess their compet-
encies, the regions still lack the fiscal autonomy, and, therefore,
the economic authority and control commensurate with their political
responsibilities. According to Article 119 of the Constitution, the
regions can have as much fiscal autonomy as the State desires. The
Regional Finance Act (Law n. 281 of 16 May 1970) supplements the
resources of a common regional fund, which is part of the State budget,
with regional taxes on public land and property, on rents on public
Property, on road traffic and on regional concessions, and with quotas
for the regions of the revenue raised in the regions from State taxes
on petroleum products, alcohol, sugar and tobacco. Since 1970, only
an average ,7 percent of regional revenues result from the regional
taxes and from the regional quotas on State taxes, while an average
83 percent result from the allocation of monies from the State's
common regional fund. Moreover, the regions have no authority to
regulate interregional commerce.
The regions have substituted the prefecture as the principal
mediator of the relationships established between the Italian State
and local institutions of government, its 8,086 communes organized
into 95 provinces. Prior to 1972, the local institutions were under
the control of the prefect, whose duty, as the State's principal
agent in each province, was to insure that the political behavior
of the local institutions of government might be consonant with the
political volition of the State. The legality of all communal deci-
sions and acts, the legality and merit of all local government con-
tracts, and the probity and regularity of communal operations were
subject to the prefect's scrutiny and sanction. Since 1972, the
supervision of the local institutions has largely become the compet-
ence of each region's Control Commission on the Acts of the Provinces
and the Communes. However, the prefect can still recommend the dis-
solution of communal or provincial administrations to the President




In any case, the autonomy of the local institutions r<
insignificant. The legislative autonomy of the communes and pro-
vinces is extremely limited, confined to some areas of record keeping,
road construction, environmental conservation, and public health,
assistance and protection. The fiscal autonomy of the communes is
equally limited, confined to the revenues provided by family and
excise taxes, and minor surtaxes; the fiscal autonomy of the pro-
vinces is non-existent, since the provinces are wholly dependent
upon the State Treasury.
The State supervises the regional institutions of government by
assigning to each region a Control Commission, composed of seven
members appointed by the President of the Republic upon the recom-
mendation of the President of the Council of Ministers (i.e., the
Prime Minister) and the Minister of the Interior. An ex officio
Government Commissioner, who resides in the regional capital, pre-
sides over the Commission, which must include a Tax Court judge,
and five professional administrators. The Regional Control Com-
missions were established in April 1972. The Government Commissioners
alone supervised the regions between June 1970 and April 1972.
The Control Commission reviews all regional legislative and
administrative acts, and can annul those which it judges outside
regional competence, or against the interests of the State or the
other regions. Regional acts not annulled within 20 days of their
presentation to the Control Commission go into effect, while those
annulled are returned to the Regional Council by the Government
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Commissioner. I£ an annuUed act u re_enacted ^ ^ absoiute
- the Regional Council, ana annulled again by the Control Commlsslon
the act is submitted to the Constitutional Court, „hich decldes qu_
tions of legality, or to the Parliament, which decides questlms q£
-It. Last, the President of the Republic can decree the dissolution
of a Regional Council under t-ho fnn •the following circumstances, specified in
Article 126 of the Constitution: if a Regional Council commits uncon-
stitutional acts or grave violations of the law; if . Regional Council
cannot perform its duties; or for reasons of national security.
The European Economic Community
The European Economic Community (EEC) is a non-sovereign intergov-
ernmental organization (IGO) founded upon the Treaty of Rome of 25
March 1957. The Treaty entered into effect on 1 January 1958 with
six adherents: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and West Germany. On 1 January 1973, Denmark, the United Kingdom
and Ireland joined the EEC, as did Greece on 1 January 1981, and as
did Portugal and Spain on 1 January 1986. Greenland, a Danish region,
seceded from the EEC on 1 February 1985.
The Treaty of Rome establishes political and economic relation-
ships of institutionalized market policy integration between the
adhering nation-states. According to Article 2, the EEC's objective
is to promote the continuous, balanced, and harmonious economic dev-
elopment of the member States, as well as their stability, closer
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relations and higher standards of Uving. According to Article 3
the EEC shall pursue its objective in eight ways: first, by elimin-
ating barriers to trade and t-n t ho vu
'
0 the ability of capital and labor,
between the member States; second, by establish^*' y caD -Lishmg common customs
tarrifs and a co»„ commercial policy toward non-EEC States; third,
by establishing common agricultural and transport policies; fourth,
by establishing an economic system which ensures equitable competition
within the EEC; fifth, by coordinating the economic policies of the
member States; sixth, by creating a European Social Fund to improve
the employment possibilities and the living standards of workers;
seventh, by creating a European Investment Bank to facilitate the
economic expansion of the EEC; and, last, by establishing trade agree-
ments with the non-EEC States to increase trade and promote social
and economic development.
The Institutions of the European Economic Community
The EEC has five political institutions: the European Council
of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors,
the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament.
2
The European Council of Ministers . The European Council of Ministers
is the EEC's most authoritative institution. The Council directs EEC
policies, in that, after having consulted the European Parliament,
the Council decides upon the legislative proposals received from the
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Commission. The Counr-M k„cil, by means of . qualified or . simple
vote, or a unanimous vote, takes five types of decisions: ^ ,
regulation, which is binding on all subjects o£ ^ ^ ^
EEC states, the EEC institutions and agencies, and ail legal
Persons under EEC Jurisdiction) as to ends and means; second, a dir-
ective, which is binding on all subjects of EEC law as to ends, but
is silent as to the means by which the ends must be achieved; third,
a decision, which is binding on those subjects of EEC law to whom it
is addressed; fourth, non-binding recordations; and, last, non-
binding opinions. According to the Luxembourg Comprise of 28/29
'
January 1966. the Council must take a decision by means of a unanimous
vote whenever a member State alleges that such a decision may affect
its vital interests. 3 The Council, which is not accountable juridically
to any other EEC institution, cannot initiate legislation. Each member
State is represented in the Council by the government minister, account-
able to his or her nation-state's Parliament, competent in the area
of negotiation. Moreover, each member State holds the Presidency of
the Council in turn for six months.
The European Commission. The European Commission is the EEC insti-
tution authorized to initiate legislation by formulating legislative
proposals which are submitted for decision to the Council. Besides
initiating legislation, the Commission oversees the application
of EEC law, and has the authority to enjoin transgressors to cease
their illegal activities and to explain their actions within a certain
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Period of ti*e, to assign penalties and corrective measures, and to
summon recalcitrant transgressors before the European Court of Justice.
The Commission consists of members chosen for renewable four-year
terras by the common agreement of all member States: the United King-
do,, France, Italy, Spain and West Germany each provide two members,
while the other member States each provide one. The emission members
are charged to act in the interest of the EEC, independent of the in-
terests of the member States and the Council of Ministers. The Com-
mission is accountable juridically to the European Parliament, which
can dissolve the Commission by voting a motion of censure, based on
at least two-thirds of an absolute majority.
The European Court of Auditors . The European Court of Auditors, created
by the Budgetary Treaty of 1975 in response to growing demands for
fiscal stringency, and operative since 25 October 1977, is the EEC
institution authorized to oversee the collection of the revenues, and
the expenditure of the monies of the EEC budget. The competence of
the Court of Auditors is limited to the external fiscal control of
the EEC budget, in that the competence for internal fiscal control
remains with the comptroller of each EEC institution and agency. The
Court of Auditors consists of nine judges, appointed for six-year
terms with total security of tenure.
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The European Cour t of Justice The v. European Court of Justice is the
EEC's adjudicative institution. Xt settles conclusive!,, and to the
exclusion ef the decisions taken by the tribunals of the Mber
States, the juridical questions posed hy the subjects of EEC lav,
«ith regard to the interpretation and application of the Treaty of
Ron,e and the Juridical acts pursuant to it, and enforces tbe penalties
assigned to transgressors by the Co^ission. The Court consists of
nine Judges chosen for six-year t«™ hy the co^on agreement of all"bM St3teS> Md £ °"r ^-ates-general »ho conduct Preliminary
judicial inquiries on its behalf.
The Europeaniadj«. The European Parliament is the EEC's ad-
visory institution, with respect to the formulation of legislation.
It issues opinions on the legislative proposals formulated by the
Commission and on the probable decisions to be taken by the Council.
These opinions are not binding legally on any subject of EEC law;
however, on the occasions specified in the Treaty of Rome, the opin-
ions must be considered by the Council before it may take a decision.
There are currently 518 members of Parliament, chosen, since
June 1979, for five-year terms by direct universal European suffrage,
and grouped, not according to their citizenship, but according to
their political party affiliation. The United Kingdom, France,
Italy and West Germany each have 81 seats, while Spain has 60, Belgium,
Greece and Portugal have 24, Denmark has 16, Ireland 15, Luxembourg 6,
and the Netherlands 25; this distribution is not proportionate to the
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population of the member States. Prior to the first pQpular
mentary elections, held from 7 to 10 dune 1979, the European Parlia-
ment counted 198 members, chosen as delegates by the Parliaments of
the member States. (A member State's delegation i-« m, *b to the European Par-
liament did not have to reflpr-1- .tlect, m terms of its distribution of seats
among the various political parties, the apportionment of the member
State's domestic parliamentary vote.) Moreover, the European Parlia-
ment has 18 standing committees, which deal with specific areas of
the EEC's activities.^
The European Parliament and the EEC Budget
The Budgetary Treaties of 1970 and 1975, signed by the member
States, give the Parliament substantive, though limited, control over
the expenditures and over the approval of the EEC budget. Before the
Treaties entered into effect, the Parliament could merely advise the
Commission and the Council in the formulation of the EEC budget.
Prior to 1975 the member States provided the EEC's budget revenue
according to agreed contributions fixed each year. However, the Bud-
getary Treaty of 1975 made the EEC self-sufficient financially by
establishing the EEC's own resources: customs duties, Common Agri-
cultural Policy levies and a portion (not to exceed one percent) of
the EEC's Value Added Tax (VAT).
The EEC budget has two categories of expenditure: compulsory
and non-compulsory. Compulsory expenditure refers to the expenditure
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which results directly and automatically fro, the Treaty of Rome;
it concerns international agreements, administrative expenses and the
organization of markets, and represents currently between 70 and 80
percent of the total EEC budget. Non-compulsory expenditure refers
to the expenditure which results from the additional decisions taken
by the institutions of the EEC; it represents currently between 20 and
30 percent of the total EEC budget. According to the two Budgetary
Treaties, the European Parliament, by means of a simple majority vote,
can modify compulsory expenditure in the first instance, but only with
the subsequent approval of the Council; however, by means of an absolute
majority vote, the Parliament can modify non-compulsory expenditure
without hindrance, save for a ceiling established by the Council
on increases in non-compulsory expenditure.
According to the Budgetary Treaty of 1975, which entered into
effect on 1 June 1977, the Parliament must ratify the EEC budget,
which is drafted by the Commission, and which must be adopted by the
Council by means of at least a qualified majority vote before being
sent to the Parliament. The Parliament can reject any budget submitted
to it by means of a two-thirds majority vote. The Parliament, the
Commission and the Council established jointly in 1975 a conciliation
procedure to facilitate the resolution of disputes.
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The European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the EEC's credit institu-
tion, prefigured by Article 3, letter j, of the Treaty of Rome, and,
according to Article 129, constituted by the EEC's member States, yet
endowed with a juridical identity distinct from that of the other EEC
institutions and agencies. 5 Operative since 1 January 1958, the EIB
has two objectives. One, according to Article 130, is to promote
the harmonious and balanced development of the EEC in three ways:
first, by contributing principally to the financing of regional devel-
opment, especially the development of the regions economically weakest;
second, by assisting the member States in the financing of the projects
necessary to the realization of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome,
and projects of interest to the EEC; and, last, by contributing to
the financing of the creation, the modernization and the reconversion
of econoimc enterprises. The EIB's other objective is to employ its
capital resources in investments whose suitability is determined not
by their profitability, but by their efficaciousness in realizing
the objectives of the Treaty of Rome and the EEC, provided such
investments may not jeopardize the EIB's credit worthiness by
threatening its solvency.
According to its Statute, a protocol which is an integral part
of the Treaty of Rome, the EIB must pursue its objectives by operating
according to normal banking criteria and by granting loans and secur-
ities. The EIB's capital resources derive from five sources. First,
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they derive fro, the contribution of capital underwritten by tbe
memb6r St3teS;
° f thlS S™' approxima tely ten percent is budgeted
as being on deposit or to be deposited. Second, tbey derive fro,
the EIB's own reserve funds, which much constitute, according to the
EIB's Statute, up to ten percent of the total underwritten capital
(unless the EIB's Administrative Council decides to create additional
reserves). Third, they derive from public bonds issued by the EIB
.
Fourth, since 1979, they derive from the New Community Instrument
(or Sportello Ortoli)
, which permits the EIB to raise funds on capi-
tal markets by granting long-term loans whose proceeds are reinvested
in EEC projects. Finally, as a last resort, they derive from unbud-
geted emergency contributions of capital underwritten by the member
States and payable totally, or in part, to the EIB on demand, as a
result of a simple majority vote of the EIB's Administrative Council,
according to Article 5 of the EIB's Statute. According to Article 18,
the total value of the EIB's loans and securities outstanding at any
given time must never exceed 250 percent of the EIB's total under-
written capital.
The EIB has twice changed the designation of its unit of account.
From 1 January 1958 to 21 April 1975, that is, from the day on which
the EIB became operative during the tenure of the Bretton Woods Inter-
national Monetary Regime (22 July 1944 - 15 August 1971) until the
end of the subsequent transition period of the international monetary
nonregime, the EIB designated the value in gold of the USA's dollar
as its unit of account. When the EEC introduced the European Unit of
Acc ount (EUA) on 21 April 1975, the EIB designated this unit as its unit
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of account. Following the creation of <-k 178 the European Monetary System, which
entered into effect on 13 March 1979 i- no vn iy/y
>
the European Currency Unit (ECU)
replaced the EUA as the EEC ' <? Imn ~*n h L s unit of account on 1 January 1981; on this
date, the EIB designated the ECU as its unit of account as well.
7
The EIB has four administrative organs. The Council of Governors,
composed of the Finance Ministers of the member States (save in the
case of Italy, represented by her Treasury Minister), sets the EIB ' s
general credit policy, approves the annual budget and report, and
nominates the members of the other administrative organs. The Presi-
dency of the Council is held for one administrative year by each
governor, according to the alphabetical order of the names of the
member States.
The Administrative Council, composed of 19 administrators and
11 substitutes, decides upon the financing and investment proposals
received from the Board of Directors, and insures that the EIB may
be administered in conformity with its Statute and the Treaty of
Rome. The United Kingdom, France, Italy and West Germany each
designate three administrators, while the Commission and the other
member States each designate one. Moreover, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy and West Germany each designate two substitutes, while
the Commission designates one; the two remaining substitutes are
designated by the common agreement of the other member States:
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands collectively designate one,
while Denmark, Greece and Ireland collectively designate the other.
The Administrators serve renewable five-year terms and are charged
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to act not in the interest of t-T, Dthelr nation-states, but in the interest
ol the EIB, to whom they are aooonntable.
The Board of Dirertnrcsectors, composed of a President and five Vice
Presidents, formubf-PQ m-,^ cjelates the f.nanoxng and investment proposals which
are submitted for decision m n,o ka • ,x x to the Admrnxstrative Council. The Board
members hold renewable six-year terms.
The Audit Committee, composed of three public auditors from the
member States, oversees the regularity of the EIB ' s financial records.
The EEC's Social Polirv
The EEC's Social Policy's goals are to proportion the supply of,
and the demand for, labor; to create conditions of full and better
employment; to improve the living and working conditions of the general
population, but especially of the indigent; and to promote the ever
greater^participation of workers in the operation of economic enter-
prises.
8
The Treaty of Rome provides the juridical bases for an EEC
Social Policy: The Preamble declares the constant improvement of the
living and working conditions of the peoples of the member States
to be an essential goal of the EEC. Article 2 assigns to the EEC the
task of establishing an ever more rapid improvement of the quality
of life. Article 3, letter i, prefigures, and Articles 123 through
127 establish, the European Social Fund to improve the employment
opportunities and the living standards of EEC workers. Article 39,
Paragraph 1, letter b, guarantees living standards for the agricultural
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Lrms
portion equal to those o£ urban popuiatiQn _ ^ ^ ^
a,d „ establish that workers My clrcuiate freeiy throughou£
HHC without sacrificlng cheir sQciai security rights ^
Articles ll7 and 118 encourag£ ^ ^ ^
of the WOrW uvin, ana „orking conditions by_ rf ^
zation of the member states' social polios. Article 119 afflj
the principle of equal remuneration for ma le and female workers.
Last, Article 128 establishes the principles of a ,Hi-xii(_xpxe r common policy
for vocational training.
The principal instrument of the EEC's Social Policy is the
European Social Fund (ESF)
, created to promote and facilitate the
retraining and relocation of EEC workers ousted from employment as
a consequence of the institutionalized market policy relationships
established between the EEC States by the Treaty of Rome. In its
original form (1 January 1958 - 1 February 1971), the ESF was a pas-
sive political instrument in that it was obliged, according to
Article 125, to reimburse retroactively and, in response to procedures
initiated by the member States or other competent public agencies,
alone authorized to utilize the ESF's resources, 50 percent of the
cost incurred in assisting the ousted workers. The ESF's passivity
advantaged the EEC's stronger economic areas in the competition
for the ESF's resources with the weaker economic areas, because the
former had greater available social resources and organizationally
superior social services. This situation provoked the reform of the
ESF.
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in 1971. the Council o £ „lnlsCers the ^ ^
<NESF) <Und" D—
" - « on . February 1971 . and
Che subsequent Programming Regulatlons^ ^ ^^^
on 8 November 1971). The NF<?r 18 an actlve Political instrument, in
that the Commission and the Council retain control over the NESF's
resources, available to competent public and private agencies, enter-
prises or individuals. The Commission and the Council promote the
participation of regional administrative governments in the decisions
which concern the nrnipcrc „p oje ts to assist ousted workers. The Commission,
which selects the projects to be financed, favors those presented by
the regions over those presented by other competent agencies or legal
individuals, while the Council must approve the projects chosen by
the Commission. The Council reformed the NESF with a series of regu-
lations adopted on 28 October 1977, and in effect since 1 January 1978,
aimed at an effective dispersal of the NESF's resources. Fifty percent
of the NESF's resources are reserved for projects to be financed at the
EEC's weaker economic areas. Moreover, these resources can cover 55
rather than 50 percent of the cost incurred in assisting ousted workers.
According to Italy's Law n. 736 of 1972, the regions must be consulted
with regard to NESF financed projects within their territories.
The EEC's Regional Policy
The EEC's Regional Policy, which constitutes both a policy in se,
and those aspects of the other EEC policies which affect the development
'»
1




,U ' (:i;! ' l ">.s taken by the KKC • , ,„.., ,, , ,a institutions and agencies may take
into account the interests^ the^ &£f^ ^ ^^
a- -chas possible^ may ellmInalo
, tho (llMt!quIllbrla amonn
regLons;
; ocoinl , ( , i
, "" regional and ,oeal , ,„-
'")•. <•! regional aim
ng
K:al ''^"'"PmenL projects by l rans I'er r I
resources from stronger to veaUer economic areas; and, last, to
Participate in the formation and implementation of the regional
|>c> I J<-
.1
c-« „| the KKC member States to ,„,,r,ll , ,i l c .4 , coo dinate these po] LcU-.j, and
1 " (,ri(, nl t llem t oward I he r,-, II i i ,- ,reallxatlon ol the KKC's established goals.
9
1 '"' T, ' ( ''" v "I Koine provide"! t he I ,,1 i ..i
'
luI 1<,wl "r. Juridical bases lor an KKC
Regional Policy: T.,e Preamble Mmm the „„™nious develop,,,,,
of the EEC States and the elimi„atlon of the di..qulllbll. nnlunR
the EEC's regions to be essentisl goals of the EEC. According to
Article. 2, the harmonious dove I .,,,„„ ,„ u | L ,,c continuous
''"I*'""' I 111.- HHC tw„ i,,. ,
<i Da I .nice
damental dut les. According
bO Article 39 (Paragraph 2, letter a), the KKC's Agricultural Policy
must taken into account the structural and natural disparities between
the various agricultural regions. According to Article 92 (Paragraph 3,
letter a), the EEC
,
when It promotes the development of regions with
abnormally low living standards or severe underemployment by provldln11
J'.
these regions with financial assistance, docs not compromise the
Treaty's prohibition of unfair competition, expressed in Article 92.
hast, according to Article 117, the KKC member States agree to equal!
I lif i r progress .
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The EEC's Regional Policy showeQ no signlflcant ^
the 1970s, beeause, the EEC's practical poUtlcal ^ ^ ^
eqUlUbrla MOng r— — though the European
Parliament's Motte Report o£ 1960 may have addressed ^ ^ ^ ^
gional prohlems and a global regional pollcy> nQ
follow. Only Cwo EEC initiatives affected specifics^ and purpuse-
fully some of the Mezzogiorno's regions. Eirst, in 1960 , the then 3ix
member States signed the Protocol for Italic 5, 1 vr lian Sulphur, which granted
to this product, mined in Sicilia, special tariff protection. This
Protocol also provided financial and social assistance, through the
E1B, and according to the norms of the ESF, to workers ousted from
employment in the sulphur mines because of the industry's reorganiza-
tion provoked by the establishment of the EEC. Second, in 1961, the
Conference on Regional Economies, organized by the Commission, ini-
tiated a study of investment strategies which resulted, after various
consultations between the EEC and Italian authorities, in the decision
to localize the greater part of the EEC's investment funds in industrial
development poles within Puglia's Bari-Brindisi-Taranto triangle, and
in a tourist development pole in Calabria. The Commission's First
Report on Regional Policy (1966), like the Motte Report, engendered
no practical developments.
The disequilibria among the regions began to assume indirect
political importance in the early 1970s, not as problems in se to be
solved, but as obstacles to the realization of other policy goals.
The Resolution adopted by the Council on 22 March 1971, for example,
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declared the elimination of re 2 ional = • .g economic imbalances to be among
the highest priorities in the EEC's plan, which proved unrealizable
to establish a complete economic and monetary union in phases between
1
January 1971 and l980 . Subsequently, on 20 October 1 971> the Coun_
cil adopted a resolution which established financial aid for regional
development, and limited the amount of aid available to the EEC's
central areas.
The Paris Summit of 19-21 October 1972 proved the precursor of
the EEC's current Regional Policy. m their final Communique, the
Heads of State and Government entrusted to the Commission the task
of elaborating a study of regional problems in the EEC, and to the
EEC's institutions the task of creating a regional development fund,
still as mere tools to facilitat-P tho » r>id iitate e EEC s economic and monetary union,
Although this Communique may not have embraced the disequilibria
among the regions as problems in se to be solved, the resultant study
and fund provoked unexpected developments.
The Commission's Report on Regional Problems of the Enlarged Com-
munity of 3 May 1973, known also as the Thomson Report, marked the
emergence, within the EEC, of a conceptualization of the disequilibria
among the regions as a concern distinct and separate from others.
The Thomson Report produced the following results: first, despite
the EEC's average growth rate of A. 5 percent during the 1960s, the
gap between the economically stronger and weaker regions remained
unchanged or widened; second, the enlargement of the EEC in 1973




incomes between the richer „ij.Lne and poorer rpcn'nnD uegio s, because of Ireland's
very low pro-capite income : third tha
.
, the regions affected most adversely
by Che disequilibria st-o t-v,~J"tlD x are the geographically perinheral „ •y irpn regions which
are predominantly agricultural ~ug cultu , characterized by structural under-
employment, and the regions with industrial sectors in decline, char-
acterized hy chronic unemployment; and, last, emigration is a ser
Problem for the regions affected most adversely by the disequl libr
The Fifth Section of the Thomson Report presented the guidelines fo
an EEC Regional Policy by synthesizing many unlmplemented proposals
formulated earlier: the complementarity of the EEC's investments,
the coordination of the member States' regional policies, the creation
of a European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) , the concentration of
financial assistance in the weaker economic areas, the establishment
of coherent investment criteria an H t-k~, d the appropriation of resources
sufficient to the realization of objectives.
On 25 July 1973, the Commission submitted for approval to the
Council three proposals based on the Thomson Report and its guidelines
a decision to create a Regional Policy Committee, the regulations to
establish a European Regional Development Fund, and the regulations
to finance regional development projects. No decision was taken, how-
ever, until the Paris Summit of the Heads of State and Government of
9 and 10 December 1974, when the Council created the ERDF, decided
to make it operative from 1 January 1975, and agreed upon the allot-
ment of its initial appropriation. On 4 March 1975, the Council
created at Brusseles the Regional Policy Committee, a consultative
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body „hich recelves the developmenc projects eiaborat£d ^
by the regio„s through their central goverMents> chQoses
to be financed, and coordinates their iwiS tlei lmPlementation with the ERDF
and the various member States Final is . ly, on 18 March 1975, the Coun-
cil approved Regulation n. 724, which establishes formally the ERDF
and Regulation n. 725, which establishes its initial financing.
With the Ministerial Decree of 25 July 1976 vhi uj i iy/ , w ch repeats Law n. 748
of 26 November 1975. thp Tt-aH^
' "alxan government instituted formally the
ERDF in Italy.
The ERDF is the EEC's principal instrument of regional policy,
whose objectives are to induce the creation of new positions of employ-
ment, and to maintain existing positions, by financing regional devel-
opment projects. in its original form (18 March 1975 - 6 February 1979),
the ERDF was a passive political instrument in that it could only sup-
plement the regional development initiatives already assisted financially
by the member States concerned, by disbursing its resources, not to
the various regions, but to the member States, according to the fol-
lowing quotas: Italy 40 percent, the United Kingdom 28 percent,
France 15 percent, West Germany 6.4 percent, Ireland 6 percent,
the Netherlands 1.7 percent, Belgium 1.5 percent, Denmark 1.3 per-
cent and Luxembourg 0.1 percent.
Under Regulation 214 of 6 February 1979, the Council of Mini-
sters made the ERDF a more active political instrument by creating
a "non-quota" section, whose resources, limited in 1980 to five per-
cent of the ERDF 1 s total appropriation, are not supplements to the
remain at
EEC's
regional development initiatives of th»V e member States but
the disposal of the EEC> ^ diabursed ^^ ^ —
regional development inlUatlves ^ MnjuncUon with _ ^
fr-. the initlatives o£ the member states> (slmuitaneousiyj
Council of „lnisters modified ^^
quotas: Ualy 39.39 percent, the United Kingdom 27 . 03 percent
^ence 16.86 percent, West Cermeny 6., percent, irelend 6 percent
the Netherlands ,.5 percent, Belgium ,.39 percent, Denmarx 1.2 per-
cent, and Luxembourg 0.09 percent.) The ERDF's "quota " section
"hich supplements the regional development initiatives o f the member
States, finances two types of investments: industrial and se„lce
investments, by covering 20 to 50 percent of the cost incurred by
the member States; and infraatrnctoral investments, by covering 30
to 40 percent of the cost incurred by the member States. Regulation
n. 214 also assigns the financing of the ERDF to the EEC's budget.
Another example of the growing awareness of the EEC's institu-
tions, with regard to the disequilibrie among the regions, is the
Delmotte Report (n. 35 of 1977), which indicates the four criteria
adopted by the EEC to determine conditions of underdevelopment in
Europe. According to the Report, an area is underdeveloped if any
one condition prevails: when the percentage of Its active population
employed in agriculture is above the EEC average, and the percentage
of its active population employed in industry is below the EEC average
when 20 or more percent of its active population is employed in an
industrial sector in decline, and when two or more percent of its
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3CtiVe P°PUlatl0n
"— = *- -- . a prolonged
Period of emlgratlon; or when the area , s unMpioyment ^ ^ ^ ^
more percent above its nation 'os average, and is equal to at least
3.5 percent, together with a net loss of ten percent of the area's
population due to a prolonged period of emigration. 10
The Common Agricultural Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), prefigured by Article 3
(letter d) and based on Articles 38 through 47 of the Treaty of Rome
,
establishes a uniform price for ffp * •t EEC agricultural products throughout
the EEC, eliminates intra-EEC tariffs, and erects price barriers to
protect EEC agricultural products from imports of lower cost.
11
It
covers cereals, Pork , beef and veal, eggs and poultry, milk and milk
products, sugar, and fruit and vegetables. According to Article 39
(Paragraph 1) the CAP has five objectives: first, to increase pro-
ductivity by means of technological innovation and an ever more rational
use of the means of production, especially labor; second, to insure
to the agricultural population living standards equal to those of the
non-agricultural population, especially by means of increased indi-
vidual incomes; third, to stabilize agricultural markets; fourth, to
guarantee regular and ample food supplies; and, last, to insure to
consumers reasonable prices for agricultural products.
On 30 June 1960, the Commission submitted to the Council the
two original proposals for the creation of the CAP; one, to create
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a fund t0 sustain the prices in agricultural Mrkets; ^^ ^
create a fund to improve agriculture! productive structures. On ,
Aptil 1962, the Councii adopted Regulation n. 25 , which creates ^
European Agricultural Guarantee and Cuidance Fund, knoTO by its French
acronym F EOGA
,
and which establishes this fund as an integral part
of the EEC hudget. On 5 Pehruary 1 964> the Councll adopted
n. 17, which formally divides FEOGA into the Guarantee Section, whose
funds sustain prices in agricultural .arkets, and the Guidance Section
whose funds are utilized to improve productive structures.
For reasons examined later, the TAP'q fm A Bi^i
,
n L r s funds are employed more to
sustain prices than to induce increases in the productivity of pro-
ducers or to equalize productivity throughout the EEC. Between 1965
and 1974, the Guarantee Section received approximately 90 percent
of FEOGA'
s
total appropriation as a consequence of the limitations
on the allotments to the Guidance Section placed by the Council of
Ministers in 1967, 1970 (Regulation n. 729 of 21 April 1970) and
1973. Such a policy stimulates production with no regard for the
market's ability to absorb the agricultural product, inhibits uni-
form increases in productivity to the disadvantage of the less com-
petitive producers, inhibits the minimization of production costs
by orienting the price support system toward the more expensive
products of the least competitive producers, holds down the real
income of the least competitive producers, and encourages excessive
production by the most competitive producers. In short, the CAP
results in unnecessarily high costs (in purely economic terms) for
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agricultural products- for- m,j, r thxs reason, the CAP's price supports are
an increasingly heavy financial burden for the EEC.
The Question of Agricjultura^^
The European emission began to concern itself formally with the
question of agricultural modernization in the EEC when, on 18 December
1968, Dr. Sicco Mansholt, then Vice President of the Commission in
charge of the CAP, issued a series of six memoranda, hnown collectively
as the Mansholt Plan, which urged a thorough modernization and ration-
alization of the EEC's agricultural system. The Mansholt Plan recom-
mended: an appreciable reduction in the number of persons employed
in agriculture; incentives and social assistance to encourage older
farmers to retire and the young to take up non-agricultural occupations;
the consolidation, where feasible, of farms too small to be competi-
tive; a considerable reduction of the area of cultivated land; and a
1 cautious price support system.
On 17 March 1972, the Commission submitted to the Council pro-
posals based on the Mansholt Plan. On 7 April 1972, the Council
adopted three directives which concern the modernization of agricul-
ture (but refused to adopt specific regulations): Directive n. 159
concerns those farms which can be modernized, by consolidating them
with other small farms to make them competitive; Directive n. 160
concerns the incentives and social assistance needed to encourage
older farmers to retire and the young to take up non-agricultural
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0CCUPatl0nS; ^d DlreCtiVe - 161— socio-economic guidance
and assistance to improve the occupationai^ ^^ ^^
employed in agriculture. As has been said rt*S
'
the ma™er of implementa-
tion of directives is left to rh* a •t e discretxon of the member States.
FEOGA's Guidance Section reimburses 25 percent of th.e cost incurred
by the memb er su.es in the lmplementatlon Qf thfise directives
_
in the case of aid glven t0 £armers ln dlsadvantaged
zones (seen as the interna! areas of the Mez.ogiorno)
, when FEOGA's
Guidance Section covers 65 percent of rh* „ •t e cost incurred by the member
States. Under Law n. 153 of 9 iq7>; Tj- ^r y May 1975, Italy established the norms
for the implementation of the three directives of 7 April 1972.
The CAP's incentives and social assistance which induce the
cessation of agricultural employment affect most profoundly the EEC's
least productive areas, in which unproductive agriculture is the pre-
dominant form of employment and producer of wealth, in which agri-
culture is not easily modernized, and in which alternative forms of
employment are not readily established, due to the political organi-
zation of the means of production induced by the Treaty of Rome. Such
areas are the mountainous and disadvantaged agricultural areas (for
example, the internal areas of the Mezzogiorno) , which comprise 25
percent of the EEC's utilized agricultural land, contain 15 percent
of the EEC's farms, and produce 12 percent of the EEC's agricultural
product. In these areas, the cessation of agricultural employment
does not result in the creation of other forms of economic activity,
but in mass depopulation and in social disintegration. On 25 May 1975,
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«- -ncu 0£ Mlnlsters adopted Dlrectiv£ ^ 268> uwch^
t-« the mass depopuUtlon Md dlsintegration prQvoted i
the mountainous and disadvantaged agricultural§ areas by the three
directives of 7 April 1Q79 k„x 1972 by provxding income supplements paid dir-
ectly to the farmers living -inl these areas. Under Law n. 352 of 10




The EEC's agricultural products most disadvantaged commercially
are the citrus and non-citrus fruits (apples excluded), the flowers,
the hard grains, the olive oil, the ovine products, the rice, the
tobacco, the vegetables and the wines produced in the EEC's Mediter-
ranean areas, such as the Mezzogiorno
.
12
These products are most
disadvantaged commercially because the EEC's Mediterranean areas are
among its most mountainous, disadvantaged, and, therefore least pro-
ductive (save certain areas, generally coastal, of intensive capital-
istic farming)
;
because the markets for the exclusively Mediterranean
agricultural products (the citrus fruits and the local wines) are
weak and are organized with difficulty; and because the CAP, for
reasons examined later, offers little protection to the producers of
the exclusively Mediterranean agricultural products from the competi-
tion of non-EEC States.
The First Citrus Fruit Plan of the EEC, established by Regulation
n. 2511 of 9 December 1969, proposed to modernize the system of citrus
)se varieties
fruit production by 31 December 1976 bv *n • •iy/o y eliminating tho<
of citrus fruits which attract littlp Ae demand, or are too costly to
process with respect to the varieties nut- „ ^p t on the market by non-EEC
countries; by improving the most viable exist.™ • •6 listing varieties; and by
establishing, improving, and enlarging the WmS-Ln cu handling, processing and
storage facilities for citrus fruits. Accordlng t0 the^ ^
States concerned, Italy and France, would cover the total cost in-
curred by their facers to convert their citrus fruit production,
the FEOGA Guidance Section would reverse to these States 50 per-
cent of this cost. The Council had directed the States concerned to
submit for approval to the Commission by 1 Jnly 1970 national pro-
graming regulations, so that these member States might begin to
implement the Plan. However, the Flan's restrictive criteria for
the disbursement of supplementary aid for farmers discouraged the
adoption of the necessary programming regulations by the set date.
Italian and French programming regulations were approved by the Com-
mission on 1 February and 16 February 1973 respectively. Moreover,
in Italy's case, the appropriations provided by Italy's Law n. 317
of 6 June 1974, adopted to finance the EEC Citrus Fruit Plan and
the corresponding national programming regulations, were disbursed
only slowly and partially. The First Citrus Fruit Plan was never
fully realized.
With a Resolution adopted on 9 February 1971, and published in
the Official Journal of the European Communities on 1 March 1971
(n. C19, pp. 15-16), the European Parliament urged the then six membe
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States to develop a coherent plan t-n -iP o improve the organization of the
production and the distribution of the EFr ' • m a ,EC s Medxterranean agricul-
tural products. However nn, o actxon was taken until 1978 when the
Council adopted the Mediterranean Packet, a series of .> e» measures which
sustain the prices anH ttV,-i„i,. whlch glven incentives £or the moderni2ac . on
of the produce structures of Mediterranean agricuitural products
The purpose was to maRe these products competitive ^ ^
ducts from non-EEC States.
Under Regulation „. 1204 of 18 May 1982, which amends RegulatlQn
n. 25H of 9 December 1969, the Council established the Second^
Fruit Plan of the EEC. The Second Plan proposes to modernize the
system of citrus fruit production in the EEC by 31 December 1988.
It would implement not only the norms of the First Plan, but would
eliminate existing piantations of unpopular varieties of citrus
fruits and would replace them with new plantations of popular var-
ieties, provided the new ones might not increase the total area used
to cultivate citrus fruits. It would also improve soil preparation,
irrigation and drainage. Moreover, it establishes more liberal cri-
teria for the disbursement of supplementary aid for farmers. The
Council had directed that the States concerned, Italy, France and
Greece, submit for approval to the Commission by 31 April 1983 nat-
ional programming regulations, so that these States might begin to
implement the Second Plan. To date, no programming regulations have
been submitted.
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The Protocol concerning It-ni-<7 ca-taly, signed together with the Treaty
of Rome by the six original EEC States affirm, n,Ldi.es, t t nns the economic devel-
opment of the Mezzogiorno to be . Mncern Mt oniy ^ uaiy
_
of the EEC as well. The Protocol ^ &
sanctions Italy . s plan to develop ^ fcy^ ^ ^
nomic expansion. « affirms , the right o£ the ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
promote the Mezzogiorno's development, it also contains a clause
which allows Italy to apply elastically the norms of the Treaty of
Rome, in order to preclude the development of dangerous tensions in
the Italian economy and in order to further the Mezzogiorno's economic
expansion. Paragraph Five bids the EEC's institutions to recognize
the particular strain placed on the Italian economy by Italy's par-
ticipation in the EEC, and by its plan to develop the Mezzogiorno by
means of economic expansion. The Protocol also alludes to Article
226 of the Treaty which authorizes the States to request extraordinary
dispensations to rectify serious regional economic problems provoked
by the EEC's establishment.
The EEC and the Italian Parliament
The juridical relationships established by the Treaty of Rome
between the EEC's political institutions and those of the member
States result in the substantive reduction of the legislative authority
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of th. member stated ,nlimmtt in torelgn poUcy> ,grleuUatm]
policy. th. regulation of ,C0B0Blc 6onpwltleni po(icyi suciai
Policy, Ubor p„licy , ,nd uhon th. Budgit<ry ,rruity ^ i975 ^
KKC """-""lllclcn, financially, t |,c KUC blld,0 ,
1
,.,"""J." 1 • I 111! member III al '
Parliament can neither Eormulate „„^ ^^
the European Court of Justice ku held that EEC norma enter into
effect lm.dUt.iy upon adoption by the Council of Ministers and
require no subsequent ratification by the member St.t... Aa has
been said, the EEC States express their binding political will, in
EEC affairs, through the Council composed not of supranational EEC
agents, but of government ministers accountable only to their national
Parliaments, for this reason, the Parliaments can attempt to influence
the elaboration of EEC norms only by directing the political behavior
"I their ministers.
The orgam created by the Italian Parliament to direct the be-
havior of Its ministers In EEC affairs lack substantive authority In
that they are merely advisory. In L965. the PnrUamu.it ' I lower house,
the Chamber of Deputies, created an Advisory Committee lor KKC Affairs,
to which the Govamment must submit a yearly report on Its KKC ac-
tivities; the Parliament's upper house, the Senate, created an Advisory
Ciunta for KKC AITairs In 1968. Kven the reformed parliamentary
rules, pub I I shed as Kesolullon n. V! In the Ca/./.etta Ufl.icl.ale ol
1 March 1971, establish that these organs can hold only anticipatory
debates with regard to EEC questions, and cannot issue resolutions to
d i roc I mi ii i :;l ei s i n EEC al I a I rs .
le
The Italian Parliament has been the FFrEEC member State Parliament
most lax in directing its ministers in EEC aff ,m airs and Italy has been
the EEC State most negligent in wi ic-Lige implementing EEC norms. 15 Italy's
Constitutional fnnrt- u,, u j.Court, by handing down Sentence n. 183 of 1973 and
Sentence n. 232 of 197S itt,j i1975, which reject the Italian Parliament's con-
tention that it may have the author! „ tity to reject or modify EEC norms,
sanctioned parliamentary controi over government ministers as th,
only valid method hy which the Parliament can participate in the
elaboration of EEC norms. Nonetheless, the Parliament has yet to
formulate and implement „ policy of polltlcalm over
ministers in EEC affairs. Por this reason, Italy's regions do not
consider the Parliament to be a valid mediator of regional interests
in EEC affairs. They prefer the establishment of a Regional Advisory
Co^ittee for EEC Affairs, not under the Parliament, but under the
Office of the Prime Minister.
Under Law n. 863 of 3 October 1977, the Parliament agreed to
modify budgetary expenditure at any time with appropriate legislation
in order to ensure the adequate financing of EEC norms whose appli-
cation might otherwise create a deficit in the budget of the State.
For instance, the Decree of 17 April 1983 harmonizes the fiscal
regulations which concern the importation into Italy of whiskey and
non-Italian sparkling wines with those which concern the exportation
from Italy of its own beverages with high alcoholic content and
sparkling wines. Currently, the Italian Parliament is studying
a legislative proposal which, if adopted, would enter automatically
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all juridically binding decisions taken by the EEC's Co -1 .cu s uncil of Mini-
sters into the body of Italian l a„law, and would put these decisions
into effect immediately. 16
Ii2g_jCassa_pe r_ il Mezzogiorno
The Cases per il Mezzogiorno (CASMEZ) , or Southern Development
Fund, created by the Italian government under Law „. 646 of 10
August 1950 initially for a period of ten years bur „. ,u ^ , t prolonged
subsequently with legislation passed in 1959, 1965 and 1980, is a
financially and administratively autonomous agency whose function is
not to supplant the ordinary administration of the Mezzogiorno, but
to address the problems of economic development by formulating and
implementing large-scale, extraordinary public works projects.
17
Since
its inception, the CASMEZ has carried out its activities in two phases,
in Phase I (10 August 1950-6 October 1971), the CASMEZ , supervised
by the Committee of Ministers for the Mezzogiorno (which included the
Ministers of Agriculture, Forestry, Industry and Commerce, Public
Works, Labor and Social Welfare, Transport and the Treasury), util-
ized its funds autonomously to formulate and implement multi-sectoral
public works projects. Phase I, characterized by an ever less dis-
persive and ever more selective use of resources, and by a progressive
shift away from agricultural investments toward industrial investments,
contained three sub-phases. In the first, from 1950 to 1957, the
CAZMEZ utilized its funds to develop the Mezzogiorno's infrastructure
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and system of aeripnlt-,,v«i
i». the enactment of £he ^^^^^ ^ ^
°f 29 July ,957, which established Industrial „„ •moo na zones In the Mezzo-
giorno) and the Vanonl Plan (Italy's first f.r s t ten-year national devel-
C
° indUSt— e -zzogiorno. In the third, f rom 1965 t0 „„
f0ll0Wfa8
" " - '» - » *- 19« and the adoption
of a new National Development Program in t-Wx hat year, the CASMEZ utilized
its funds still more selective, v w-n-i,^icLc iy ith respect to the n^Qf an ALn past and promoted
the development of laree-qr^l^ u a *g sca e heavy industry, capital-intensive agri-
culture, and the modernization of infrastructure.
The CASMEZ's activities entered into Phase U when the italian
Parliament enacted Law n. 853 of 6 October 1971. This law, which
Provided the CASMEZ's funds for the 1971-1975 period, and which holds
the development of the Mezzogiorno to be Italy's primary concern in
economic planning, harmonizes the CASMEZ's function with the function
of the ordinary regional governments, by making the CASMEZ a planning
and advisory agency for the formulation and implementation of regional
and interregional "special projects" in well-defined areas of industrial,
agricultural, infrastructural and tourist development. In November
1971, the Italian government dissolved the Committee of Ministers for
the Mezzogiorno and transferred its duties to the Interministerial
Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) , which had been created in
1969 to replace the National Committee for Economic Planning (CNPE)
,
formed in 1962. The CIPE, assisted by a committee of regional
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presidents, must approve £he^ ^ ^^
and presented by the Mlnlster f„ Extraordinary Intervention ^ ^
Mezzogiorno. Moreover, Law n. 183 of 2 Mav 1976 v.- uoa r z n y 1976, which provided the
CASMEZ 'a foods for the 1976-1980 period, details its responsibiiities
in the formulation and implementation of the "special projects," and
institutionalizes the coordination of panning between the CIPE, the
CASMEZ and the regional governors. On 2 Aogust 1984, the Italian
Parliament put the CASMEZ into liquidation. 18 The event ostensibly
marks the beginning of a period of transformation in which the Italian
government will presumably reconsider the ways in which the State inter-
venes in the Mezzogiorno ("See rh^nt-oT- * u j.Ue L aPter 5, heading: THE CASMEZ "Trans-
formed") .
Summary
Two sets of juridical relationships affect the Mezzogiorno in
the context of Italy's participation in the EEC: first, the juridical
relationships between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy; and,
second, the juridical relationships between Italy and the EEC. As
to the first set of relationships, Italy's Republican Constitution of
1948 affirms the concept of regional political autonomy by recognizing
explicitly the existence of subnational administrative regions and by
affirming the concept of regional legislative autonomy. The subnational
administrative regions which are part of the Mezzogiorno are the juri-
dical nexus between it and the rest of Italy (besides the fact that the
Mezzogiorno is soverp-icm Tf-o-i-u re gn Italian territory t^i tCOry)
- Italy's Constitution
limits juridically the political * -autonomy of its regions by denying
them the authority to reeulat-P !„+.gulate interregional commerce and by granting
them only as much fiscal autonomy and, therefore o ly "a n i , n y as much economic
aUth°rltJ ^ SCaC£ d—
•
— th. State affirms Juridically
it, Particular role ln the Mezzogiomo's eConomic development fcy
instruments of extraordinary intervention tor the area such as the CASMKZ
designed to formate and to implement special pub l ic works proJects .
As to the second set of relationships, the Treaty of Rome of
25 March 1957 declares the continuous, balanced and harmonious economic
develops of the EEC States to be the EEC's goal and affirm that it
will attempt to realize this goal by establishing political and economic
relationships of institutionalized market policy integration among the
member States. This institutionalized market policy integration has
two fundamental elements: first, the greater mobility of capital, labor
and commerce among the EEC States; and, second, common customs tariffs
and a common commercial policy toward non-EEC States. Under the Treaty
of Rome, the authority of the EEC's institutions in many cases super-
sedes the legislative authority of the member States' Parliaments
with regard to foreign policy, agricultural policy, the regulation of
economic competition, fiscal policy, social policy, labor policy and
the EEC budget. Moreover, the Protocol concerning Italy affirms the
Mezzogiorno's economic development to be the EEC's concern.
It remains to be seen whether the means (e.g., regional legisla-
tive autonomy, instruments of extraordinary economic intervention,
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institutionalized market policy inteerflM™Y l e 8ra tion, a protocol to a treaty)
and the professed goals (e.g., regional polltiGal autonomy> b^
and harmonious economic development, o£ the politics! actors under
study correspond effectively in reality. To this end, it is necessary
to place the Juridical relationships established between these political
actors against the historical record by examining the political and
economic relationships established between the, in the context of the
distribution of power amone rhp™V <*r g t em. Such an examination will show if the
means, in the historical context in which they are adopted, lead to the
political actors' professed goals and, indeed, if these goals are their
true goals.
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CHAPTER m
THE MEZZOGIORNO FROM ITS ORIGIN
TO THE POST-1945 PERIOD
The essence of the Kingdom of Italy, proclaimed fo_Uy by ^
first Italian Parliament on 18 February 1861, marked the emergence of
the modern Italian Sf^P At-tate. At rts inception, the Kingdom of Italy
(18 February ,861 - 2 June l9w) expressed ^ integration ^ ^^
tical authority of the following sovereign politieal aetors : the Kingdo
of Sardinia (1720-1861), the Kingdom of the TVo Sicilies (.102-1860),
the Grand Duchy of Toscana (1567-1860), the Duchy of Modena (1452-
1860), and the Duchy of Parma (1545-1860). Lombardia, then part of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire (1699-191 fu *.K oyy and the territory of the Papal
States (756-1870), save Rome and Lazio, were also part of the Kingdom
of Italy at its inception. In 1866, following France's victory over •
Austria, the Kingdom of Italy annexed the Veneto from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. On 20 September 1870, when Italian (that is, "Pied-
montese") troops entered Rome by breaching Porta Pia, the Papacy, whose
temporal power in Italy at that time depended upon the support of France
surrendered Rome and Lazio to the Kingdom of Italy; the Papal States
ceased to exist. Finally, in 1918, following World War I, the Kingdom
of Italy completed the country's political unification by acquiring
from the defeated, and subsequently dismembered, Austro-Hungarian
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Empire Trentino-Alto Adiee pw,.n nxg , Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Istria. The
latter was acquired by Yugoslavia following World War II.
1
The Kingdom of Italy, by assuming sovereignty ^^^
tories, political!^ reorganized their means of production. Prior to
the unification of I ta ly , the above_cited ^ ^ ^
authority to affect the political organization of the means of production
of the territories which became part of the Kingdom of Italy by erecting
or eliminating tariff or other barriers to trade with other territories,
by controlling the movement of capital in their territories, by deter-
mining the size of the money supply in their territories, and by exer-
cising independent fiscal policies in their territories. 2 The political
unification of Italy made the State the single political locus where such
decisions might be taken most authoritatively to affect the political
organization of the means of production on Italian territory.
In reality, the Kingdom of Italy was the product of a particular
process of unbalanced integration dominated politically by the Kingdom
of Sardinia, whose initiatives to unify Italy were favored by the inter-
national balance of power during the second half of the nineteenth
century. The Kingdom of Sardinia's political predominance in the uni-
fication of the country gave to the Kingdom of Sardinia's ruling class,
an emergent autochthonous bourgeoisie, control of the State apparatus,
in fact an extension of the Kingdom of Sardinia's administrative and
fiscal systems to the rest of Italian territory. The Kingdom of
Sardinia's ruling class used its control of the State apparatus to
consolidate its political predominance in two ways: first, by coopting
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the rival ruling classes absotW tato the new state> chfi ^
whon Was the Kingdom of the ^ Sicllles , autochthQnous bourgeoisie> md
ail other social groups which might contend f„ an .ctu equal or dominant
measure of the control of the State apparatus; and, second, by estah-
"
Ushlng alliances with social groups uh ich accepted subordinate position,
of political tutelage. 3
One Economy, Thrge Economic Svsi-p^
The Kingdom of Sardinia's political predominance in the unification
of Italy did not reflect a commensurate economic stature with respect
to the economies of the actors absorbed into the new State. In 1861,
the Kingdom's economy was not developed enough to occupy the rest of
Italian territory by means of simple economic expansion. Moreover,
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies' economy was as developed structurally,
if not as developed productively, as the Kingdom of Sardinia's. 4
The Kingdom of Sardinia's ruling class used its control of the
State apparatus to establish its predominance in the Italian economy
by politically reorganizing the means of production on Italian ter-
ritory, and by employing the real income produced by the economy to
its own advantage and benefit. This political reorganization of the
country's means of production created the three distinct economic
systems which comprise the Italian economy
5
and determined the function
of each one. In short, the Kingdom of Sardinia determined Italy's
political order and economic structure.
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The economic svstpm nf ru„ ^,ybce ot the northwest occuDipq fil i/a.p es b 1,746 square kilo-
meters, or about 20.5 percent nf to Italian territory, within the juris-
diction of four subnational administrative regions- M .. Liguria, Lombardia,
Piemonte and Valle d'Anqt^ Bv- •os a. Prior to the unificatlon of Italy
_
»eans of production 0f thls terrltory „ere under the jurlsdictlon o£
the Kingdom of Sardinia, save Lombardlaj ^ under Jurlsdiction
of the Austro-Hungarian Emplre . The Klngdom Qf sardinia , s autochthonous
bourgeoisie, once the Kingdom of Sardinia's rulin, r lud g class, now became
the Italian bourgeoisie's politically dominant component, that is, the
bourgeoisie of the economic system of the northwest. The highest
expression of this bourgeoisie t-ho i n A - • i, he industrial and financial leader-
ship became Italy's northwe^, Prn 0n fy n ste elite, a ruling class which identifies
its interests territorially with the economic system of the northwest.
For this reason, the economic system of the northwest became the center
of the Italian economy, that is, the system which conditions preponder-
antly the development of the other systems by determining preponderantly
the political organization of their means of production. Moreover, this
system sustains not only small and medium enterprises, but the greater
part of Italy's large enterprises as well, because its centrality
allows it to create within itself the conditions for greatest development
The economic system of the northwest experiences positive, balanced
development
.
The economic system of the center/northeast occupies 111,444
square kilometers, or about 37 percent of Italian territory, within
the jurisdiction of eight subnational administrative regions: Emilia
Romagna, Friuli-Venezia tGxulxa, Lazxo (the northern two-thirds), Marche,
Toscana, Trentino-Alto Adi ge DmhH a j, U brx and Veneto. Prior to the unifica_
tion of Italy, the means of production of this territo.vmi ry were under the
Jurisdiction of the Austro-Hungarian Enplre
, thfi papal states> GrMd
Ouchy of Toscana, the Duchv o£ Modena and ^^ q£^ ^ ^"1C SyStSm
°f =-^«/-«heast became the scienter of the
Italian economy , that ls , the system „hlch ^
small and medium enterprises which serve as the externa! economies o£
the large enterprises of the economic systen, of the northwest, together
with some large enterprises of its own T-IV 0 -t,S 0
*
Llke the economic system of the
northwest, it experiences balanced development.
The Mezzogiorno is the economic system of southern Italy, and occu-
pies 128,010 square kilometers, or about 42.5 percent of Italian terri-
tory within the jurisdiction of nine subnational administrative regions.
Eight of the nine regions are wholly within the Mezzogiorno: Abruzzo,
Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicilia.
Only the southern third of the remaining region, Lazio, is part of the
Mezzogiorno. Prior to the unification of Italy, approximately 77 percent
of the Mezzogiorno «s territory comprised the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,
whose economy was the largest and wealthiest incorporated into the new
national economy. The island of Sardinia (Sardegna) belonged to the
Kingdom of Sardinia and Lazio belonged to the Papal States. The
Mezzogiorno became the periphery of the Italian economy. It is the
system whose means of production are politically organized in nearly
total dependence of external exigencies, which change over time.
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The Me2Zoglor„o has provided the more central)
system „lth a market ,« thelr manufactured goods> ^ outiet
their surplus investment capital and tHt*P
'
Wl h capital, cheap labor and
cheap agricultural products 6 iinrlQ . i. .P a . Under such circumstances, the MeZZ0 -
giorno cannot and does nnt- rl^^iot develop in a positive, balanced way but
instead underdevelops
.
The Question of the ' '
^^2^Q]_2llJL_^
The unification of Italy under the Kingdom of Sardinia deprived
the MeZZOgiorno of a ruling class endowed with the political autonomy
and the organizational capacity needed to define, defend and promote
its best interests. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies' autochthonous
bourgeoisie, which had become that Kingdom's ruling class, could have
become the standard-bearer of the MeZZOgiorno ' s best interests, had
the unification of Italy resulted from a process of balanced integration,
or from a process of unbalanced integration in favor of the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies. However, the northwestern elite used its control
of the State apparatus to install, as the Me ZZOgiorno • s new ruling
class, a politically subordinate ally who would serve the best inter-
ests of the economic system of the northwest in exchange for political
dominance in the Me ZZOgiorno. The northwestern elite displaced the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies' bourgeoisie, and replaced it with the
landlord class of the MeZZOgiorno ' s great estates.
7
The Mez Zogiorno 1 s
new ruling class expressed the northwestern elite's political and
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ec°nomlc lnterests ln the — — itmd the Mezzo.
Siorno's own interests> and organized Me2zogiorno , s^ ^ ^_
duction accordingly.
The Kingdom of Sardlnla , s & ^
of Ualy resulted in the Me220glorno . s subordlnatlon and ^
hisner taxes and a proportloMtely greacer share Qf puMic ^ ^
but allocated proportionately lees public monies to the Mezzogiorno.
The Ki„gdom o £ Italy
- 8 ba„kin g system, always firmly ln the hands of
the northwestern elite and represented principally by the Banco Nazionale
(transformed into the Banca d'ltalia in 1898), drained the reserves of
precious metals from the Mezzogiorno's banking system, represented
principally by the Banco di Napoli and the Banco di Sicilia. In this
way, it choked off credit to industries in the area. Moreover, the
Kingdom of Italy's agricultural policies oriented the Mezzogiorno's
agriculture toward the cultivation of Mediterranean agricultural pro-
ducts (locally produced wines and olive oil, citrus fruits, fresh and
dried fruits) for external markets, but oriented agriculture in the
rest of Italy toward the cultivation of grain, and other crops with
stable internal demand. Although Mediterranean agricultural products
may have been highly remunerative on the international market at that
time, their dependence on external demand made the Mezzogiorno's
agriculture more vulnerable to damage by protectionism than agriculture
in the rest of Italy—as was proved when the Kingdom of Italy imposed
the tariffs of 1878 and 1887.
8
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The Mezzogiorno has never Wn i-vbee the master of its own destiny, let
alone the center of the Italian economy. The northwe,, ,y- m stern elite has«i«-u, takm advantage o£ the Mezzogiorno , s poiuicai
by organl2lng social consensus ln the ^ poii£icai^ ^
Port of an Italian economy „hose ^
development £or the_ic^ q£ ^ ^ ^^
northeast, and in underdevelopment for the ^ ^^
th-t traditional historiography re£ers to Mezzoglorno , s underd_
elopment as the "Southern Question." In realitv it „ ." I y, is a Northern
Question, a phenomenon whose causes are found more outside the Mezzo-
giorno than within and whose roots are found in the political economic
relationships established between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of the
international economy.
TABLE 1.—The structure of the Italian economy
Economic System Function 2Area (km ) Percent of Italian
Territory
Northwest Center 61,746 20.5
Center/Northeast Semi-center 111,444 37.0




The political and ideological biases which inform historiography
nave greedy impeded the elaboratlon Qf ^
of Italy's Fascist regime (28 October 1922 - 25 duly 1943) , especially
to determine whether or not Fascist Xtaly's poll tical leadership might
have genuiaely undertaken to change the structure! relationships between
Italy's three economic system with the end of abolishing the Mezzo-
giorno's underdevelopment. 9 Unfortunately, traditional historiography
presents Fascism indiscriminately as an ideological abstraction and as
a historical experience, by attributing to the ideology the inherent
evil attributed to the regime by those who did not benefit from it
or could not make use of it, and by attributing to the Fascist experience
the ineluctability of war, defeat and all its negative consequences,
presumably born of an allegedly evil ideology. On the other hand,
recent critical historiography has (timidly) begun a revaluation of
Fascism, by distinguishing ideology from history, and by suggesting
that the Fascist leadership may have attempted a positive and prag-
matic reorganization of the means of production on Italian territory,




The northwestern elite has always viewed with apprehension any
prospect of a territorial reorganization of the Italian economy be-
cause a reorganization would put into question the traditional centrality
of the economic system of the northwest. The northwestern elite did
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not grieve at Fascism's downfall in World War TT hw II because Fascism's dev-
6lOPment b0dS 1U^ C- «»~ern eWspoUtical and
economic interests, italy's lndustrlal leadersMp> Mghest ^^^^
sion of the northwestern elitP onl. j •e, entered into a marriage of convenience
with the Fascist leadership: each triPH i-« • ,P C ed to manipulate the other for
its own ends.
Fascist development benefitted the northwestern elite's political
and economic interests because fascism celled the Left in Ita ly after
the "revolution that failed" of 17 April 1 920 and ; in this „ay> pre-
served the northwestern elite's political autonomy and power.
12
More-
over, the country's lll-fated participation in World War I! taVored the
northwestern elite's interests in that the immediacy and the priority
of the war effort necessitated an intensive utili2at ion of the national
economy's existing structure, and precluded the possibility of a terri-
torial reorganization of the economy, for example, to the benefit of
the Mezzogiorno.
However, Fascism's development more than offset these advantages.
First, the regime's endemic instability made constant the possibility
that the leadership might at some point organize social consensus in a
way which resulted in the political subordination of the northwestern
elite. The industrial leadership had to struggle constantly and dip-
lomatically to impede the Fascist leadership from politically reor-
ganizing the means of production on Italian territory in any way which
might have compromised its own political autonomy or privileged political
and economic position. Second, although the northwestern elite may
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have largely prevented Fascism fr™ , , ,
™ tr0m real"ing its revolutionary potential
Fascism succeed in breaking the q£ ^ ^
class by encouraging the development of a class o £ small peasant pro-
prietors. In this way, Fascism greatly weakened the system o £ organized
social consensus established by the northwestern elite in the Mezzogiorno
soon after the unification of Italy. Last> Austrla , s annexatlon fcy
Germany (the Anschluss) on ,2 March 1938 marked Italy's subordination
'
to Germany in the Rome-Berlin Axis (24 October 1936 - 25 July 19«).
Had the Axis won World War II, Italy's victory would have been Pyrrhic,
because Germany intended to suffocate Italian industry and to make
Italy into an agrarian client state. 14
Military Defeat^jDccupation and Political Conflict
Italy lost twice in World War II. The Allies (the United Kingdom,
France, the Soviet Union and the United States) defeated Italy mili-
tarily as Germany's subordinate ally in the Axis, and then subordinated
Italy politically as an Allied co-belligerent (13 October 1943 - 2 May
1945). The Armistice of 8 September 1943, which had exacted as its
price the country's unconditional surrender to the Allies, in effect
put it into the hands of the United Kingdom and the United States,
which had succeeded in excluding France and the Soviet Union from the
military occupation of Italian territory. 15
The Armistice and the Anglo-American military occupation did not




between the United Kingdom and the United States as well h1 as between the
northwestern elite and the Left.
The United Kingdom and the United q^t-x States, whose interests in Italy
were more parallel than identical Wh, both occupxed Italy militarily
ever, Anglo-American occupation policy embodied no coherent, g lobal
Political strategy because it reflected the different intentions of
the United Kingdom and the United States- „ m.. on the one hand, the United
Kingdom wanted to punish Tf-al-,, =It ly economically and militarily because the
Fascist regime had succeeded in asserting italian interests which
challenged its imperial dominance in the Mediterranean region; on the
other hand, the United States wanted to establish in Italy a regime
congenial to its tutelage. 16
The Anglo-American military destruction of the Fascist regime
jeopardized the northwestern elite's traditional political dominance
in Italy. When these forces destroyed ^ ^^
western elite found itself precariously atop a political order now
lacking legitimacy and a stable institutional structure. In this un-
stable situation, the northwestern elite had to confront challenges in
all parts of Italy: in the economic systems of the northwest and
the center/northeast, where Italian capitalism and the Left which
criticized it had developed most, many workers struck and joined the
anti-Fascist resistance movement; in the Mezzogiorno, where Fascism
had broken the political dominance of the landlord class, many landless
peasants and day laborers occupied the great estates in order to ex-





The Le£t took advantage of instabiuty ^ regain ^
lost under Fasclsm by championlng poliUcai dlaa££ecUons
_ ^ ^
forming them into opposition to the Fascist m -cn f regime, and into positive
political support. The Tpfi- r.™Left, now represented principally by the Itali
Communist Party (Pen K 0 t tn ,Y CD, better organized and more coherent politically
than the Italian Socialist Parh, (v^\ u • i_ ,^ ty(PSl), which had dominated the Left
before Fascism, succeeded in 0ream'7in 0m o g niz g more consensus among the north-
ern workers than among the southern peasants. In northern Italy, the
Left easily put itself at the vanguard of the workers' movement because
that area was its traditional stronghold and because the Axis stub _
born resistance to the Allied advance northward provided it with an
opportune cause around which to rally popular support. On the other
hand, in the Mezzogiorno, the Left belatedly
( in 1948) put itself at
the vanguard of the peasants' movement, begun in 1944, because it was
not as well established there as in other parts of Italy and because
the rapid Allied advance through the area precluded the necessity of
organized anti-Fascist partisan resistance. The Left wanted to sub-
ordinate the northwestern elite on behalf of the working class.
18
American Hegemony and Its Limits
The distribution of power in the international system proved to
be decisive in the determination of the outcome of these political
battles. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged from World War
II as superpowers, each hegemonic in its own sphere of influence.
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Their military cooDpratiAr, •peration agaxnst the Axis evolved Into a Cold War
against each other, with the resultant ideological polif ,81 i » P itical, economic
and military divisions which collectivplve y comprise the East-West conflict
Power while the United Kingdom Became a political actor of secondary
importance. For this reason, the United States won its political
battle with the United Kingdom concerning the objectives of Anglo-
American occupation policy, which evolved from a technical program
of military rule, determined preponderantly by the United Kingdom, to
an instrument of African foreign policy. This evolution marked the
Progressive decline of the United Kingdom's influence in Anglo-American
relations and the inverse ascent of the United States to the position
of arbiter of events in Italy. American foreign policy interests
prevailed in occupied and postwar Italy, against whom the United
Kingdom could not realize its vendetta. On 31 December 1945 the Anglo-
American occupation of Italy ended formally with the dissolution of the
Allied Military Government and with the restoration of sovereignty in
internal affairs to the Italian government. On 10 February 1947,
Italy signed a Peace Treaty with the Allies in Paris.
19
The United States used its hegemony over Italy to give victory to
the northwestern elite in its battle with the Left at the end of World
War II. The United States perceived that the destabilization of the
country's traditional political order caused by Fascism and by World
War II would make a regime dominated by the northwestern elite more
dependent upon American support, and therefore more congenial to its
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give
tutelage, than a regime dominated by the Left wM hy n t , hic promised to
Italy greater autonomy ln th6 ln ternati„nal systfim unicj
Sta.es desired. „oreover> ^^^^ ^^ ^
strategic military posture against ^^ ^^^ ^ ^
Mediterranean region by maklng use o£
The United States was hegemonic but act omnipotent, in that it
could not control al! the variables which would determine the future
course of events in Italy . The preconditions for the attenuation of
its hegemony accompanied its establishment. Two factors heyond its
control conditioned it in the exerri^P nf ?- uLn c ze o its hegemony over Italy at
the end of World War II: the renewed strength of the Left in Italy
and Italy's geographic location in the context of the East-West conflict
The Left, whose communist component, the PCI, had succeeded in
maintaining clandestine organizations during Fascism, emerged from
World War II stronger than it had ever been previously. Its political
resolve and its dogged paramilitary activities against the Axis in
Italy as the principal component of the anti-Fascist partisan resis-
tance movement had gained for it considerable popularity. 20 By 1947,
it had organized enough political consensus to contend seriously, if
not successfully, for control of the Parliament.
21 m short, the Left
at the end of World War II was a major political force in Italy and a
valid electoral rival of the political Center-Right.
As to Italy's geographic location in the context of the East-
West conflict, it is approximately 4,000 miles from the United States,
with the Atlantic Ocean between, but is approximately 500 miles from
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the Soviet Union, with south.central Europe ^ e
Anglo-American occupation of Italy may have secured fw ^ .^^
American hegemony, its place was on the geographic periphery of the
American sphere of influence. In geographic terms, the United States
faced difficult logistics necessary to the maintenance of hegemony over
Italy and to a viable strategic posture in the Mediterranean region.
These factors constrained the United States to secure Italy's
political allegiance by legitimizing to Italian society the re-
establishment of the country's traditional political order and economic
structure. To this end, the United States had to temper the exercize
of its hegemony by allowing the northwestern elite to organize mass
social consensus, principally through the Christian Democratic Party
(DC), so that the northwestern elite might offset the strength of the
Left. The United States also had to allow Italy the economic capacity
to create conditions of increasing prosperity so that the regime might
justify its existence and might seem more appealing to Italian society
than a regime dominated by the Left. In other words, these factors
prevented the United States from maintaining its hegemony over Italy
by means of a repressive use of force or from using its hegemony to
underdevelop the Italian economy. In fact, these factors induced it
to neutralize the United Kingdom's plan to punish Italy. Had it not
tempered the exercise of its hegemony, the United States would have
discredited and undermined its own position there, as well as Italy's
traditional political order and economic structure, and would have
2 2inadvertently assisted and legitimized the Left.
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The United States found itself i„ .ln 3 P-^o-eal and delicate situ-
•— Uecause, in order to maintain its negemonic position
whrch oould potentially allow it to regain lost politic autouj-j-i-xcax nomy:
delicate because the exceq^,^ aessxve development of these capacities would
make Italy under the northwestern elite too ,rn x strong and independent
lnSUfflClSnt d— - capacities could Help the
-ft to displace the northwestern elite at the top of Italy - S poUUcal— . Under these circumstances, the United States needed to influence
the development of ftal^s capacities so that they might disadvantage
American interests minimally. The United q* *y in States used its hegemony to
attempt to manage the balanced development of ^ ci the economic systems of
the northwest and the center/northeast, and the underdevelopment of the
Hezzogiorno, by assignlng t0^ , ^ ^ ^^^
of the international division of labor on ^ *. t_x r , so that the northwestern elite
might retain power yet remain under American tutelage.
The United States pursued its foreign policy interests in Italy in
four ways: first, by engaging in veiled manipulative activities:
political pressure, ideological legitimization, covert intelligence
gathering, the dissemination of disinformation, surreptitious acts of
political violence against those perceived as threats to American inter-




second, by infusing approximately $5 billion into Italy
between 1945 and 1958, of which $1,515 million went overtly to the
economy between April 1948 and December 1952 through the European
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by f±^y integrating the-— ^ *. internati0Ml e_y under^ infiuen
by promoting the lnstltutl0Mli2ed
poUcy integraUon ^
«- ^lian economy „lth the Qth£r^ ^^
T the ldeologicai b— - ~ and , el,determ :ationunder American influence" (which had „ i jreplaced unqualified self-determinati
1th the advent of the Cold War); and, last, by establishin •> g institution-
Creati°n>
°"
4 APr" « -—— Treaty 0rganl2atlon
(NATO), of which the United States has always been the d ,b D ominant member.
A Problema tic Relationship;
In the post-1945 period, American hegemony has benefitted the
serving the country's traditional political order and economic structure.
The DC, as the principal exponent of the northwestern elite's interests,
took full advantage of American hegemony to gain control of the State
apparatus by excluding the left fmm r^*-- ixu cn L t trom national governments between
31 May 1947 and 4 December 1963.
25
However, at the end of World War II, the United States exacted
as its price the severe limitation of Italy's political autonomy.
Italy had to swear allegiance to the United States in return for needed
support. In short, the northwestern elite had to submit to tutelage
from abroad in order to rule at home. Moreover, the United States, by
c
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assigning to Italy a subsidiary role in M,«7 the upper ranks of the inter-
national division of labor
, Umited northwestem^^* organize the neans of productiQn Qn icaiian terrUory ^ ^
tage and benefit
However, £he northwestern^^_ ^
in political autonomy, »„r reslgned ltself ^ ,
under African tutelage, fostered the development q£ ^ ^
organize mass social consensus and to create conditions of i„creasing
prosperity. The political p0„er derived frQm Dc , s
strength, together with an unprecedented increase in the strength of
the economy, resulted in a eradnal nn^ ax g u and modest increase in Italy's
autonomy, which allowed it to modify its position in the international
system. A cogent toward an autonomous United Europe, together with
independent foreign policy initiatives toward the Soviet Union, the
East Bloc, the countries of the Middlp T?aa +nit; i xaaie h st, and many underdeveloped
countries, replaced unswerving allegiance to the United States.
26
In all probability, the consequence of a tempered American hegemony
which distresses the northwestern elite (and the United States) most
is the opportunity afforded the Left to emulate the northwestern elite
in the ability to organize mass social consensus. In this, the PCI,
almost equal in strength to the DC, has far outdone the PSI, weak
and politically compromised. Although the DC may have to take the
strength of the Left into serious consideration, the political divi-
sions between the PCI and the PSI, which culminated in the dissolution
in 1957 of the Unity of Action Pact of 1934, have thus far prevented
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the Left from consolidating its QCra, n,T,8 st ength enough to gain control of the
government. The DC ha« ilargely succeeded in coopcing the m fcy
it in nearly all r no i -: ~y coalition governments slnce „ December 1%3 ^ a v . rtuai
guest in power, together with mlnor centrist lay parties. 27
The spared African hegemony which helps the northwestern elite
to retain its traditional political and economic dominance in Ualy
also creates conditions which can lead to its downfall. Ihis situation
could persuade the northwestern elite to pursue its best interests by
reducing its dependence on the United States rather than trust that
the advantages of a tendered American hegemony will always out„eigh
'
the disadvantages. For its part, the Left desires to displace the
northwestern elite at the top of Italy's political order and to increase
the country's autonomy by organizing social consensus based on counter-
balanced American and Soviet influence. In any case, foreign interests
will determine preponderantly the type and degree of development exper-
ienced by the Italian economy unless and until a ruling class acquires
'
sufficient political autonomy to organize the means of production on
Italian territory more in accordance with its own exigencies than in
dependence of external exigencies.
The Mezzogiorno After World War II
Underdevelopment Renewed
At the end of World War II, the Mezzogiorno ' s traditional political
and economic relationships with the rest of the Italian economy were in
97
crisis. Fascism had effectively ax undermined the northwestern elite's
system of political control over th* Me Mezzogiorno by fostering the
development of a cla« nf -, -,ass of small peasant proprletors
_ As ^^
the northwestern elite's subordinate political allv », ,-^itie i y, the landlord class
Of the MezzogiornCs great estates, was greatl y weahened. „oreoVK
«- MezzogiornCs ml lltary
fcy ^.^^^ ^
voked nearly fear years of mass politioal instahiiity (1944.1948)
I* eliminated the Fascist re gime. s socio-political and institutional
structures implemented to manage the area '« = ,s agricultural transformation
Peasants and landless day laborers occupied and appropriated land.
2 *
The balance of power in the international system determined the
outcome of the crisis in the relationships between the Mezzogiorno and
the rest of the Italian economy long before the political instability
in the Mezzogiorno ended. First, ^erican hegemony over Italy guar-
anteed the Mezzogicrno's continued subordination in the Italian economv
hy reestablishing the northwestern elite's traditional dominance in
Italy. Second, the factors which constrained the United States to
temper the exercize of its hegemony over Italy re quired the northwestern
elite to legitimize its dominance by organizing socia l consensus and by
creating conditions of increasing prosperity. Last, the United States
constrained the northwestern elite to face intense international compe-
tition by integrating the Italian economy into the international economy
under the banner of the "free entprnrieo" u • ,i e p se ideology, which promoted an
increase in industrial activity, commerce and the mobility of capital
and labor. In this situation, the northwestern elite had to devise a
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new system of control over the M»„„ •Mezzogiorno because the landlord class
discredited in the eyes of th» „e peasants and the workers, was no longer
a viable instrument for the area's political subordination. Had the
northwestern elite attempted to reestablish the landlord class's poll-
Ucal and economic dominance in the Hezzogiorno, the „ t would have had
an opportune cause around which to rally popular support.
The northwestern elite confronted the Mezzogiorno's political
instability by availing itself of the modified "free enterprise" ideo-
logy adopted as an expedient by the United States and by the united
Kingdom during the 1930s to reconcile their common abstract ideological
principles with the rpalit-v ~c .-u •e lity of their economically depressed areas
The modified "free enterprise" ideology, whose manifestations include
the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States
(1933) and the enactment of the Depressed Areas Laws of 1934 and 1937
in the United Kingdom, posits the need of industrialization to overcome
underdevelopment and the idea that underdevelopment is a technical
problem to be solved within a given economic structure by means of
systematic State intervention. According to this ideology, private
investment in an underdeveloped area is induced by developing the area's
infrastructure and by offering capital incentives (i.e., advantageous
credit terms and tax exemptions) to businesses. Moreover, this ideo-
logy disparages the direct industrialization of an underdeveloped
29area by the State.
The Left contested the modified "free enterprise" ideology's con-
ceptualization of underdevelopment by maintaining that underdevelopment,
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*« from belng . technlcal problM tQ ^ sQived Mitun ^^
s-ucture, ls caused by tha£ ^^^^ is ^^^^ a
problem because the organl2atlon o£ Qf product±on ^
if not determined, politically. ln short „ rom , a reorganization of the means
of production to the benefit of an underdeveloped area is neu cessary to
overcome underdevelopment. As tn rh^ mP nt. o the Mezzogiorno
' s underdevelopment,
the Left maintained that the modified "free enterpri,." -a ,se ideology would
-rely allow the ^Western eUte to legltlmlze ±tg _ Qf ^ state , s
resources Co establish a system o £ control over the Mezzo.iorno suited
to the northwestern elite's new place and function in the international
economy under a tested American hegemony. Moreover, according to the
heft, an essential precondition to the solution of the problem of the
Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment was a reor ganization of its means of
production: it would be necessary to modernize the Mezzogiorno's system
of agricultural production so that the area might begin to produce more
efficiently the capital to be accumulated to finance self-sustained
30development. In an Italy dominated by the northwestern elite under
American tutelage, the Left had to operate from a position of political
inferiority
.
The Instruments of Political Control;
Land Reform and Public Works
The
ideology
northwestern elite used the modified "free
to legitimize the conceptualization of the
enterprise"
Mezzogiorno's
underdevelopment « a v . 100
t „.
1 problem t0 be
Italy ,raditional economic structu
y means of systematic StatP"on designed Co lnduce prlvate
lndUStrlal
13 allowed it to reestablish i*- a
i • .
tS contr°l over the area bv— „„„„ , „western elite qn t-w . north-c , so that lt might better sustain ,vbUSC international mmnon.-'and impede the development of effective petition"mpe tltiDn from the „ez20glorno ,entrepreneurs, reestablished its contrnlo over the Mezzoglorno in sucha «ay as to increase the area's • ,s involvement in the process of capital
accumulation in the ItflH D„a ran economy. It expanded ^
productive base without changing the area', i8 S s P la^ in the national
economy through policies of land reform and pub l lc works 31
The northwestern elite used these policies to replace the Me 2ao-
giorno's landlord class w,t->, .With a group of subordinate allies better able
to meet its new exigencies p„t». ,. Political stability in the Mez.ogiorno
and in italy best served the interests of these subordinate allles
-cause the dominance they enjoyed in the Me.aogiorno depended upon
the northwestern elite's dominance in Italy. Ihe land reform, „hlch
ejected a limited redistribution of property ownership by expropriating
the poorest agricultural land in the areas of the greatest political
instability, consolidated the development of a class of small peasant
proprietors 32
;
the public works policy, which established in the Mez2o-
glorno a system of political patronage and clientelism, created a bur-
eaucratic "middle class," known more commonly as the "State bourgeoisie."*
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Three laws governed land refer, in Che Mezzogiorno. The Parlla.
ena" ed 2M ° f 12 (tacwn as the Law £or the sila
S±la]
'^ -——«— - and higb plateau
of Calabria, and Law n. 841 of 21 0ctober 1950 (known as the Summary
Law [Legge Stralcio]). The Sip,H« t» •xcilian Regional Government enacted the
other law, n. 104 of 27 December lQsn (v1950 (known as the Sicilian Law [Legge
Siciliana]). These laws created ei^htg reform districts which embraced
8,558,000 hectares (i.e 21 1 LlU.e., 21,147,673 acres) of cultivated land in 36
provinces, equivalent to 30 percent nf Tf ano Italian territory and 41 percent
of Italy's cultivated land.
34
It was np to the Land Reform Agencies (Enti dl Riforma) t0 carry
ont the land reform by determining the land to be expropriated, the
compensation to be awarded, and the distribution of the expropriated
land, and by providing the grantees with the financial and technical
aid necessary to make tbeir land productive. These Agencies expropri-
ated a total 767,000 hectares, of which 673,000 hectares, equal to 7.9
percent of the land, lay within the eight reform districts, and 94,000
hectares lay elsewhere. Nearly 89 percent (682,000 hectares) of the
expropriated land was distributed to 109,103 families, of whom 8 percent
were small proprietors, 40 percent sharecroppers, and 52 percent agri-
cultural laborers. Approximately 75 percent of these families lived
in the Mezzogiorno. The high cost of the redistribution and the better-
ment reflects the poor quality of the land expropriated. The Land Reform
Agencies, which employed the greater part of their resources to clear
land, to establish irrigation systems, to acquire farm machinery, and
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to construct roads
, schools and agricuuurai viuages>^ ^^
Hon, or an average $1>200 per Hectere, and an^^ ^ ^
settlement of each family. 35
The northwestern elite's publlc works pollcy> fa ^
the modified "free entemriw" ^ iterp se rdeology, was not a development policy
with precise goals, hut rather a general pre-industrialization policy
calculated to induce the expansion of private economic activity and to
increase employment in the Mezzogiorno hy developing agriculture, im-
proving infrastructure, and providing capital incentives to business.
The principal instrument was the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (CASMEZ)
,
charged with formulating and implementing public works projects, and
with coordinating their realization with the ordinary institutions of
government. It also sought to attract private investment capital to the
Mezzogiorno from within and without Italy. American hegemony over Italy
manifested itself in the CASMEZ 's activities through the legitimation
provided by the modified "free enterprise" ideology and financially
through the World Bank, dominated by the United States. The Bank pro-
vided 30 percent of the CASMEZ 1 s funds in its first decade. Moreover,
Americans and Italians jointly drew up the CASMEZ 's initial disburse-
36ment plan.
Law n. 949 of 25 July 1952 extended the CASMEZ ' s life, established
originally by Law n. 646 of 10 August 1950 at ten years, to twelve
years, and increased the CASMEZ' s original appropriation of LIT 1,000
billion (to be disbursed at an average annual rate of LIT 100 billion)
to LIT 1,280 billion, to be disbursed at an average annual rate of LIT
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HO billion from Che fourth to 3J
7 From "seal Year 1950-
1951 to Fiscal Year 1957-1958, the CASHEZ aliooated its funds as follows:
TABLE 2. -The capital allocatiion of the CASMEZ
Under Law n. 646 of
10/8/1950






































100.0 1 ,280.0 100.0
SOURCE: Joseph A. Martellaro, Economic Development jn Southern Italy
195Q- 1960
'
Washin§ton, DC: The Catholic University of America Press,
1965, p. 11.
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In this perxod, the CASMEZ spent LIT 1 035 7 bill,
129 5 biiim '
° r an avera se «T, llllon Per year, as follows:
TABLE 3.-The CASMEZ's yearly expenditure 1950-1958
Fiscal Year
LIT (in billions)
1950- 1951 . .
4.0
1951- 1952 . .
50.3
1952- 1953 . . .
116.9
1953- 1954 . .
157.1
1954- 1955 . . .
181.7
1955- 1956 . .
197.4
1956- 1957 . .
173.8
1957- 1958 . .
154.5
Total 1,035.7
SOURCE: George „. „il debrand, CrowUUind_Sis^^
MJiEden^, Cambrldge> MA; universuy pressj i96s> ^ ^
The Mezzogiorno ln the Italinri F„„„„m„
The folding statistics reflect the gap in economic develops
which existed between the Mezzogiorno and north-central Italy (i.e.,
the economic systems of the northwest and the center/northeast) in
1951. The distribution percent by sector of employment (1) and Gross


































ThlrC,"SeV£n Per"nt " resided ln the Me2zogiorno
distention o£ lncom£
, wlth uaiy a£ ioQj showed t^
Mezzogiorno at 58.2 and north-central Italy at 126 1 Th2 / . I. e average income
Per hectare or farmland (in thousands of LIT) sho„ed the Mezzogiorno
« 230, Italy at 265, and north-central Italy at 2,0. Industrial^
in ^Mezzogiorno numbered 709,788, against 3,456,466 in north-central
Italy. I„ Italy 19 . 7 milUon peopU empioyed> o£^ ^
lived in north-central Italy, and 6.5 Hilton in the Mezzogiorno. For
every person employed, 1.3 people were unalloyed in north-central Italy
against 1.6 in the Mezzoeiornn 40 u-t.n g o. Fifteen percent of Italy's industrial
invests and 19.7 percent of its industrial employment were located in
the Mezzogiorno. 41 Businesses employed an average 6.9 people in north-
central Italy against 2.6 in the Mezzogiorno. In the latter, there were
3.7 million agricultural workers, that is, 43 percent of the national
agricultural workforce. 42
The capital infused into the Mezzogiorno by the public works
and land reform policies, together with private capital and monies
spent by the ordinary institutions of government, increased the area's
involvement in the process of capital accumulation in the national
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economy by developing its nr^ -..P 8 S P oductive apparatus. The mibHo
.
i
Public works policyVel°Ped lnfr— — -* the land reform
, Icrease, agricultural^ fcy ^
techniques, mechanizing farms, and fertile
Tj
rtilizing and irrigating the land.-n 1951 and 1959 , „, Percent 0£ Italy , s agricuuurai ^
-cent of lts lndustrlal lnvescmentsi ^ percgnt q(
S6Ct0r lnV6StmentS> 23 - 3 "™ ° f -— lnvestments
, 37 . 2 percMt
of its public administration lnvestments> ^ percent ^ ^«- investments were located ln the Mez20giornQ
. ^ ^^ ^
sectoral distribution of the fiv.j jxed investments in the area was 19 8
Percent in agriculture, „. 9 percent ln lndustry> ^ percent ^ ^
tertiary sectory, 23 . 2 percent in ^^^ ^ ^^
in public administration. The sectoral A* - -udistribution of fixed investments
in Italy was 11.3 percent in agriculture « Qbix i , 33.9 percent in industry, 22.1
percent in the tertiarv serf™- 9/ /y ctor, 24.4 percent in housing, and 8.3 percent
in public administration. 43
Between 1951 and 1958 the Mezzogiorno registered the following
growth rates in constant 1963 prices: net product, 4.4 percent; agri-
culture, 2.12 percent; industry, 7.46 percent; the tertiary sector,
4.87 percent; end public administration 2.94 percent. In thls perlod>
the Italian economy registered the following growth rates, also in
constant 1963 prices: Gross National Product (GNP) , 5.32 percent;
agriculture, 2.98 percent; industry, 7.57 percent; the tertiary sector,
4.75 percent; and public administration, 2.89 percent. The growth rate
of its most productive sectors, agriculture and industry, was less in
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the Mezzogiorno than in the rP« e ,est of Italy, while the
national economy's least productive
PubUc administration „a - *•
3 the percentage distribution by sector „f






























The Mezzogiorno's development ^^ ^
Sooas. North-central Italy . s industries _ ^ ^
demand than the Mezzogiorno 'a own industries because the former, located
in the more dominant economic systems of the northwest and the center/
northeast, were already more diversified and more productive. The Mez-
zogiorno's most advanced indus tries succeeded in sustaining the compe-
tition of similar industries based in north-central Italy, hut were too
few in number to affect significantly its own development. The i„crease
in productivity of the Mezzogiorno's agriculture complemented the in-
crease in the productivity of north-central Italy's industries because
the Mezzogiorno, in its relationship with the rest of the Italian economy,
became a net importer of manufactured goods and a net exporter of agri-




s industries most affected bv the ,r n y increased demand
mat,UfaCtUred "~ * ^-tensive and, therefore, iess
Productive, smaii traditicnai industries which produced for the iocai— and had no competition from north-centrai I£aly - a lndms
These industries absorbed proportionate!, more of the Mezzogiorno.s
Ubor force which ieft agricu lture to see, industry employment than
north-centrai itaiy's industries absorbed of the labor force there
However, the «eMogW . reiativeiy inefficient industries conid not
natch the increase in productivity of the industries in the more domin-
ant economic systems of the northwest and the center/northeast. Between
1951 and 1958, vaiue added in the industriai sector increased by 6. ,5
percent in Italy, but onlv hv s q«y, o y by 5.98 percent in the Mezzogiorno. In this
Period, pro capite income in the Mezzogiorno fell from 64.5 percent
to 62.5 percent of Italy's average. 47 Between 1951 and 1959, value
added in the Mezzogiorno • s manufacturing sector was 12.5 percent of
the value added in the Italian economy's manufacturing sector. 48
The increased employment in the Mezzogiorno
' s labor intensive
industries was insufficient to absorb all the unemployed and under-
employed in its work force. The northwestern elite compensated par-
tially for the lack of industrial employment opportunities in the
Mezzogiorno by absorbing workers into the tertiary sector and public
administration at a higher rate in the Mezzogiorno than in the more pro-
ductive systems of the northwest and the center/northeast. The majority
of unemployed and underemployed in the Mezzogiorno remained a reserve
work force for the industrial expansion of more dominant economic systems
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within and without Italy 49 tk •
agrlcultu ; p
increase in the Pr°du— - <-
dustrial ,
Perm" ted 38riCUl— borers t0 seek 1d_— reducing che Hezzogiorno , s agncui— -—ursd g00ds produced in
Between 1951 and 1961> the
^^




























In this period, agricultural productivity increased by 5.25 percent
in the Mezzogiorno but by 5.40 percent in north-central Italy
51
, Khlle
value added in the manufacturing sector increased by an average 6.17
percent per year in the Mezzogiorno but by an average 8.36 percent
per year in Italy. 52
no
Summary
T*e Klngdom of sardinla ^^^^ uaiy , s poiitiMi^
::;r° r
ucture by d"in8 the~ -
the economic system 0£ the centGr/nort ,ieast ^ Me2zogiMno _
Kln8d°m





"WCh **»«*- i- *«~ territorial!, with
the ecm„,lc system of the northw£st (met Qf wMch beio^ ^ ^
Kingdom of Sardinia prior m ci-,*. • r •to the unification of It-ilv^ ,nialy) and reorganized
politically u» means of productlon on itauan terrUory ^ ^s ^
advantage and benefit. Por thls reason
_ ^ ^ ^ ^
northwest became the Italian economy's center , the economlc^ ^
the center/northeast its semi-center and the Mezzogiorno its petiPhe ry
The economic systems of the northwest and the center/nertheast exper-
ienee generally positive, balaneed development and the Mezzogiorno
underdevelopment
.
It is unelear whether Faseist Italy's political leadership may have
genuinely undertaken to change the structural relationships between
Italy's three economic systems with the goal of abolishing the Mezzo-
giorno's underdevelopment. However, it is clear that the United States,
victorious in World War II, subordinated politically a defeated Italy
and restored its traditional political order and economic structure




the Unlted States to temper the exerc
Italv'. • u
hegemony over Italy:y s peripheral geographic location i„ the a .ln American sphere of i„n~~ o £ the Italians,
Popalar for it
Anglo-American military occupation of ltaly The f
„ .
Y- Se fa«ors constrainedthe United States to secure i>.l .
'
S POll"Cal all^»nce hy helping thenorthwestern elite to legitimize its traditlnional dominance in Italy.
- end, the United states helped the northwestern elite to organizemass social consensus through the nr jDC and to create conditions of i„creas~y in the face of the intense international economic competition-eh resulted from the Italian ec_y , s ^ ^
economy under American influence.
The northwestern elite, so that it might hetter sustain this
intense international competition, legitimized . renewal „ „^
sifieation of the Mezzogiorno 's underdevelopment to the advantage and
benefit of the economic system of the northwest hy using the Allied
"free enterprise" ideology to legitimize the implementation of the
puhlie works and land reform policies. The modified "free enterprise-
ideology conceptualized the area's underdevelopment as a technical
problem to be solved within the national economy's traditional struc-
ture. The public works and land reform policies increased the Mezzo-
giorno's involvement in the process of P„Tvit- n i i •Fi-uueb r cap tal accumulation in the
Italian economy without changing it<? rr^if^ ^ idu x s traditional place in the Italian
economy
.
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CHAPTER iv
A HISTORICAL PRELUDE TO ITALY'S PARTICIPATION TNTHE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMim




. the United Kingdom £olled .m ^
initiated the deeiine of Spai^s polltical predomlnance fa Europe by
destroying the Spanish Armada in the English Channel. 1 The United
Kingdoms victory over Spain meant that the United Kingdom aceuired
naval supremacy and, therefore, the means to become the greatest colo-
nial imperialist. It also meant that the distribution of power within
Europe shifted to the advantage of northern Europe's nation-states.
From then on, the fundamental cause of political conflict in Euro
was the conflict of interest between the United Kingdom and Europ
other major nation-states, those of northern continental Europe. On
the one hand, the United Kingdom, striving to keep Europe politically
divided, made use of its insular location in order to protect its naval
supremacy and, therefore, its political autonomy and its colonial pos-
sessions. On the other hand, Europe's other major nation-states strove
to become the United Kingdom's most serious rival by seeking hegemony
over continental Europe.
Unable to place continental Europe under its hegemony, the United
Kingdom would have been equally unable to defend itself against another
118
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state which miuht holH hegemony over contlnental Europe>
each other so that n„ -
b SL
tlJL the strong states mi Rht not- ug t become too strong, northe weak states too weak. in shortS , the United Kingdom wanted a con-tinental Europe divided against itself so that it . ,might not be united
against the United Kingdom.
»—. ft. four centuries wbich followed the UnUed KingdM , s
3CqUired
""^ >011^ — Gnomic predomlnance _
Burope but ever greater predomlnance poUUcai ^
the international econmy , s meMs of ^^^^^ ^ ^
states in the development of poUticai) £conomic ^
tion. Eor this reason, the military CQnfUcts^ ^
states resulted ln eve r greater dlsruptions of ^ ^
Power. I„ Che twentieth ce„tury
, European mllitary confUcts bec_
world wars,
^^^^^ Ofthe jawr^tih^l strata^ Klalllbrl,m "
From 1939 to 1945 Germany attested for a second time to place
'
the rest of Europe under its hegemony by force of arms. This was World
War II, a European military conflict of global di,„onsions. World War
II was the most catastrophic military conflict on European soil to
date not because Europe emerged militarily devastated and economically
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Lance of
crippled from the 2reaf P^ aaneatest drsruptron of the international bala..
power to date but becaiwp l _h6 St"eS WtaUy
««°P. emerged poli-tically subservient to the United c+. « *.States and the Soviet Union, who
SmerSed as supe— 3 In «- - *. ^Pe^ defeated






The superpowers divided Europe into spheres of influence and
-de the common border between these spheres the ..passive axis" u(
which they balance their strategic political and^ lnterM,
in broad terms, the United States exerci.es hegemony over Western
Europe while the Soviet Union exercizes hegemony over Central Europe-
Easter Europe has always been the westernmost section of Soviet ter-
ritory. Europe's political subordination by the superpowers affects
Germany more than Europe's other states because the "passive axis"
divides Germany into two distinct states and locates one in each sphere
of influence: West Germany, under African hegemony in Western Europe;
East Germany, under Soviet hegemony in Central Europe. 5 The strategic
equilibrium between the superpowers is more sensitive along the "pas-
sive axis" than elsewhere because, although Europe may be subordinate
to the superpowers, Europe's states, in comparison with other states
save the superpowers, exert greater influence over the political organi-
zation of the international economy's means of production.
The superpowers seek to maintain the existing strategic equili-
brium, in part, by keeping Europe divided into stable, tractable spheres





Central Europe in such a way as to . k •achreve two common goals. Firsteach superpower wants to prevent th ,uP e other from exercizing hegemony
over both Western and Central Europe because the .suPerpower in such
a position would alter the exist***r rng strategic equilibrium in its favor
by increasing its influence over t-h* i • •he political organization of the
natl°nal eCOn°my ' S— ~ -end, boch superpowers ^
t- P-vent Europe from regainlng ^ ^^ ^
states in either sphere of influence if, autonomous and cooperative with
each other, and esDerinliv -if i- .p c a ly If politically unified, „ou l d ef£ectlv
^val the superpowers' influmce over poUticai organizatim ^
the international economy's means of production. At the same tlme
a Europe in serious conflict with itself either within or between the
superpowers' spheres of influence would in all probability precipitate
another world war by disrupting violentiy the international balance
o£ power and by destabilizing the existing strategic equilibrium between
the superpowers.
The sensitivity of the strategic equilibrium along the "passive
axis" prevents the superpowers from maintaining their hegemony in
Europe by means of a repressive use of force and, instead, constrains
them to legitimize their hegemony by securing the allegiance of Europe's
states. The superpowers must satisfy sufficiently the interests of
these states so that the latter may perceive that the certainties of
political life under the superpowers' hegemony may outweigh the risks
of defiance. Otherwise, disaffection which result in political in-
stability among them would jeopardize the existing strategic equilibrium.
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nomic capacity to create conditions of increasing
. .
prosperity so that
their regimes may be stable an Ay and may enjoy public favor. After all
the superpowers can afford to enforce their A •r dominance in Europe by
force of arms only when they perceive that restraint may compromise
their vital interests more.
The legitimation of hegemmy puts superpowers ^ a
and ,lltate sltuatlon; paradQxicai because ^ ^^
txcal allegiance of Europe's states by helping them Co develop ^
Political and economic capacities which could potentlal ly allow the.
to regain lost political autonomy; delicate because the excessive dev-
elops of these capacities could underline the superpowers' hegemony
b. making Europe's states too strong and independent while the insuf-
ficient develops of these capacities could underline the superpowers'
hegemony by creating political disaffactions among Europe's states.
The superpowers, who exercize their hegemony to satisfy principally
their own interests, cannot maintain their control unless they concern
themselves with the interests of Europe's states. In effect, the
superpowers could undermine their hegemony either by indulging or by
neglecting the interests of these states.
The superpowers' geographic location relative to the "passive
axis" determines their sensitivity to the autonomy of the other states
In their respective spheres of Influence: the "passive axis" is approxi-
mately 4,000 miles from the United States, separated from Western Europe
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by the Atlantic Ocean and -Jo«. is approximately 500 ml les Iron, the Soviet
Union, which herders Central Enrope. The Soviet Union's •: umo proximity to
the passive axis" makes it more amrov ," PPrehensrve about the increased
autonomy of Central Europe's statP. t-v,P es than the United States about
Western dope's, while the United States' distance irom the "passive
over Western Europe's states as rh a c •n t e Soviet Union must be over Central
Europe's. Under these circumstances should t-h, e superpowers undermine
their power in Europe, the geo-political exigencies of th P , •"igeuc r e existing
strategic equilibrium would, in all probability
,^^
states to repudiate American hegemony and would, with equal probability,
induce Central Europe's states to accept a str,,n.dax e coexistence with
the Soviet Union.
Northern Europe's States: The
First Among Subord inn tes
Although World War II may have left Europe subordinate to the
superpowers, the distribution of power within Europe remains to the
advantage of northern Europe's states. The strategic equilibrium
between the superpowers is more sensitive along the northern half of
the "passive axis" than along the southern half because northwestern
and north-central Europe's states in comparison with southwestern and
south-central Europe's exert greater influence over the political
organization of the international economy's means of production.
For this reason, the superpowers are concerned that the former states
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especially those closest to the 'W •passxve axis," may be more
tractable than the latter states. 6
* Waste. Europe, the United States is concern, that West
^ Md FrMCe *—— - -table than Western
Europe's two major states closest to nthe "passive axis" and, therefore
between the superpowers. Ihe United States attempts to legitimize
its hegemony over West Germany and France hy giving to them political
and, therefore, economic predominance in Western Europe so that theymay derive the greatest «?h*ro ^ vshare of benefits from their relationships with
Western Europe's other st«»= t cates, m fact, African hegemony in Western
Europe privileges West German, more than France in the strategic
equilibrium because West German, borders the "passive axis" and, in
comparison with Erance, exerts greater influence over the political
organization of the intpmcinnni ,cn ernational economy's means of production.
Western Europe's Integration UnrW ^^.^
Hegemony: The Basic Premise's
After World War II, the United States promoted the institutionalized
market policy integration of Western Europe's major economies. As a
result, the EEC contributed to the stabilization of the strategic
equilibrium between the superpowers. First, the EEC stabilized Western
Europe politically by creating greater interdependence between its major
economies than with those of other areas. Second, the EEC consolidated
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- and France , s predoninance _ western^
ZT7 the unlform Uffiltatlon of -**—
—
the EEC member States pff^t-- iS e Actively sanctioned the exisMnc, a-
- tmg dxstribution
of power which gives an advantage to West rP 7& c w Germany and France.
This institutionalized market nnl *po 1Cy integration interests West
Germany and France becanwause the tempered American hegemony over Western
Europe promises to sanction their nnH-- ipolitical predominance in the EEC.
The two countries exercize their political „™h •P predominance over Western
Europe's other states by fostering the EEC, a ,C s development only in the
ways which satisfy princinallv t-^j ¥ l xiiLxpaiiy the exieenn pQ nf ind-gencies ot their own economies
They perceive tha£ their lnteres£s ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
redistribution of power to the EEC's institutions because , strong ^
Jeopardizes their political predominance ln Western^
should the costs of American hegemony seem to West Germany and Prance
greater than the benefits, and should the prospect of an autonomous
Western Europe under their political predominance seem unlikely, West
Germany and Prance would have to accept a strengthening of the EEC's
institutions as the means to repudiate American hegemony.
West Germany, France and Western K„rnpP ' ,
Integration Unde r American Hegemony
~
The Rewards of PoliMVal pr^„„.,- nin . r
West Germany and France derive three fundamental advantages from
their political predominance over Western Europe's other states. First,
they have greater political autonomy and, therefore, a greater capacity
to organize the means of production of their
i
economies according tointernal exigencies, to create rh
t .
6 ^ COmP °Sition internal demand ando orxent the productive capacity of th.
,
P " y eir economies to meet theneeds of their own populations. Second th P „
'
h3Ve 3 8reater capacityto concentrate within their borders the accumulation and the invest-
ment of capital and, therefore, to establish the leveis of prod • ,„u* i ,
S t P uctivity
entrepreneurs of Hestern Europe , s ^ t
. As a consequence, west German md FrMch
"~ COmPetlUVe -— entrepreneurs and are™re able t0 establish che remuneratiye yaiue ^ ^
exchanged wlth chose produced eisewhere ^ westcrn^ 8 ^
West Germany and France have a nrMt-rg eate capacity to determine the divi-
sion of labor among Western Europe , s 9tate8) ^
which goods and services produced in Western dope's other economies
Will be exchanged for their own goods and services. 9
These advantages allow West Germany and France to determine the
Political organization of the means of production of Western Europe's
other states hy conditioning the ways in which they may accumulate,
invest and consume the real income produced hy their economies and,
therefore, the ways in which they may use their labor forces. West
Germany and France can do this by offering to the politically dominant
entrepreneurs of the other states the prospect of the greatest remuner-
ation for the production of goods and services which satisfy principally
the exigencies of the West German and French economies. Such a prospect




economies because their politicals AP Utical y dominant entrepreneurs seek to^ themselTCS the greatest compecitive advmtage ^ ^
an, French markets by uslng their poUticai ^^ ^
sumption of their product «* i„ „x, • ,P s xn their domestic markets. This allc
the real income produced bv t-hp^ =y their economies to accrue to the
earnings to be used as investment capital Th.. e concentration of invest-
ment capital in the hands of the ooUMnaii ap litically dominant entrepreneurs of
WeStem EUr°Pe ' S
°
ther " *-»• *s these entrepreneurs
- control the deMnd for labor by lnvesung capitai ^ ^
profitable ways.
West Germany and France also affect the consumption of the real
income produced by the other West European economies, and the use of
the labor forces in these economies, by producing goods and services
for export and by investing capital. The two states affect this con-
sumption by penetrating the others' domestic markets with goods and
services generally more remunerative than those imported from them and
by investing capital in Western Europe's other economies in order to
produce goods and services which satisfy some of the demands of their
populations. West Germany and France affect the use of the labor
force by creating a demand for labor too great to be satisfied with
their domestic labor forces alone and, therefore, which requires the
importation of external labor.
West Germany and France will determine the political organization
of the means of production on the territories of Western Europe's other
states unless and until these states acquire greater political autonomy.
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Without such autonomy, those West Eur„
t . , A
«« opean states whose domestic poli-ical and economic exigencies ar.e most eompatibie wtth those of WestGermany and France win £are best and clesxre change least. Onthe other hand, those WPOr pest European states whose domestic political
and economic exigencies ^r-o ia e least eompatibie win fare „orst and^-sire chan8e most. In any ^ as ^ _ ^
Power remains to their advantage, West Cermany and Prance will have
high levels of productivity and pro capita incomes in .— K- nie l many economic
sectors, a more divers-, fi »H -ir,*- iersx red internal production and a more balanced
spatial distribution of productive facilities. 10
The EEC, The CAP
West Germany and France madp rh* re the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
the EEC's pivot because agriculture is the basis of economic activity
fore, of industrial costs.
11
The CAE's fundame„tal purpose is to insure
that the EEC's agriculture may be a viable source of surplus capital
to be accumulated and invested according to the EEC's political dic-
tates, that is, according to the demands created principally by West
Germany and France. For this rp^nn m, q -n easo , the two states made the EEC the
custodian of the CAP tv,-; o •?„ -i •. This is a policy of international agricultural
protectionism which makes the EEC a closed economic system within the
international economy for the accumulation of capital through the
agricultural sectors of the EEC States. It reserves their domestic
markets for the nearly exclusive.12 consumption of EEC agricultural pro-ducts. Moreover, West Germany and France have retarded H
n , .
, by means
ot opposition or neel P^ *-v,g ect, the equivalent development of the EEC's
other policies, e.g., Competition and Industrial F
w . ,
J-naustr , Energy, Fiscal,
Fisheries, Monetary, Region* 1 c . iy> r al, Social and TransDort- k q-Li-diibport
, because their
-elopment, save perhaps the develops of the Energy, Fisherles and
Transport Policies, could undermine severely the two states ,
Pred0,I"Ce "~ W6Stern Europe's other states by translating author,
- the EEC's institutions, Influenced by the other EEC States. These
institutions could develoD "F„mn Dp European interests" different from West
German or French interests.
In addition, West Germany and Prance made the CAP the EEC's pivot
because It satisfied their reciprocal Interests. The CAP's price sup-
ports and protectionism for the EEC's agricultural products, aside
from securing the political support of West German and Erench farmers
for their countries' regimes, guaranteed to Erench farmers, whose
production In 1957 already exceeded domestic demand, a market for
their surpluses, a high and stable price for their products, and,
therefore, a high return on their investments. In return, Erance
accepted the abolition of barriers to commerce within the EEC and,
therefore, allowed the EEC to become a market open to West German
industrialists, who in 1957 were already net exporters. The CAP
also minimizes the EEC's dependence on external food supplies by
guaranteeing the viability of the EEC's agriculture. Moreover, the
export of the surpluses caused by the excessive stimulus of the CAP's
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price supports aids the EEC qt-a* ln 0£fSetC1^ «*• Wgh cost of enersupplies, approximately 70 percent of uWch impm
West Germany and France cnnlnco d undermrne their predominance overthe other EEC States by mismanaging the CAP ,hs g n . Should the CAP's price
supports and protectionism for the EEC. ,C s agricultural products oblige
the EEC to expend more caoit-al t-„pit to maintain the CAP than the EEC's agri-
culture can provide to the EEC, the CAP would be perverted. ln such
a Situation the EEC's agriculture would no longer provide the EEC
sectors o f the EEC States' economies. Such a depletion o f capital -
would ariect adversely the parlance o f these economies by hindering
the accumulation of capital for- ae x r productive investment and could, con-
sequently, create political d±q»ffo^nXLl isa fections among the EEC States.
Western Europe's Intpp^Hon u^a"
ThTFl^r~~~-g^ation under_American Hegemony;
When Italy, as an original signatory of the Treaty of Rome, be-
came one of the EEC's six founding members, its integration into the
international economy under American hegemony reached its highest
expression to date. The political and economic relationships of insti-
tutionalized market policy integration established by the Treaty are
the "rules of the game" which determine how the EEC States may respond
legitimately to the demands of international economic competition.
There are two fundamental rules: one concerns intra-EEC competition;
gy
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the other concerns competition wv-^mp L between the FFr ct-^cn EEC States and other States
As to the former, the EEC States aerp^ * , .greed to eliminate barriers to trade
and to the mobility of capital and labor To ,a . ward non-EEC States, the
EEC States agreed t-n Pct-oKi • x.o establxsh common customs tariffs and „ n
,
Ub a common
commercial nolirv vrP cy. „oreover
, the Treaty establ . shes EKia
two principles of integration-. tha prohibltion of
competition, and the equalization of progress. 14
Among the EEC States thp, e Treaty glVes to the prohibition of
falsified economic competition dp f a,t nP c r e cto prevalence over the equali-
zation of progress. The Treaty's "n,1 P" „t,4 t,S ruie which concerns intra-EEC
competition (legitimized implic itly by the »free enterprise „
limits the EEC States' market policy authority and, therefore, their
effective political control over the relationships established
between their economies. This limitation of political control deter-
mines ante factum the way in which the EEC's institutions and States
can legitimately attempt to equalize progress In the EEC. Under these
circumstances, the equalization of progress is an ideological palHa-
tive in a treaty whose dominant "free enterprise" ideology reflects
American hegemony over Western Europe. It also legitimizes an economic
system which, in practice, rewards the EEC's strong states by giving
to them the greater share of the benefits derived from their rela-
tionships with the EEC's weak states.
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The tempered hegemony exercized by ^^^ ^^
at the end of World War „ o££ered ^ ^^
deal security end economic uncertainty by obliging l£ tQ accept ^
conditions which aff P nforiLU directed its management of tho J^-^^ •6 i r e Italian economy. The
first condition obliged it to expose entrepreneurs to intense inter-
nationai economic competition by increasing the mpblllty of„ce
capita! and labor between tbe Ualian economy and otber economic systems
principally those of Western Europe. Tbe second condition obliged
It, through its political agent, the DC, to legitime its dominance
in Italy by organizing mass social consensus and by creating conditions
of increasing prosperity.
These conditions affected the northwestern elite's management
of the Italian economy by establishing ante factum the "rules of the
'
game" which determined how it might resoond m ^u xgu p to the exigencies of inter-
national economic competition and political legitimation. The first
condition limited its market policy authority and, therefore, its
effective political control over the relationships established between
the Italian economy and other economic systems by determing which
measures of extra-economic intervention it might or might not implement.
The second condition obliged it to risk its political legitimacy by
accepting responsibility for the national economy's performance, and
by promising its positive performance. Its response to the exigencies
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o £ tnternetionel economlc Mmpetuion Md poiiMcai
-** - oontex t of che established
determined ^^orga„i2atlon of the means o£ production on itaUM
The above-cited ron^T*--;conditions put the northwestern elUe ^ a
dOXlCal SUUatl0n
- ^ *" «» «*—«- its control
over the italian economy , per£orMncfi; ^ vMch ^^^
obliged 1£ to accept responslblUty
. 0n handj ^
condition obliged the north„estern eUce ^ deveiop . ^ poiitiMi
C3PaCity
" °rSaniZe "~— —— - ft. economy . s c«y
to creete conditions o £ increaslng prosperUy; ^ ^
hoped t„ legitime lts dMlnance ln uaiy by gaining
possible benefits f rom the re lati onsblps estabiished hetween the na-
tionel economy and other economic systems. On the other hand , the
first condition underlined its efforts to aUow the Itelien econo^
to sustain the co.petition of economic sy stems init laily M re developed,
or managed by initial ly mo re dominant sta tes
; the first condition re-
werded the superior strength of these systems by glvlng t0 them the
greeter share of the benefits derived from their relationships with
the Italian economy.
Under these circumstances, the northwestern elite had to concern
itself more with the exigencies of international economic competition
than with the domestic demands of political legitimation. In order
to legitimize its dominance in Italy, the northwestern elite had to
legitimize a political organization of the means of production on Italian
territory which might give to the economic system of the northwest the
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latest posslble ^ ^ ^
Were the economic system of ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
petition because the fir c t- ~ j- .first condrtron undefined excessively the system . s
a suitahle political organi 2ation o£ ^_ q£ ^^
territory with Us domestic repercussions, the northuestern^
Political legicimac y Kould suffer greatly ^ such a sitMtion ^
suade it to pursue lts best lnterests by changin§ ^ h^ ^^
Hshed rules. However, at the end o£ World War ^
elite could only hope chat the measures to he taken to sustain inter-
national competition mlgh C not create disaffections which the political
Left could champion.
The Mezzogiorno's "ProgramW' UndferdeVelo pment
During the 1950s, the northwestern elite became increasingly
aware that the exigencies of international economic competition would
influence preponderantly the political organization of the means of
production on Italian territory because American hegemony over Western
Europe promised to result in the institutionalized market policy inte-
gration of the major West European economies. For this reason, the
northwestern elite addressed itself with urgency to the preparations
needed to make the economic system of the northwest as competitive
as possible in the international economy. To this end, between 1950
and 1957, the Italian State spent four times more for capital incentives
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eco-
to businesses in north-central n,ian Italy than to those 1„ the Mezzogiorno 1
Moreover, the northwestern elite now wanted to Increase the Mi Mezzogiorno
movement In the process or capital accusation In the Italian
allow. Althon8h the northwestern elite may have succeeded ln restab-
Ushing Its political control over the Mezzogiorno by means of these
policies, It considered them Inadequate to allow th„4 e economic system
of the northwest to meet th ae exxgencxes of international economic com-
petition
.
The northwestern elite made ideological virtue of political nec-
essity once again, this time by partially repudiating the modified
"free enterprise" ideology's conceptualization of underdevelopment.
It contended that such a conceptualization might impede the State from
dealing effectively with the problem of the Mezzoglorno's underdevelop-
ment because, under the resultant preindustrialization policy, the
State could merely attempt to induce the area's industrialization by
developing infrastructure and agriculture. It still maintained that
the Mezzoglorno's underdevelopment was a technical problem to be solved
within Italy's traditional economic structure, but now advocated that
the State might take a more active role In the political organization
of the area's means of production.
The northwestern elite legitimized the State's more active role
by incorporating the problem of the Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment
nto the elaboration of national economic programs, more symbolic than
ubstantive. Through the DC, it availed itself of the economic
x
s
programming conrpnt- (t,-. ~cept (programmazxone economica) to create the impres -
sion that the State intended to reallylxze a series of declared socio-—. objectlves by carrylng out a predeterm±ned
Plan. In order to mlsuia ldeoiogicai ^ ^ ^
n0rth"eSt6rn eUte — usin8 the phrase^ Plamin8" —>. ^ Itallm gQvernment
-opt* Us first nacional deyelopment progrM ^^ Eiaborated
fox the Per lod 1955 .1%4> the VaMnl plM Vanoni)^ ^
reduce unemployment in the Me2Zoglor„0 , to remedy lu
-t without sacr lf icing economlc growth ln the ^ uauan
eco„omy and t0 lmprove ltaly , s lnternaUonal baianc£ Qf paymmts
These goals, by remalning abstract declaratlons> ^^
western elite's true attitude toward the P roblem o£ the Mezzoglorn0
s
underdevelopment. 17
The_Jezzogiorno' s Modernized UndPnU.i.p,.^
.
Incentlves ^l^endenFlndu^t7iaT^7MTLon
The Italian government specified the State's more active role in
the political organization of the Mezzogiomo's means of production by
enacting Law n. 634 of 29 July 1957, which made the State an
agent of industrialization with the task of directing and controlling
capital investments in the Mezzogiorno. Law n. 634 established two
contradictory policies: one charged the State to industrialize the
Mezzogiorno directly by concentrating large industrial and infrastruct-
ural investments in "areas of industrial development"; the other charged
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the State to industrialize rh* mqt e Mezzogaorno lndlrectly by implement
an incentives policy which miau Dght encourage the dispersion of small and
medium businesses outsidp the* »«6 e areas of Industrial development." 18
An "area of industrial development" 1 =i is a conglomeration of
"industrial nuclei" or areas l„ uan whach large businesses are concentrated
-gather with the infrastructure necessary to support and to Join them.
La* n. 634 charged the Committee of Ministers for the Mezzogiorno to
approve the projects for industrialization submitted for Judgment by
a consortium of communes in each industrial area. Under this law,
each consortium must attempt to attract industry by developing the
necessary infrastructure, up to 50 Derrpnt- ofP l du p cent of whose cost the CASMEZ
would cover. Moreover, Law n. 634 obliged north-central Italy's large
parastate industries to locate 40 percent of their total investments
and 60 percent of their new investments in the MeZZOgiorno.
The incentives policy aimed to reduce the production costs of
small and medium businesses in the area by providing for tax reduc-
tions and exemptions, advantageous credit terms and capital grants
offered by the CASMEZ. Law n. 634 increased the capital available to
such businesses by allowing medium term credit institutions based in
north-central Italy to operate in the MeZZOgiorno for the first time.
The incentives policy encouraged the dispersion of small and medium
businesses by hoping that reduced fiscal obligations to the State
would result automatically in lower production costs and, therefore,
greater competitivity and would adequately substitute the infrastructure




The contradictory pollcles^ by ^ ^ ^^
north-central Italy , s Urge ^^^^ industries more ^ ^
and medium businesses in the Me2zQgiorno because ^ ^^
industrialization prevailed over the poUcy Q£ indirecc industriaU2ati
for two reasons. First th^ nnvt-i,. e northwestern elite, through the DC, poli-
tical dotted parastate industries, the Committee of Ministers
for the Mezzogiorno and the CASMEZ. Seeond, the parastate industries,
already more productive than the small an An d medium businesses in the
Mezzogiorno, disposed of greater capital resourees and operated in
areas equipped with adequate infrastrueture . The incentives policy
also did not result in the establishment of many small and medium busi-
nesses in the Mezzogiorno for another two reasons: first, because
reduced fiscal obligations to the State did not result in lower pro-
duction costs and did not substitute adequately the infrastructure and
the external economies lacking outside the "areas of industrial devel-
opment"; and, second, because the Italian government subsequently
eliminated any incentive for small and medium businesses to locate in
the Mezzogiorno by implementing a similar incentives policy for the
rest of Italy.
In reality, north-central Italy's large parastate industries
benefitted most from the incentives policy designed originally to
promote the establishment of small and medium businesses in the Mezzo-
giorno. Law n. 634 defined such businesses as those whose personnel
totaled less than 500 and whose total fixed investments did not exceed
LIT 1.5 billion. Following the enactment of Law n. 555 of July 1959,
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which modified Law n. 634 tho rn •"4, e Committee of Ministers for the MeZzo-
giorno, in December 1QSQ ,1959, extended the incentives policy to those
businesses whose personnel totaled less than 500 * .and whose total fixed
investments did not exceed LIT 1 k-.1Tu Li J billion. in Mav 1 qa i ^ „n y iybl, the Committee
extended the incentives policy to WP x businesses of all sizes, provided
the value of no single productive unit might exceed LIT 6 billion;
xn this way, a business of any si 7 P ™kze, whose assets micr>^ u~LS ignt be opportunely
dis tributed; could take advantage of the incentives^
Law n. 1462 of September ,962 extended ^ ^ ^ ^
businesses, provided they might be ^ ^^
ment no greater than LIT 6 billion.
Moreover, Law n. 634 refinanced the CASMEZ and extended its life
to 15 years, that is, until 1965 ti« „n i S 3
. The government appropriated addi-
tional monies to the CASMEZ under Law n. 622 of 24 duly 1959 but did
not extend the CASMEZ' s life further. u„der Law n. 622, the funds for
vocational training include LIT 8,500 million from American agricultural
surpluses accepted by the Italian government under Law n. 1349 of 28
December 1957.
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Eollowing its refinancing, the CASMEZ increased its
yearly expenditure greatly. For example, in FY 1958-1958, the CASMEZ















































































When the United Klngdom foned a spanish invasiM ^^
the distribution o f P0„er within Europe shl£ted t„ ^ ^
northern Europe's nation-states. During the £our centurles^ ^
lowed the United Klngdom . s vlctQry over^ ^
acquired ever greater predoninance over Europe and over the political
organization o £ the international econo^s means o£ production by sur-
passing other states in the develops of political, economic and
military organization. For this reason ^ rlQ -iS
>
the military conflicts among
northern Europe's states resultpH ^r ed m ever greater disruptions of the
international balance of nnwr Tnpowe . In the twentieth century, European
military conflicts became world wars.
In World War II, Europe defeated itself because it lost its poli-
tical autonomy to the United States and the Soviet Union which emerged
as superpowers and divided Europe into spheres of influence: Western
Europe under American hegemony, Central Europe under Soviet hegemony.
Although Europe may be subordinate to the superpowers, Europe's
states, in comparison with other states save the superpowers, continue
to exert greater influence over the political organization of the
international economy's means of production. For this reason, the
superpowers made the common border between their spheres of influence
the "passive axis" upon which they balance their strategic political
and military interests. Moreover, the superpowers are concerned that
northern Europe's states, especially those closest to the "passive
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axis, may be more stable and tractable m« m,W th3n th° Se of southern Europe.
The former, in comparison with the l^t-a ter, continue to exert greater
influence over the nnliH^in polxtical organization of the intern^ il ternational economy's
means of production.
The United States M concerned that West^ ^^
be more stable and trart-pMo t-^c able than other states under American hegemony.
in fact, African hegemony over Western Europe privileges West German,
.ore than Prance „ the strategic equlllbrlum between ^
West Germany borders the "passive axis" m *V and, m comparison with France,
exerts greater influence over the doHh. ipolitical organization of the inter-
national economy's means of production.
The United States promoted the EEC because it effectively sanctioned
the predominance of West Germany and Prance in Western Europe by limiting
uniformly the EEC States' market policy authority. The predominance of
West Gremany and Prance gives to them, i„ comparison with Western Europe's
other states, a greater capacity to organize the means of production
of their own economies according to internal exigencies, to concentrate
"ithin their boundaries the accumulation and the investment of capital
and to determine the division of labor in Western Europe. For this
reason, the West German and Erench economies determine preponderantly
the EEC's development.
The predominance of West Germany and France in the EEC constrained
the northwestern elite to legitimize its dominance in Italy by legitimizing
a political organization of the means of production on Italian territory
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which might give to the economic system of th.e northwest the greatest
possible competitive advantage in ^ •l the international economy. To this
end, the northwestern elite legitime an intensification of the MeZ2o-
giorno-s underdevelopment to the advantage and benefit of the economic
system of the northwest beyond what the public wor.s and the land re-
form policies might allow t*-. it accomplished this by using the "eco-
nomic programming" concept to legitimize the implementation of the
Policies of incentives and dependent industrialization, « used this
concept to create the impression that the State might more effectively
address the problem of the MezZOgi<Ws underdevelopment by incorpor-
ating this problem into national economic programs and by taUing a more
active role in the political organization of the Mezzogiorno's means
of production. The policies of incentives and dependent industrial-
ization increased the area's involvement In the process of capital
accumulation in the Italian economy without changing its traditional
Place in the economy by locating large parastate industries in its
"areas of industrial development."
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Integration]
, Torino: Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1977; Gianni
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Information on the CAP's effect on the international economy
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EEC-ACP Interactions and Images as Redefinitions of Eur-africa-
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Lougheed, "The Common AiilcSfaTT'ol • f ' JanUary 1975 = A. L.
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European Community" in The Annals of the I
External Relations of the
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See Joseph La Palombara, Italy: The Polit-irc; of pi** •
Syracuse NY: Syracuse UniversitTfer^^
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Italy-Republic Without Govetmnent? New York NY W u
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With regard to the policy of direct industrialization, see
for example, Alfredo Del Monte and Adriano Giannola, II Mezzogiorno
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CHAPTER v
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY'S TTNRAt immA» ITALY IN THE InS^^^o^™
Premise
Italy's participation in the EEC increases it. i is involvement in the
Process of capital accusation among the EEC States principally t0
advantage and benefit of the West Cerman and Erench economies.
The EEC's unbalanced integration hx, a -c , by determining preponderantly the
Italian econo^s place and function in the EEC and in the international
economy, glves t0 Italy . subsidiary ^ fa ^^^ ^ ^
resultant international division of labor. Tbis role manifests itself
most clearly in three international exchange relationships: Italy's
con^ercial exchange; the exchange relationships between the Italian
Lira and other currenripQ- Qn jc es, and the movements of capital and labor.
(The movements of capital are examined in this chanter th»xii Luxb n p , e movements
of labor in the next.)
The EEC's Unbalanced Integration And
Italy's Commercial Exchange
The volume of Italy's commercial exchange reflects the development
stimulated by the increased mobility of capital, labor and commerce
between it and the other EEC States. Between 1953 and 1963, the value
of its exports increased from LIT 942 billion yearly to LIT 3,706
148
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bilUon yearly (that ls , frM $15 bniion ^ ^^^
yearly ). one third of this lncrease ^^^^ betueen ^
two thirds between 1958 and 1962 2 t^i •^2. Italian exports, if set at 100 in
1953, reached 180 in 1957 and 453 in 1964 while thpi?oq, n e exports of all
manufactured goods doubled between 1953 and 1957 and then tripled
between 1957 and 1%4. „hUe world expQrts by ^^ ^
tween 1953 and !957 and by 56 percent between 1957 and 196,/ Moreover
between 1953 and 1963, Italian exports to European countries rose fro,
little more than LIT 600 billion to more than LIT 2,000 billion yearly ,
while exports to Africa and Asia increased from LIT 200 billion to LIT
450 billion yearly .
5
On the other hand, its exports to the United States
and Canada, in terms of volume, remained practically unchanged at about
10 percent of total exports.
6 m 1963, in terms of value, 67 percent
of Italian exports satisfied European demand, while the remaining 33
percent satisfied North American demand. 7
TABLE 5. -Italy's commercial exchange 1957-1964 change per cent
in constant 1963 prices
1957- 1959- 1961- 1963-
1958 1960 1962 1964
Imports from the EEC + 3.3 +42.9 +21.5 +11.2
Imports from the rest of the world + 8.7 +20.
1
+13.5 + 7.8
Exports to the EEC +11.4 +37.0 +23.9 +14.2
Exports to the rest of the world +18.9 +15.3 +11.8 + 7.8
~-
, ^^^^....j. utii xiiLegiazione economica euro-
pea sulla struttura delle esportazioni italiane" ["The Effects of Euro-
pean Economic Integration on the Structure of Italian Exports"] in
Rassegna economica
, September/October 1975, n. 5, p. 1144.
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Italian economic perforce was shaped by lts comercial
in general but especially by tt8 exchanges^ ^ other ^^
States and less so with Western Europe's other countries, as Tahles
6 through 9 indicate:
TABLE e.-Co^nercial exchange (goods and services) as percentage of GDP
Italy
EEC










































SOURCE: Helen Wallace, William Wallace, Carole Webb editors Pol,
TABLE 7.—Italy's commercial exchange 1951-1971 change per cent













Imports from the EEC +26.6 + 4.4 +32.2 + 6.3 +16.5 + 17.8
Imports from the rest
of the world
+ 6.0 +11.3 +16.8 + 6.5 + 9.5 + 10.6
Total Imports + 9.5 + 9.8 +20.0 + 6.4 +11.5 +12.9
Exports to the EEC + 5.8 +17.2 +30.4 +18.8 +20.1 +13.3
Exports to the rest
of the world
+11.1 +15.9 +13.6 +10.9 + 8.8 + 7.2
Total Exports +10.2 +16.1 +16.5 +12.9 +11.7 + 8.9
SOURCE: Franca Falcone, "Effetti dell' integrazione economica europea
sulla struttura delle esportazioni italiane" ["The Effects of the Euro-
pean Economic Integration on the Structure of Italian Exports"] in
Rassegna economica , September/October 1975, n. 5, pp. 1142-1143.
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TABLE 8 Intra-EEC commercial exchange 1952-1971 ae
Italy's commercial" exchangf
° f
Imports from the EEC as % of
total imports






















Eranca Ealcone, "E£fetti deir lntegra2lone ^
Pea suUa struttura delle esportazioni ltallana" ["The Effects of Euro-pea* Economic integration on the Structure of Italian Exports"] i„
Rassegna economic*
, September/October 1975, n. 5, pp. 1H2-U43
TABLE 9. -Intra-EEC coamerclal exchange 1958-1980 as percentage oftotal commercial exchange (goods only)
Italy
EEC







































SOURCE: Helen Wallace, William Wallace, Carole Webb, editors,
Policy Making in the European Community (Second Edition), Chichester:
John Wiley and Sons, 1983, p. 123.
From 1954 to 1971, Italy's share of world exports of manufactured
goods increased from 2.7 percent to 6.8 percent, as Table 10 indicates:
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TABLE 10.-Quota per cent o£ Morld exports q£ actured goods
SOURCE: Elvi0 Dal Bosco and Florina plerem>
struttura del commercio P qt- Prn ^= •este o dex paesx membri della CEE" ["The
I™ °;°
£ FOrei8n S— of the EEC Member Cou„tries"]
iltalla. Roma: Centre Stampa-Banca d 'Italia, December 1973 n 3
During the 19 70s, Italian exports reached an average 6 .A percent
of the export markets of all industrial countries, as Table 11
indicates on the following page. In this period, the average volume
of exports exceeded imports but the average value of imports exceeded
exports
.
The structure of Italy's commercial exchange, both in terms of
the types of goods and services exchanged and in terms of their geo-
graphic distribution, reflects the economy's subsidiary role in the
upper ranks of the international division of labor. The expansion
of exports resulted primarily from demand in the EEC for the manu-
factured goods produced by the country's traditional, i.e., labor-
intensive sectors; in 1963, exports of manufactured goods produced by
the capital-intensive sectors represented only 15 percent of total
8
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raw materials and exported primarily m a-medium value-
as Table 12 indicates:
added goods,
TABLE 12. -The structure of Italy's m

















SOURCE: My elaboraUnn ~* a
Thp j r -i •
oratlo of data extracted from Donald C. Tempie Italian Economy, New York- Prao „ L1y> . Praeger Publishers, 1981, Chapter 7.
eman
,
During the 1960s, xtalian exports Qf agrlcuUural products ^ a
Part of total exports increased in absolute terms but decreased in
relative terms. During the 1970s, they decreased in absolute terms
because demand in the RFC fnr t*--i •EE o Italian products concerned principally
traditional manufactured goods and because the CAP favored both con-
tinental agricultural products and the agricultural producers, already
more efficient and productive, of the EEC's more dominant economic
systems. The increase in agricultural exports during the 1960s re-
sulted from the external demand for processed agricultural products
from north-central Italy. During the 1960s and the 1970s, exports of
agricultural products from the Mezzogiorno (i.e., Mediterranean agri-
cultural products) first increased little, then decreased (see Tables
155
13 and 14). During the 1970s, Italy
quantities of agricultural products.
imported progressively greater
,uota (in thousands of\oJZT^tl l^of^
SOURCE: Marcello Gorgoni, "Agrumicoltura italiana e mercato estero"
["Italian Citrus Fruit Production and the Foreign Market"] in Rassegna
economica May/June, 1973, n. 3, p. 772.
TABLE 14. -Per cent of the Mediterranean agricultural products imported
by the EEC from the Mezzogiorno
Citrus Fruits Vegetables Dried Fruits
1969- 1970 7. 7 19.6 25.5
1974- 1975 4. 9 17.2 17.0
SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from Vincenzo Guizzi,
Comunita' europea e sviluppo del Mezzogiorno
[ The European Community
and the Mezzogiorno ' s Development ], Milano: Giuffre'. 1978. p. 181
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Italy effects the principai share o£ ^ ^
the countries of Western Enrope, especia lly the other EEC Mb er States
The United States provided 10 percent of itaiy's _cial exchange
during^he 1960s'
; the American share decHned to 7 percent dU rin g the
1970s. Durlng the I960s
, Ualy , s conmerciai exchange ^^
Producing and exporting countries increased because it hecame increas-
ingly dependent on foreign sources fnro its energy supplies, 82 percent
of which are imported. 11





















SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from Donald C. Templeman,
The Italian Economy, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981, Chapter 7.
An ever greater number of Italian entrepreneurs produces goods
not for the Italian market but rather for foreign markets (those of
157
states both weaker and stronger than Italy) Italv . q n ,. .^J- j. y s participation
in an EEC debated politically by West Cermany and rrance under .
tempered African hegemony increases the ^ ^
Process o£ capital accumulation among the EEC States prlncipally t0 the
advantage and benefit of the West German and French economies. This
reduces the prospects of maxlmum reparation and of a stahie demand
in the Italian market relative to many foreign markets.
According to a stody issued in duly 1985 by the Istituto Co^ercio
Estero (ICE)
,
Italy's Foreign Trade !nstitute, the number of Italian
businesses which sell goods abroad increased from 48,32! in 1972 to
slightly more than 86,000 In 1985 (an increase of about 78 percent).
The geographic distribution of these businesses reflects the Mezzo-
giorno 's subaltern position in the Italian economy: 70 percent are
located in northern Italy, 20 percent in central Italy and 10 percent
in the Mezzogiorno.
In recent years, an ever greater number of the entrepreneurs of
central Italy and the Mezzogiorno has sought higher remuneration not
by selling greater quantities of products in the Italian market but
rather by penetrating foreign markets. Of the more than 86,000
Italian businesses which sell goods abroad, the export earnings of the
30 percent located in central Italy and in the Mezzogiorno increased
from 21.2 percent of Italy's total export earnings in 1978 to 24.1
percent in 1983; the export earnings of the 70 percent located in
northern Italy decreased correspondingly from 78.8 percent of Italy's
total export earnings in 1978 to 75.9 percent in 1983. Between 1978
158
and 1983, the number of businesses^ ^^^
±n CamPan±a ln P^ Ctw of the Mezzogiorno's regions),
and to a lesser extent in the Veneto (a region of the economic system
of the center/northeast), than in the country's other regions.
12
The Italian Lira is an authentic currency because other states
VieW " 3 UnU ° f aCCOunt » » instrument of exchange and a fund
of value.
13
The Lira derives its value from the political organiza-
tion of the means of production on Italian territory. For this
reason, its value relative to thp to1„q n e nt.ul ne value of other currencies results
from, and reflects, two fundamental relationships: first, Italy'
ability, relative to the ability of other states, to influence th
political organization of the international economy's means of pro-
duction; and, second, Italy's ability, relative to the ability of
other states, to influence the political organization of the means
of production on its territory. In short, the Lira's value results
from, and reflects, the Italian economy's place and function in the
international economy and, therefore, the Italian economy's role in
the international division of labor.
The Lira's value relative to the value of the United States
Dollar and of the West German Mark indicates most clearly the Italian
economy's subsidiary role in an EEC dominated politically by West




unner a te.pereo toiean negem0ny becaUse tta Unlted states .„„ West
Ger,any Have the greate s t abllity
, relative t0 Ualy
, „
both the political organization o£ the means „£ ^^
territory ana of tne international eC onomy . s means of production. Tne
Dollar, which forms the largest Dart of rha «. . ,S p the official reserves held
by central banks in the world, is current, v rh, i, x ly t e only authentic reserve
currency in the international economy. It U the currency considered
the most valid international means of payment by other states for two
reasons: first, because the United States is the state most able to
influence the international economy and, therefore, to determine the
international division of labor; and, second, because the United
States is the only state which can use its own currency to finance its
deficits in the international economy. 14 The West German Mark is a
de facto reserve currency in the international economy, that is, a
currency considered a valid international means of payment inferior
only to the Dollar, because West Germany's political and economic
predominance in Western Europe gives it a great ability to influence
the political organization of the international economy's means of
production and, therefore, to determine the international division
or labor.
The most common indicator of the Lira's value relative to the
Dollar and the Mark is the exchange rate between these currencies,
that is, their politically accepted ratio of value expressed as each
currency's price in the others' monetary denominations. Such an
indicator is misleading, however, because it expresses the ratio of the
1M)
extrinsic value between these currencies, that is, each currency'
buying power in the others' economies, not the ratio of the int
value between them, that is, an adjusted comparison of their b
power within their respective economies. The difference between th
ratios of the extrinsic and intrinsic values between these currencies,
called seigniorage, accrues to the United States and to West Germany
at Italy's expense because Italy occupies a subaltern position rela-








American hegemony over Western Europe ensured to the United
States and to West Germany the ability to appropriate seigniorage
from Italy. The United States exercized its power in the international
system in such a way as to foster the creation of a politically accept-
able complex of the ratios of value between the various currencies in
the world. Thus emerged an international monetary regime, whose in-
stitutional mechanics and formal political commitments might oblige
the world's various states to maintain the fluctuations of the ex-
change rates between their currencies within politically accepted
margins but might not oblige the dominant states to compensate the
subaltern states for the value lost in the form of seigniorage. In
short, the United States fostered the creation of an international
monetary regime which might maintain both the stability of exchange
rates between currencies and the advantages and benefits enjoyed by
the dominant states. The resultant Bretton Woods International Mone-
tary Regime (22 July 1944 - 15 August 1971), which became fully
™ - »«. had three fundamental characterlstlcs:
£
vertibility of the currencies of it ,5 ° WeStem E-°P-'s major states for
gold beginning in December 1958; and last f ,a, , flxed exchange rates be-
tween currencies, whose PvMn,'> uub extrinsic value cnnlH fiou d fluctuate no more than
+1 percent from parity excenrY pt m cases of official devaluation 17
An international Monetary Non-Re g ime began on 15 August 1 971
when the United States unilaterally terminated the Bretton Woods
Regime by devaluing the Dollar and by suspending the Dollar's con-
vertibility for gold. Under the Smithsonian Agreement of December
1971, the central banks of the Group of Ten that i, th' n ls > e major indus-
trialized countries ln the world ^ ^^
France, ltaly> Japan , the Netherlands
_^ ^^^ ^
West Germany) committed themselves ^ ^ ^ ^
exchange rates between their currencies within a margin of +2 .25 per-
cent reiative to the Dollar. On 19 March 1973, the Group of Ten
together with Switzerland (then an associate member, now a full
-her) and the minor EEC member States, e.g., Denmark, Ireland and
Luxembourg, renounced the Smithsonian Agreement because it estab-
lished fluctuation margins without establshing the institutional
mechanics and the formal political commitments which might govern how
the central banks of the adhering countries might maintain collectively
the prescribed parity between their currencies.18 In the meantime,
under the Basle Accord of 21 March 1972, the EEC member States estab-
lished "central exchange rates" between their currencies, put these
162
exchange rates into effect on 10 April 1972 . h, and agreed to maintain
their fluctuations within a margin of +2 2S „8 - 5 P erce"t. In 1973, Sweden
and Norway committed themselves to the Basle An a un a i ccord, but Italy re-
nounced it in February 1973 for rh» By »/J. t t e same reason for which it had
reMCed SmlthSOnla
" A~- 19 * AP-l 1973, the EEC states
created the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (FEC0M)
, charged ^
rebate the £lMncial operatiQns ^ ^^^ ^
the EEC States to maintain the parity o f their currencies reiative to
the "central exchange rates" established under the Basle Accord. 2"
Under the Kingston Agreement of January 1 976> che Group of Ten
together with »e»mrk , Ireland
, Luxembourg Qnd
the international Monetary Non-Regime hy establishing a new Interna-
tional Monetary Regime based on the coordination by their central
banks of flexible exchange rates between currencies. 21 Under the
Brussels Accord of 5 December 1978, the EEC States created the Euro-
pean Monetary System (EMS) which entered into effect on 13 March 1979
and recommitted them to maintain the fluctuations of the exchange
rates between their currencies within a margin of +2.25 percent
relative to the "central exchange rates" of these currencies, except
In the cases of the Irish Pound and the Italian lira, accorded fluctu-
ation margins of +6 percent.
22
The Bank of Italy is currently consid-





the exact aMunt Qf selgniorage ^ ^
ascertained because the economic sciences dlspose^ ^ ,^
tific formula „hlch ^ quantify the relatlonsMp between
Price nor of a concrete end universal model of analysis. In short
the economic sciences lacx universal criteria and means with whlch
eurrencies may be compared in order to determine their real ratio of
value. The ability to determine correctly theirnecti ratio presupposes the
ability to make a universal comparison between currencies which derive
their value from the political organization of different, particuiar
means of production. The ability to dateline correctly the exact
amount of seigniorage gained by the dominant states at the expense
of the subaltern states presupposes the ability to differentiate, es-
pecially i„ quantitative terms, between the intrinsic and the extrinsic
value of currencies.
Nonetheless, the political and economic relationships established -
between Italy and the United States allow some observations on the
relationship, in terms of value, between the Lira and the Dollar and,
therefore, some observations on the Italian economy's place and func-
tion in the international economy. Although Italy may effect the
principal share of its commercial exchange with the countries of
Western Europe, especially with the EEC States, it has become more
164
depend than the other EEC States on the Dollar as an international^ ° f ^ CalCUl— tb. value of a greater share Qf ifcs
imports than of its exports in Dollars 24 a , ac . A study issued in July 1984
by the Banca Commerciale TfaU a -r,r,i Itali ns compares the payment structure of
Italy's commercial exchange with that of the EEC:


























S0URCE: La Repubblica (Roma) 26 July 1984, p. 27.
The payment structure of Italy's commercial exchange ties its
balance of payments to the Dollar, whose extrinsic value, more than
that of any other currency, determines the cost of Italian imports.
On the one hand, for every 10 Lire lost by the Dollar in its exchange
rate with the Lira, the cost of Italian imports decreases by LIT 480
...... 25
billion. On the other hand, a strong Dollar relative to the Lira,
by increasing the price of Italian imports, produces three consequences,
First, an econometric study issued in December 1983 by the Bank of
Italy revealed that, under the conditions then prevailing, the Dollar,
165
when valued at LIT 1 6DD1,600, was responsible for three percentage points
of Italy's inflation rate.
26
Seconrl rh*s ond, the average Dollar/Lira exchange
rate in 1984, that is, $1 = LIT 1 7sn
• ^ i' 750
. against the average Dollar/
Lira exchange rate in 1983, that is $1 - ttt i ma, - LIT 1,519, constrained
Italy to disburse LIT 2,935 billion more In 1984 than In 1983 to cover
the cost of imports, as Table 17 shows on the following page. Last,
a strong Dollar hinders Italy's ability to take advantage of the
reductions of the prices of raw materials (see Table 18): although
fewer Dollars may be needed to purchase raw materials, more Lire are
needed to purchase Dollars.
American hegemony over an Italy dominated politically and econom-
ically by its northwestern elite has made the Dollar Italy's principal
international means of payment. The Dollar drains value in the form
of seigniorage from the Italian economy through Italy's commercial
exchange with the international economy, and especially through its
importation of petroleum, because the Dollar's extrinsic value rela-
tive to the Lira determines preponderantly the cost of Italian imports.
Should the Dollar prove too costly for the Italian economy, the
northwestern elite, or another future ftiling class, could decide to
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TABLE 18.—Adjusted index of rh*xuu r t e prices of
market (1977=100)










































Italy and the ECU
The European Currency Unit (ECU), created by the Brussels Accord
of 5 December 1978 to replace the European Unit of Account (EUA)
, would,
in all probability, replace the Dollar as Italy's principal international
means of payment. The ECU is currently not an authentic currency but
rather another EEC unit o£ account, that ls . . redenomlnaUon q£ g
the central banks of the EFf qt, ra c 27 ™states. The Fni'c ~j.nt: r,^u s value results
fro», and reflects, the composite value of the currencies of the
EEC States: each currency contributes a portion of the ECU's value
according to a coefficient prescribed collectively by the F





All the EEC States except West Germany are currently disposed
to transform the ECU from the EEC's unit of account into the EEC's
authentic currency because such a transformation would allow them
to terminate their dependence on the Dollar as an international
means of payment by making the ECU equal, if not superior, to the
Dollar. West Germany is opposed to such a transformation. It would
deprive the West German economy of the advantages derived from the
Mark's predominance over the other EEC currencies by terminating
the Mark's role as a de facto reserve currency in the international
economy. Should the political and economic costs of an EEC divided
monetarily against the Dollar outweigh the advantages gained for the
West German economy by the Mark's predominance over the other EEC
currencies, West Germany would have to accept the ECU's transformation
from the EEC's unit of account to the EEC's authentic currency. 28
Italy is currently one of the EEC's principal proponents of a
transformation because it could aid the northwestern elite in mini-
mizing the negative consequences of the EEC's unbalanced integration
169
for the Italian economy. it woulH *n T ,y d allow Italy to terminate its de-
pendence on the Dollar as an 4^4-international means o£ payme„t and the
Mark's predominance over the Lira. In order t0 reduce ^
on the Dollar, Italy opened nitrations recently with three of its
prinoipal suppliers of crude oil and natural gas, Algeria, Saudi
Arabia and the Soviet Union, all congenial to the Kalian proposal to
the ECU the neans of payment in their oo^ercial eXohange with
Italy. Moreover, the Italian Parliament is eonsidering a bill
whioh would oblige the Ente Nazionale Idroearburi (ENI) , the Nations!
Hydrooarbon Corporation, to invoice at least half of Its net importa-
tion of natural gas in ECUs by the end of 1986.
30
In order t0 termln.
ate the Mark's predominance over the other EEC currencies, Italy must
attempt to overcome West German resistance to the ECU's transformation
by organizing among the EEC States the broadest possible political
consensus for such a transformation.
The Italian Lira, the EUA/ECU and the West German Mark
The relationship between the contribution per cent of the Lira
and of the Mark to the value of the EUA/ECU is the most accurate
indicator of the relationship, in terms of value, between these cur-
rencies because a fixed and stable coefficient mediates each currency's
contribution. Between May 1975 and May 1984, the Mark's contribution
to the value of the EUA/ECU increased by 9.93 percent, that is, from




by 5.51 percent, that is, from 13 An nJ- J- lJ iii percent t-n 7 onp tu c o /.89 percent. The
Lira's co„tributlon to the value rf ^^ ^^^
of the Mark . s contribution ln May 1975> n ^ ^ ^
in short, between May 19„ Md ^ 1984> ^
by 15.44 percent ln absolute ^ fcy^^ ^^
terms, against the Mark's value- tho M i « u, e value of the Lira's contributi
per cent to the value of the EUA/fptt oon /ECU as a percentage of the Mark's
contribution per cent decreased bv ?ft 1/y 28.14 percent in absolute terms,
132.05 percent in relative terms.
West Germany's predominance over the other EEC States manifests
itself in the value relationships between the Mark and the other EEC
currencies in two ways: first, the Mark's contribution to the value
of the EUA/ECU is clearly the greatest among the contributions of the
EEC currencies; and, second, between May 1975 and May 1984, the Mark's
contribution to the value of the EUA/ECU increased greatly, principally
at the expense of the Italian Lira and the French Franc whose contri-
butions together with those of the other EEC currencies, save the
Dutch Florin, decreased, as Table 19 shows.
The value relationships between the Lira and the other EEC cur-
rencies reflect the Italian economy's subordinate position among the
economies of the other major EEC States, in that, between May 1975
and May 1984 (and not only in this period), the other EEC currencies
ined value on the Lira. Between 1973 and 1976, the Lira's depreci-
tion cost the Italian economy, through its commercial exchange, $7.3































































SOURCE: My elaboration of the data presented in Appendix A
DM=West German Mark; FF=French Franc; L=British Pound; HFL=Dutch Florin
(or Guilder); LIT=Italian Lira; FB=Belgium Franc; DKR=Danish Crown;
IRL-Irish Pound; FLUX=Luxembourg Franc.
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TABLE 20. -The contribution per cent of t-Vi .the value of the EUA/ECU relative to rL ^ °" EEC CUrrencies to
May 1975 984



































































































































































O CO CO ||
*J J-4 ^ ^-N
3 d) rl rH
i—
I 00 i—I CU *—
'
O C 3 1
co co cu i—I /—
\
JQ X X CO CN





















































































cO CU CU •H
ft CJ M






CJ •H cdw 4->




4J 01 cj 4J
43 o
























































































































































































































































































t>o cu cu s-/
O C 3 ^ i









































































The EEC's Unbal^nr^ intepr fl t^n a i.
There are two fundamental types of foreign capital invested in
the MeZzogiorno: non-Italian and Italian. Each type co.es from three
Principal sources. Non-Italian foreign capital co.es f rom the United
States, the EEC States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Lebanon, Liechten-
stein, Sweden and Switzerland, and the EEC's agencies. 32 i talian
foreign capital, that is, capital invested in the Mezzogiorno by
entrepreneurs and agencies based in north-central Italy co.es from
'
the parastate industries, the CASMEZ and north-central Italy's oli-
gopolies. Law n. 43 of 7 February 1956, modified by Law n. 169 of
11 March 1965, regulates the investments of non-Italian capital on
Italian territory and provides that investors may transfer out of the
country all the capital invested productively, together with all the
dividends and profits realized. Italy's legislation relative to the
policies of incentives and dependent industrialization regulates the




legislation relative to the policy of incentives applies equally to
the investments of non-Italian and Italian foreign capital.
34
)
The investors of non-Italian capital invest in Italy so that it
may continue to play its role in the international division of labor
and so that one or more of Italy's three economic systems may be
either a market for the goods and services produced by this capital
or a territorial base for the production of goods and services to be
exchanged elsewhere. The principal determinant of the investment of
non-Italian capital „ the Me2zoglorno
_ ^ ^ ^
system of the northwest and the center/northeast, ls the^ ^
incentives. Before the Italian government abolished salary discrim-
ination between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy in l969> the in_
vestors of non-Italian capital invested in the Mezzogiorno to tahe
advantage of the lower cost of labor. 35
These investors consider the Mezzogiorno not a market but rather
a territorial base for the production of goods and services to be
exchanged elsewhere, two-thirds of which are exported principally
to north-central Italy and to Western Europe's other states, espec-
'
daily the EEC States. One quarter of the businesses which produce
goods and services in the Mezzogiorno with the participation of non-
Italian capital produce primarily for export; two-thirds export a
sizeable portion of their goods, while only ten percent produce for
the Mezzogiorno. The quality of the investments of the non-Italian
capital in the Mezzogiorno reflects the Mezzogiorno's subaltern posi-
tion in the international economy. Investors employ their capital
not to promote research and development (R and D) , reserved for the
more dominant economic systems, but to produce and assemble certain
parts of some products.
Private Foreign Capital in Italy
Although the EEC States collectively, in comparison with the
United States, may manage more plants and may own and may participate
178
37
in more companies in Italy, the UnitPd Q* *-y, Ln u e States, responsible for 75
percent of the non-Italian can-it-.i •p al invested in the Mezzogiorno and
LIT 10,000 billion of investments in the Italian pcn economy, i s by far
the single largest source of th. forelgn capUal ^^
Foreign i„vestors
, as lndependent en£reprfineurs
_ or ^ ^
majority participants together with Italian investors, produce goods
and services in Ualv according to the following figures. As Table 24
shows, these refer to the pivht- l Q v,> -e ght largest sources of foreign capital
invested in Italy.







( 2 .16) 58




( 3 .14) 100
West Germany 271 (17 76) 389
(EEC)
(729) (47 77) (1,230)
Sweden
47
( 3. 08) 80
Switzerland 174 (11. 40) 288
United States 576 (37. 75) 1,048
Total 1,526 (100.00)
SOURCE: La Repubblica (Roma) 2 January 1985, p. 35.
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There are currently in Italv ft?n „~y m y 820 companxes (see Table 25) with a
labor force of 424,000, whose canit-*! ^ a •pital is predominantly or entirely
foreign.












































SOURCE: La Repubblica (Roma) 4/5 March 1984, p. 30.
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Investors from the eight brooC h ^ r ,la gest sources of foreign capital provide
at least 50 percent of the capital in 797 companies, that is, in 52
percent of the 1,526 companies which produce goods and services on
Italian territory with the participation of foreign capital, as Tabl,
26 shows
:












Companies in Italy with capital
predominantly or entirely
foreign

































SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from La Repubblica (Roma)
4/5 March 1984, p. 30 and 2 January 1985, p. 35.
181
The influx of foreign capital into Italy in 1983, 1984 and 1 985
reflects the county strategic Stance to foreign investors,
concerned to Influence as much as possible the political organization
of the means of production in Italy so that it may continue to play
its traditional role in the international division of labor. These
investors legitimized their interest in Italy by creating a percep-
tion of the country as a most desirable site for the investment of
capital. 39 They demonstrated their interest in many significant
ways. For example, on 25 July 1984, the EEC approved the expenditure
of LIT 1,084 billion of investment capital in north-central Italy and
LIT 800 billion of investment capital in the Mezzogiorno, principally
through north-central Italy's private oligopolies, in order to faci-
litate the restructuring of Italy's automotive industry. 40 On 7 August
1984, Electrolux (Sweden) became Zanussi's controlling shareholder by
purchasing 49 percent of Zanussi's stock for LIT 32 billion.
41
On 4
September 1984, a consortium of foreign banks covered $500 million
of bonds issued by Italy's Ministry of the Treasury, which had placed
these bonds on the Eurodollar market one month earlier in order to
facilitate the reconstruction of some of the Mezzogiorno ' s areas
affected by the earthquake of 23 November 1980.
42
From 28 to 30
March 1985, more than 100 of the world's largest private investment
agencies attended a "summit meeting" organized by Euromobiliare in
Florence to elaborate programs for the future investment of capital in
43
Italy. On 2 April 1985, a consortium of London City's banks
covered another $500 million of bonds issued by Italy's Ministry of
182
the ir^ « and> on 14 Aprn 1985> m buiira
of bonds on the Italian market Co flnanC£ ,^^45
The largest share of the foreign capita! invested in Italy> and in
Western Europe, is American. In 1981 m„ ,i ,i 1983, the United States, by investing
53.8 billion abroad, surpassed its record, established in 1980, of
52.! billion of foreign investments/6 m Western Europe it invested
52.2 billion (compared to 5797 million in 1982), which represents
57.9 percent of total foreign investments. 1„ London clty i£
51.1 billion, that is, 50 percent of the $2.2 billion invested in
Western Europe." On 22 December 1983, AT and T (United States) be-
came Olivetti's largest shareholder by purchasing 25 percent of Olivetti's
stock for LIT 440 billion ( $ 260 million) with an option to purchase
up to 40 percent of its stock/ 8 On 24 October 1984, the Merrill Lynch
investment firm (United States), at the head of an international con-
sortium of banks, placed $1 billion of bonds on international money
markets on behalf of Italy's Ministry of the Treasury. 49 In 1984, the
United States, after a 20 year absence, started to invest again in the




Foreign investors purchased 30 Italian companies in 1984.
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Two hundred and f if tv-o-i rrU<- ^x y eight plants, which employ 78,667 people
currently produce goods and services in rh» mm t e Mezzogiorno with the par-
Ration of „on-Itallan capltal
, provlded by 19?5 companies ^
Table 28 shows. nu compared t0 slxteen pUnts ^ ^ ^ ^





















N 1 ITTlK d >*li LIU1U c L (%) Number (%) Number (%)
2
( 1.03) 9 ( 3.49) 837 ( 1.07)
3
( 1.54) 3 ( 1.16) 1,852
( 2,36)
5
( 2.56) 8 ( 3.10) 1,071 ( 1.36)
21
( 10.77) 21 ( 8.14) 2,551 ( 3.24)
19






8 ( 4.10) 13 ( 5.04) 4,766 ( 6.06)
20
( 10.26) 24 ( 9.30) 6,787 ( 8.63)
75
( 38.46) 108 ( 41.86) 27,016
( 34.34))
3 ( 1.54) 3 ( 1.16) 510
( 0.65)
1
( 0.51) 1 ( 0.39) 80 ( 0.10)
9 ( 4.61) 10 ( 3.89) 2,331 ( 2.96)
3 ( 1.54) 6 ( 2.33) 2,055 ( 2.61)
24 ( 12.31) 22 ( 8.53) 6,107 ( 7.76)
75 ( 38.46) 96 ( 37.21) 37,879 ( 48.15)
195 (100.00) 258 (100.00 78,667 (100.00)
SOURCE: IASM, Iniziative industrial! a partecipazione estera nel
Mezzogiorno
[ Industrial Initiatives With The Participation oTToTiign
Capital in the Mezzogiorno ], Roma: IASM. Dprpmhpr 1 QR1
a p i]
185
The entity o£ the investments of non.ltaUan capttai ^
Me22ogiorno reflects the area's subordinate posltlon ^ ^
ticnal economy. Ihe frQm ^^^^ ^
foreign capital in Italy have located only 175 m ,u i ui (11.5 percent) of their
1,526 companies in the Mezzogiorno, as Table 29 shows.





































SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from la Repubblica (Roma)
2 January 1985, p. 35 and IASM, Iniziative industrial! a partecipazione
estera nel Mezzogiorno [Industrial Initiatives With The Participation
of Foreign Capital in the Mezzogiorno
1 , Roma: IASM, December 1981, p. 11
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n0n"ItSllan CaPUal
«» *—*~ has thus far
exacerbated the area's disequilihr,-. •equrUbrra r„ par t because the investors ^
concentrated their^ territorially,^^ ^ ^
number of plants, in southern La2lo and in Campania so that these
investments might benefit both from fh= • tthe infrastructure ooncentrated
around and between Rome and Naples and from the geograPhic proximi ty
of sonthern Laz io and Campania to the marhets of Western EuroPe, espec-
ially the EEC States » of the two hundred flfty-elght plants which
produce goods and servirPQ ™xces ln the Mezzogiorno with the participation
of non-Italian capital 167 ffi/, 7Pl i, 167 (64.7 percent) are located in southern
Lazio and in Campania, 46 (17.8 percent) in AbruZ20 and Puglia,
33 (12.8 percent) in Sicily and in Sardinia, 12 (4.7 percent) in
Calabria, Marche (Ascoli-Piceno province), and Basiiicata, hut none
in Molise, as Table 30 shows.
The percentage of the non-Italian capital invested in southern
Lazio and in Campania as a percentage of the non-Italian capital
invested in the 258 plants located in the Mezzogiorno is as follows
(in descending order): North America (Canada and the United States),
81 percent; Western Europe Non-EEC (Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzer-
land), 79 percent; Western Europe (EEC and Non-EEC), 58 percent; EEC,
50 percent; and Oceania/Middle East (Australia, Japan and Lebanon),
23 percent. The highest concentrations in southern Lazio and in
Campania of this foreign capital have resulted from the investments
which come from Lebanon (100 percent), Liechtenstein (90 percent),
Switzerland (82 percent) and the United States (81 percent).
187







































SOURCE: IASM, Iniziative industriali a partecipazione estera n.l
Mezzogiorno [Industrial Init iatives With The Participation of Foreign
Capital in the Mezzogiornol
. Roma: IASM, December 1981, p. 12.
(*) The province of Ascoli-Piceno is an area of competence of the CASMEZ
The concentration of southern Lazio and in Campania of the capital




TABLE 31.—The concpntr.n t
southern Lazio and in SiiTS^°T??
-
nUmber



















































SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from IASM, Iniziative indus -
trial! a partecipazione estera nel Mezzogiorno
[ Industrial Initiatives




an, of £he non.Itallan capUal lnvested ^ Mezzogiorno> ^
through the European Regional n„, iDevelopment Fund (ERDF), the Guidance and
Guarantee Sections of the CAP (FEOGA)
, and the EIB.
The EEG States allocated to the ERDF EUA 1 ,300 milUon for the 1975
»77 period, xhia sum refiected West Germany's polltlcal predomlnance
over the other EEG States, it is much cioser to the allocation of
EUA i.000 million proposed by West German,, the principal contrihutor
- the ERDF, than to the aiiocation of EUA 2, 250 million rec„ed
by the Thomson Report, or to the aiiocation of EUA 3,000 million desired
by England, Ireland and Italy, the ERDF's principal prospective bene-
ficiaries. ^ in 197S rh& vvr^1*75, t e EEC s various regions, through their central
governments, presented to the EEC's Regional Policy Committee 1,521
Projects, of which 1,183 were approved. Of these projects, 60 percent
concerned the development of infrastructure and 40 percent industry and
services. Moreover, in that year, the ERDF allocated to the EEC States
EUA 299.8 million, of which Italy received EUA 124 million (equal then
to LIT 187.5 billion and 41.4 percent of the total allocated by the
ERDF)
.
This promoted further investments in Italy of EUA 743 million
(equal then to LIT 1,516 billion) among 174 projects. In 1976, the
ERDF allocated to the EEC States EUA 500 million, of which EUA 375.49
million (75 percent) to develop the infrastructure and EUA 124.51 million
(25 percent) to develop industry and services. Italy received the
190
equivalent of LII 128 bllUon> o£ wMch UT buUon ^
went for the develops o £ the infrastructure and L„ ^^
(9 percent) for industry and services. 56
Between January 1975 and January 1977, Italy received from the
ERDF the equivalent of LIT 230 billion, 50 mill lon . It invesCed ^
the Mezzogiorno LIT 216 billion and 255 million (93 . 8 percent) . ^
sum was subdivided* T tt i ^7 k,- i -i •d
.
LIT 157 billion, 737 million (73 percent) to
develop the Mezzogiorno ' s infrastrur ^Q^j-n rastructure (91 projects) and LIT 58
billion, 518 million (27 nercenM t„ Ho 1U/ p cent) o develop its industry and services
(163 projects). Between 1975 and 1978, Italy's quota of the ERDF's
funds equalled EUA 748 million (40 percent of the ERDF's capital,
EUA 1,880 million). The Regional Policy Committee approved the expen-
diture of EUA 528.20 million, equal to 71 percent of Italy's quota
and 35 percent of all approved expenditures in the EEC (EUA 1,525.50
million). Between January 1975 and June 1979, the Regional Policy
Committee approved 1,606 projects in Italy, or 24 percent of the total
6,792 projects approved in the EEC. The ERDF contributed EUA 612
million to the 1,606 projects in Italy; this represented 36 percent
of the EUA 1,725 million disbursed to finance projects in the EEC.
57
The EEC States allocated to the ERDF ECU 1,850 million in 1982,
ECU 2,010 million in 1983. The Regional Policy Committee approved
3,277 projects in 1982 and approved the disbursement of ECU 2,116
million for 3,683 projects in 1983. Of the projects approved in
1983, 89 percent concerned the development of infrastructure and
11 percent industry and services. In 1983, the Regional Policy
191
Committee approved 1,035 projects in Italy Thi,i i
'
ls ^presented 28 percent
ot the 3,683 projects approved in the EEC Th„L
*
e P^Jects in Italy pro-
"° ted lnTCStmentS
°f KU 3 ' 566 - 70 """on, or 29 percent of the KU
12,497.73 ^XUon o£ investmen£s promoted by erdf , s concributions
^ the EHC. In 1983> the Reglonal poUcy Committee approved ^
contributions to thp 1 ~~ •1,035 projects in Italy of ECU 818.96 million,
equal to 39 percent of the ECU 2 121 £ i -n-, .61 million contributed by the
ERDF to finance projects in the EEC.
58
Between 1975 and 1983, the Regional Policy Committee approved
21,729 projects in the EEC, of which 15,901 (74 percent) to develop
infrastructure and 5,578 (26 percent) to develop industry and services.
It approved 8,008 projects in Italy (37 percent of the total in the
EEC), of which 6,675 (83 percent) to develop infrastructure and 1,333
(17 percent) to develop industry and services. The projects in Italy
promoted investments of ECU 19,772.46 million, equal to 28 percent
of the ECU 70,141.60 million of investments promoted by the ERDF's
contributions in the EEC in this period. Moreover, between 1975 and
1983, the Regional Policy Committee approved ERDF contributions to
the projects in Italy of ECU 3,493.55 million, that is, 38 percent
of the ERDF ' s contributions to projects in the EEC (ECU 9,175.97
•it \ 59million)
.
The EEC's programs which coordinate the intervention of two
or more EEC agencies in a given area (and when necessary with the
interventions of the appropriate agencies of the EEC States concerned),
the so-called "integrated operations" or "integrated programs" currently
192
under elaboration, represent other potential sources of foreign capital
to be invested in the MeZzogiorno. These program concern the EEC's
peripheral economic systems, i.e., those located principally in Medi-
terranean and far northwestern Europe. They are designed to insure
the survival of inland farming, to create jobs outside the agricul-
tural sector, and to guarantee inco.es which may maintain or improve
the standard of living. These programs aim to achieve their objectives
by improving the infrastructure; by rationalizing coastal farming,
principally through specialization; and by modernizing fisheries.
The EEC is currently implementing two experimental "integrated pro-
grams," one in Naples, the other in Belfast. 60
The ERDF new regulations, which entered into effect on 1 Janu-
ary 1985, modify the system which governs the distribution of the
ERDF capital to the EEC States. The quotas, once fixed, are now
variable and governed by margins of fluctuation. Under the new regu-
lations, Italy receives a minimum of 31.94 percent and a maximum of
42.59 percent of the ERDF ' s capital.
61
As before, the EEC's Regional
Policy subsidizes the regional policies of the EEC States by means
of the ERDF ' s contributions to the financing of the projects elabor-
ated by the EEC's various regions. However, it does nothing to foster
the accumulation and the investment, according to internal exigencies,
of the real income produced by the EEC's underdeveloped economic
systems. For this reason, the Regional Policy remains incapable of
promoting the EEC's positive, balanced development.
193
The Common Agripnl^„n1 Pol irv i> i
Th- Common Agrlcultural pQllcy (cAp) renects ^d°minanCe " G— »d—e over Che other EEC States It
offers greater prlce support and protection ^ their (cmtM)
agricultural products tha-n f-« m a •a to Mediterranean agricultural products.
It also expends more ram> a ic pit l to sustarn agricultural prices, based
ou the production costs of the !east efficient producers, than to
modernize or to rationale inefficient producers. In this way, the
-St efficient producers, esPecially those of the more dominant eco-
nomic systems, receive the greatest return on their investments, re-
tain their advantage, in terms of productivity, over less efficient
ones, and produce more surplus capital to be transferred to the other
sectors of the economy. For example, between 1962 and 1968, FEOGA '
s
Guidance Section, in order to modernize and to rationalize inefficient
agricultural producers, expended the equivalent of LIT 230 billion.
This represented only 3.5 percent of the LIT 6,500 billion expended
by FEOGA's Guarantee Section to sustain agricultural prices between
6 2
1968 and 1972. Between 1965 and 1974, the expenditures of FEOGA's
Guidance Section equalled only 10. A percent of FEOGA's total ex-
63
penditure.
Such a policy disadvantages Italy's agricultural system within the
EEC because, in comparison with the agricultural systems of the poli-
tically dominant EEC States, Italy produces, for reasons of topography
and climate, a proportionately greater quantity of Mediterranean
194
agricultural products pnri *a d a proportionately lesser quantity of contin-
ental agricultural products. Therefor.i e, under the CAP's price regime
which favors continental agrlcuUurai products> ^^ ^
capxtal to be transferred to it-* „f-us other economic sectors. Three examples
are indicative of somp n f i-v^ a <. •e o the detrimental consequences of Italy's par-
ticipation in the CAP fni- u .or its agricultural system. First, with respect
to capital contributed and received th* papl a, e CAP cost Italy LIT 175,209
million between 1962 and 1Q7n. t- i1970. Italy lost LIT 224,977 million to
FEOGA's Guarantee Section and gained LIT 49 7fi« -n- ,s Q ii , 68 million from FEOGA'sr l
Guidance Section. Second, Italy's agricultural producers, in com-
parison with the producers of the other EEC States, benefit least from
the CAP, as lahle 32 shows. Last, the CAP has aggravated Italy's defi-
cit relative to the commercial exchange of agricultural products:
currently, Italy's agricultural exports are less than LIT 7,000 billion,
while its agricultural imports are more than LIT 16,000 billion, with
a resultant deficit of more than LIT 9,000 billion65 (LIT 10,126 bil-
lion in 1984
66
). Moreover, the CAP disadvantages most the Mezzogiorno's
agricultural system within Italy and within the EEC because Mediterranean
products, disadvantaged under the CAP, form 56 percent of the Mezzo-
giorno's agricultural production, as Table 34 shows.
195
TABLE 32.—The consumer and taxpayer lo,,/^
the CAP in 1978






























































SOURCE: Gisele Podbielski, "The Common Agricultural Policy and theMezzogxorno^in ^urnal^f_Common Market Sadies, June 19sT,\TlLl 1
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105 87 75 100 98 81 103 54
1973-
1974
137 63 61 96 88 61 57 57
SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from Rosemary Galli aid
Saverio Torcasio, La partecipazione italiana alia politica agricola
comunitaria
[ Italy's Participation in the Common Agricultural Pol icy]
,
Bologna: II Mulino, 1976, p. 48.
~
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SOURCE: Gisele Podbielski, "The Common Agricultural Policy and the
Mezzogiorno" in Journal of Common Market Studies . June 1981, Volume 19,





Between 1958 and 1982, the EIB invested ln the EEC ECU 22,487.9
million, of which ECU 15,974.4 million (62 percent) tn r .K P o finance regional
development projects and ECU 9,634.3 million HRj.ii (,3a percent) to fin*
projects of interest to the EEC (i.e., the modernization and the r
version of businesses, the development of ener8y resources and infra-
structures). 67 m this period, the EIB invested in Italy ECU 9,902.8
million (see Table 35), equal to 44 percent of the ECU 22,487.9 million
invested in thp FFP nf *-u jEEC. Of the sum invested in Italy, the EIB invested
ECU 7,710.4 million (78 percent) t-n fM„aw o finance regional development pro-
jects and ECU 2,194.2 million (22 percent) to finance projects of inter-
est to the EEC. The EIB's investments to finance regional development
projects in Italy averaged ECU 40 million per year between 1958 and 1967,
ECU 165 million per year between 1968 and 1972, ECU 270 million per year
between 1973 and 1977, more than ECU 1,000 million per year between
1978 and 1982, and ECU 1,450 million in 1982 alone.
68
Between 1958 and 1982, the EIB invested in the Me Zzogiorno ECU
7,293 million, equal to 74 percent of the ECU 9,902.8 million invested
in Italy, and 95 percent of the ECU 7,710.4 million invested to finance
regional development projects in Italy. The geographic distribution of
the EIB's investments in the Mezzogiorno has both positive and negative
aspects with regard to the area's disequilibria. On the positive side,
the EIB invested ECU 1,860.1 million (25.5 percent) of the ECU 7,293
million to finance multiregional projects. This sum clearly exceeds
198
TABLE 35. -The structure of the EIB's inv, r•-ne Jiijj x estments in Italy 1958-1982
Sector
Investments




















SOURCE: Banca Europea per gli Investimenti
, Venticinque anni
1958" 1983 twenty-five Years 19_5^-1983] , Luxembourg: Banca Europea
per gli Investimenti, Information Division, Public Relations Office,
1983, p. 28.
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the sura lnvested in My slngle regiQn Q£ ^ ^
the remaining ECU 5 217 i ^-t n •, .3 milUo„ not invested or lMned in ^ muu ._
regional projects in the area's =-i„„isxngle regxons, in PUglia (1 9 percent
0£ " EIB ' S ^ « >™> - campanla (12 percent)
Toge ther these three regl0„ s recelved ^ percent ^ ^ eb1s^
ments. Each of the Me 7 7n ffin,nn >zzogxor o s other regions received less than 10
percent (see Table 36).
TABLE 36.—The distributi
n^ZillnlllZ-lls?'















































SOURCE: Banca Europea per gli Investimenti
, Venticinque anni 1958-1983[TVenty-five Years 1958-1983], Luxembourg: Banca Europea per gli Invesflmenti, Information Division, Public Relations Office 1983 p 28
(*) The province of Ascoli-Piceno and (**) the Island of'sibVare areasof competence of the CASMEZ.
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i£jL2£-*H2Ji^
The poUc.es e, lncentives and dependent ^
"ed the^ and economlc relatlonsMps betueen Mezzogiorao
and «. ltalia„ State by maklng the MeZ2ogiorno ^ ^
of th. c«plex of parastate industries ^ ^^ ^^ ^
parastate lndustrles the ^ ^^
(see Table 37). *. economlc dominance q£ ^ ^
the Mezzogiorno modified the nnHHo^ipol ltlcal and economic relationships,
mediated by the Italian i_ , ,Y x State, both between the Mezzogiorno and the
rest of the Italian economy and between the "State bourgeoisie" and
the northwestern elite. It intensified the Mezzogiorno
' s underdevel-
opment by increasing the area's capacity to accumulate capital and by
exacerbating its diseouilibria. It also transformed the "State bour-
geoisie" from a heterogeneous group composed of a public managerial
class responsible for the functioning of the economically subaltern
parastate industries of north-central Italy and a bureaucratic "middle
class" in the Mezzogiorno into the Mezzogiorno • s dominant class, a
public managerial class which identifies its interests territorially
with that area. In short, the policies of incentives and dependent
industrialization increased the Mezzogiorno
' s power in the Italian
economy, fused the area's economic needs with the "State bourgeoisie"
s
political needs, increased the "State bourgeoisie" '« power within the




These co„sequences o £fered to the „orthwestern^
SecUrlty and polltlcal uncertalnty by creating posiUve Md^
strengthened and undefined its privileged poli-
tical and economic position in Italy On hii-cax . the one hand, the Mezzo-
greate r power ln the ltallan economy^ ^^
western eUte's P„ltio» by ,llowiag u tQ galn^ ^
benefit £rom the Mezzoglorn(j sq ^ ^ ^ ^^
west might better sustain internatotmlationa economic competition under the
adverse conditions created by the EEC's unbalanced integration. On
the other hand, the remaining consciences undermined the northwestern
elite's position. The fusion of the Mezzogiorno
' s economic exigencies
with the "State bourgeoisie'" a political exigencies, together with the
"State bourgeoisie-
s greater power within the State apparatus, under-
mined the northwestern elite's position by reducing its control over
the State apparatus in favor of a group which identifies its interests
territorially with the Mezzogiorno. The exacerbation of the Mezzogiorno'
disequilibria undermined the northwestern elite's position by creating
disaffections which the Left could champion. 70
These contradictory repercussions obliged the northwestern elite
to increase its concern for the domestic exigencies of political legi-
timation because its ability to legitimize its dominance in Italy rested
its ability to respond to the exigencies of international economic
ompetition by minimizing the costs and by maximizing the benefits
Bated by the consequences of the policies of incentives and dependent





Policies of incentives and dependent industrialization, whe-
ats expanded the Mezzogiorno's productive ba , e> ^ &^ ^
social control. The investments of this policy did not expand the
Mezzogiorno's productive base; they expended capital unproductive^
by subsidizing incomes, by commissioning in the area public works
projects not functional to the accumulation of capital in the national
economy and by increasing employment in the area's tertiary sector
and public administration at a rate disproportionately high relative
to the rate of increase of productivity in the area's agricultural and
industrial sectors. In short, the northwestern elite responded to the
exigencies of international economic competition and to the domestic
exigencies of political legitimation by combining astutely the produc-




The northwestern elite found itself in a delicate situation, in
that the mismanagement either of the policies of incentives and depen-
dent industrialization or of the policy of social control could under-
mine its privileged political and economic position in Italy by hinder-
ing the process of capital accumulation in the economy. An excess of
productive investments by means of the policies of incentives and
dependent industrialization could transform the "State bourgeoisie"
into a valid political rival capable of challenging the northwestern
elite's control of the State apparatus and, therefore, of investment
capital. An insufficiency of productive investments by means of the
policies of incentives and dependent industrialization would involve
the Mezzogiorno insufficiently in the process of capital accumulation
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in the Italian economy . Moreover> an excess rf unproductive^
the quantity of capital avaxlable for productive investments in the
Italian economy.
The northwestern elite invested in the Me^ogiorno's underdevel-
opment by denting the polioios of incentives and dependent indus-
trialization. These policies emitted the Italian State to the expen-
diture of huge a.ounts of capital so that the Mezaogiorno-s intensified
underdevelopment might allow the economic system of the northwest to
sustain international economic competition better under the adverse
conditions created by the EEC 1 «? ,mui,n„^ •y n UhL s unbalanced integration. The northwestern
elite receives a good return on its investment only when the "State
bourgeoisie" is subaltern and when the political and economic costs of
the Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment are low relative to the benefits
realized for the economic system of the northwest. The northwestern
elite enjoys an inherent advantage in its relationships with the "State
bourgeoisie"; the northwestern elite is an organic class firmly estab-
lished in civil society and capable of organizing mass social consensus;
on the other hand, the "State bourgeoisie" is an artificial class super-
imposed on civil society and incapable of organizing mass social consen-
sus. The northwestern elite enjoys no such advantage in its relation-
ships with the Left representative of the working class and capable of
championing effectively (the PCI more than the PSI) the political dis-
affections created by the Mezzogiorno's exacerbated disequilibria. In
a political confrontation, the northwestern elite would find in the
"State bourgeoisie" an opponent much less formidable than the Left.
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TABLE 37. -The distribution per cent in , Q7 , cproperty and employees of Italy'sTeaTlnl l ^ turnover , real
to their financij iiz?il;:s::ses 8rouped accordi^
Turnover Real Property Employees
. Mezzo gin rri ^









Parastate Industries 10.22 13.53 13.46
Montedison Group 6.07 7.78 8.64
Fiat Group 2.61 3.52 4.32
Independent Businesses 81.10 75.27 73.58
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
SOURCE: Alfredo Del Monte and Adriano Giannola, II Mezzosiorno nell '
economia italiana
[ The Mezzogiorno in the Italian Economy 1 , Roln^-
II Mulino, 1978, p. 235.
2(1 S
965
In 1961, businesses employed an averaPP Q i , .y u ge 9.1 people in north-central
Italy, against 3.4 in the Mezzogiorno 72 vnr au . Fo every person employed,
1.3 were^unemployed in north-central Italy, against 1.9 in the Mezzo-
Industrial workers in the Mezzogiorno numbered 965,000 against
74
giorno
4.5 million in north-central Italy
TABLE 38.—Employment distribution per cent according i-« k •
ln ,,











Mezzogiorno 77.44 12.49 4.81 5.26
North-central Italy 55.08 23.65 5.80 15.47
SOURCE: Alfredo Del Monte and Adriano Giannola, II Mezzogiorno nell '
economia italiana
[ The Mezzogiorno in the Italian Economy 1 . Bologna:
II Mulino, 1978, p. 232.
Between 1960 and 1964, Italy's investments in the Mezzogiorno were
43.1 percent in agriculture, 23.5 percent in industry, 23.7 percent of
investments in Italy's tertiary sector, 24.9 percent in housing, 30.0
percent in public administration, and 26.2 percent in net fixed invest-
ments. In this period, the sectoral distribution of fixed investments
I 111!
At I In? same
y was 9 . i
i n the Mezzogiorno was I r, r, , .15.6 percent in agriculture, 28.5 percent in
industry, 20.4 percent in the tertiary sector 26 4 ,tLU) > /o.o percent, in
housing sector, and 9.1 oereani In i up ce t in public administration.
time, the sectoral distribution of Eiv«rf i01 1 lM (1 invest niiMil |.n j | ., |
Percent in agricuXture, 32.7 percent in lndu3try> 22 . 3 percent ^ ^
tertiar, sector. 27.9 percent in the hou3lng sector ^ ?<|^
in public Ministration." Value added in the MeZZogiorn0 .s manufac-
ture sectors was 11.7 percent of Cat added in the national manufactur
sectors. The investments of the parastate industries equalled 29.9
percent of all the industrial investments in the MeZzogiorno in the
1960-1964 period, against 15.8 percent in the 1957-1959 period. They
equalled 12.6 percent of all the industrial investments in north-central
Italy in the 1960-1964 period aaainai in -7 11




The Mezzogiorno registered the following growth rates between
1958 and 1963, in constant 1963 prices: net product, 5.88 percent;
agriculture, 3.96 percent; industry, 7.99 percent; the tertiary sector,
6.68 percent; and public administration, 3.61 percent. In the same
period, the Italian economy registered the Col lowing growth rates,
also in constant 1963 prices: Gross National Product (GNP) , 6.58
percent; agriculture, 1.57 percent; industry, 9.26 percent; the
tertiary sector, 3.26 percent; and public administration, 3.47 per-
cent. Value added in the industrial sector increased by 12.45 percent
in Italy, by 11.44 percent in the Mezzogiorno.
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Pro capltc income
in Italy was 60 percent of the EEC average in I960 and 63 percent in
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1963; capita income ln the Mez2Qglorno ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
average in l963 » In^ ^ dlstrlbutlon ^ ^ ^^ ^





























In the 1958-1963 period, in comparison with the 1951-1958 period,
the growth rate of Italy's net product outstripped the growth rate of
the Mezzogiorno's, but with a margin inferior to the previous one by
0.22 percent. The growth rate of Italy's industrial sector again out-
stripped the growth rate of the Mezzogiorno's, and with a margin sup-
erior to the previous one by 1.16 percent. Similarly, the growth rate
of the value added in Italy's industrial sector again outstripped the
growth rate of the value added in the Mezzogiorno's, and with a margin
superior to the previous one by 0.84 percent. The growth rate of the
Mezzogiorno's agricultural sector this time outstripped the growth rate
of Italy's by 1.53 percent. The growth rate of the Mezzogiorno's ter-
tiary sector again outstripped the growth rate of Italy's, and with
a margin superior to the previous one by 1.30. The growth rate of the
public administration in the Mezzogiorno again outstripped the growth
rate of the public administration in Italy, and with a margin superior
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to the previa one by 0.09 percent. As hefore, the growth rate of
the national economy's least productive sectors> ^ ^
and the puhlic administration, was greater in the Me 2zogior„o than in
the rest of Italy. The gro„th rate of the national economy's si„gle
most productive sector, industry, „as areater i„ «,y, w g n the rest of Italy than
in the Mezzogiorno~but now by wider margins. An inverse tendency
manifested itself only in the national economy's second most produc-
tive sector, agriculture, whose growth rate was greater in the Mezzo-
giorno than in the rest of Italy. There the investments effected by
the CASMEZ nourished the area's agriculture and partially protected
it from the adverse conditions created by the CAP, while north-central
Italy's agriculture restructured itself under the CAP.
A Commitment to the Mezzogiorno '
s
"Programmed Underdevelopment"
During the 1960s, the northwestern elite became increasingly aware
that the quality of the productive investments effected by means of
the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization would deter-
mine the quality of the return obtained from the investment in the Mezzo-
giorno »s underdevelopment. Only those productive investments which
might benefit the economic system of the northwest and which might
furnish a sufficient quantity of surplus capital to finance an effi-
cacious policy of social control, which might not hinder excessively
the accumulation of capital for productive investment in the Italian
economy, would allow the northwestern elite to maintain its position
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of finance in Italy. This awareness induced it to intenslfy ^
Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment by locating the productlve
of capital in the area's most proving "areas of industrial devel-
°Praent>
" that *" ^ th°Se «~ * «CH the productive invests
of capital promised to satisfy most the exigencies of the economic
system of the northwest. To this end, the northwestern elite reor-
ganized the institutional mechanise which governed the accumulation




The northwestern elite, through the DC, legitimized this invest-
ment strategy by presenting the resultant reorganization of the State's
intervention in the Mezzogiorno as the foundation of a renewed commit-
ment to the "economic programming" concept. In January 1965, the
Council of Ministers approved for the 1966-1970 period the so-called
First National Economic Program (in reality, the first after the Vanoni
Plan of 1954) inspired by the Rider to the Report on the 1962 Budget,
known more commonly as the Nota Aggiuntiva La Malfa, and by Professor
Pasquale Saraceno's report, issued in 1963, on the state of the Italian
economy. Like the Vanoni Plan, the First National Economic Program
was more symbolic than substantive. The Italian Parliament sanctioned
the Program in principle in July 1967, that is, after nearly one-third
of the programming period had elapsed. Moreover, the Program's funda-
mental goal, the coordination of the CASMEZ's activities with those
of the ordinary administration, remained an abstract declaration.
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The Italian government reorganized the institutional mechanisms
which governed the accumulation and the investment of capital in the
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Mezzogiorno by enacting Law n. 717 of o fi T/ 26 June 1965 and Law n. 1523 of
30 June 1965. lau n 71-7 •1 L w n
- 71 ? increased the Statp' c <*, 1"-lie s e s involvement in the
deVel°P"Mt
°
£ «—««. ,y chargin g the or_
dinery admlnlstration to locate at least 40 percent of its public
«ork8 projects in the „ez20glorno . u also ^^
involvement in the area . s inoustrisHzetion by charglng ^„
to concentrete the expenditure of the greatest pert o £ its resources
on the most promising; "areaq nf i„jng s o industrial development" and to concen-
trate on expenditure of ire >-^^^ • •its remainxng resources on the Mezzogiorno
s
most promising agricultural areas. Moreover, Law n. 717, aside from
extending the CASMEZ's life to 1980, charged it to cover 85 percent
of the cost incurred by the consortiums of communes to develop the
infrastructure necessary to attract industries and to cover 40 percent
of the cost incurred by individual businesses to equip themselves
with an infrastructure. It also located the Committee of Ministers
for the Mezzogiorno within the National Committee for Economic Pro-
gramming (CNPE), replaced in 1969 by the Interministerial Committee
for Economic Programming (CIPE).
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Law n. 1523 of 30 June 1965,
known more commonly as the Single Text (Testo Unico) , more symbolic
than substantive and, therefore, less important than Law n. 717,
gathered under a single heading the legislation which concerned the
institutional mechanisms which governed the accumulation and the
investment of capital in the Mezzogiorno.
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A greater amount of public and private capital invested in the
Mezzogiorno, especially in its industrial sector, accompanied the
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location of the productive investments Qf capital m ltS most promisinj
areas. Between 1965 and 1970, the CASME7 p a aZ expended LIT 2,800 billion
40 percent more than the LIT 2 000 M1H,U ° bllUon expended between 1950 and
1965, as Table 39 shows:












240 12 1,344 48
Infrastructure 660 33 980 35
(Subtotal 900 45 2,324 83 )
Agriculture 1,100 55 476 17
Total
2,000 100 2,800 100
«udULeu rrom Uisele Podbiel^^-^^^ Post-War Economy . Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974, p. 135.
The parastate industries increased their investments which equalled
33.2 percent of all the industrial investments in the Mezzogiorno in
the 1965-1969 period, against 29.9 percent in the 1960-1964 period
and 15.8 percent in the 1957-1959 period. They provided 12.4 percent
of all the industrial investments in north-central Italy in the 1965-
1969 period, against 12.6 percent in the 1960-1964 period and 10.7 percen:
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- «. unions to pamclpate in formuUtion ^ a* Agencies of lnternaUonal^Ws private oligopolies decMtraii2ed their ^^^^^ ^
sing some of their productive £aclUtles ^ ^ Me2zogiorno>86
The Mezzogiorno reeisterpH r-r,Q -p -, ,g ed the following growth rates between
1963 and 1966, in constant 1963 prices- np,, et product, 4.47 percent-
agriculture. O.U percent; lndustry
, 5 . 8? perc£nt; ^ J_
tor, 5.13 percent; and public administration, 3 . 65 ^ ^
same time, the Italian economy registered the foil •i BJ-icer a l owing growth rates,
also in constant 1963 prices: Gross National Product (GNP)
, 4.14
Percent; agriculture, 3.43 percent; industry, 4.09 percent; the ter-
tiary sector, 4.42 percent; and public administration, 3.61 percent.
Value added in the industrial sector increased bv 11 A
7
y .47 percent in the
Mezzogiorno, by 7.26 percent in Italy. 87
In the 1963-1966 period, in comparison with the 1958-1963 period,
the growth rate of the Mezzogiorno 's net product outstripped the growth
rate of Italy's by 0.33 percent. The growth rate of the Mezzogiomo's
industrial sector outstripped the national growth rate by 1.78 percent.
The growth rate of the value added in the Mezzogiorno
• s industrial
sector outstripped the growth rate of the value added in Italy's by
4.21 percent. The growth rate of the national agricultural sector
outstripped the growth rate of the Mezzogiomo's by 3.32 percent.
The growth rate of the Mezzogiomo's tertiary and public administration
sectors again outstripped the growth rate of Italy's, but this time with
a margin inferior to the previous one by 0.71 and 0.10 percent respectively,
213
our-
Thus, as before, the growth rate of the Tf*Hc r Italian economy's least
Produc"ve sectors
'
the—— - the Publlc adminlstratlon
,
was greater in the Mezzoglomo than ^ Qf^^
narrower margins. Ihe grouth rate of ^^^^vs^ ^
ductive sector, lnduscry> was greater ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
rest of Italy between 1963 and ,966 because the lnvestnents
under the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization „
ished the Mezzogiorno's industries while north-centra! Italy . s indus-
tries restructured themselves after 12 years of strong, sustained
growth (1951-1963, especially 1958-.963). The growth rate of agri-
culture was greater in the rest of Italy than in the Mezzogiorno
between 1963 and 1966 because north-central Italy's agriculture, in
comparison with the Mezzogiorno 's, was better able to restructure
itself under the CAP while the Mezzogiorno's agriculture nearly stag-
nated after the CASNEZ had completed the investments mandated by Law n.
622 of 24 July 1959.
Between 1965 and 1969, 40.4 percent of Italy's agricultural invest
ments, 25.4 percent of its industrial investments, 25.5 percent of
its tertiary sector investments, 26.7 percent of its housing invest-
ments, 36.4 percent of its public administration investments, and
28.1 percent of its net fixed investments were located in the Mezzo-
giorno. In this period, the sectoral distribution of fixed invest-
ments in the Mezzogiorno was: 12.0 percent in agriculture, 24.4 per-
cent in industry, 21.1 percent in the tertiary sector, 30.6 percent
in the housing sector, and 11.9 percent in public administration.
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At the same tlBe the sector dlstrlbutlon of £lxed ^
Italy was 8., percent ln agrlculture> ^^ ^ ^ ^
Percent ln the tertlary sector> pfircent tn ^^
and 9.3 percent in public administration 88 .7 i. Value added in the Mezzo-
giorno's manufacturing sectors was 13.2 percent of ^,z the value added
in the national economy's manufacturing sectors. 89
The Mezzogiorno registered the following growth rates between
1966 and 1970, in constant 1963 prices: net product, 5.36 percent-
agriculture, 3.53 percent; industry, 7.47 percent; the tertiary sec-
tor, 6.35 percent; and public administration, 2.52 percent, m this
period, the Italian economy registered the following growth rates,
also in constant 1963 prices: Gross National Product (GNP) , 5.95
percent; agriculture, 1.71 percent; industry, 7.82 percent; the ter-
tiary sector, 6.46 percent; and public administration, 2.44 percent.
Value added in the industrial sector increased by 12.18 percent in
Italy, by 11.88 percent in the Mezzogiorno. 90 m 1970, the distri-
bution per cent by sector of employment (1) and Gross Domestic Pro-






























In the I 'J66- 1 970 n.-ri,,,! ^Period, m comparison with the 1963-1966 period,
the growth rate of tmu,'oItaly , net produot and lndustrlaJ^
the growth rate o£ the Me220glorno , s by 0 percfint ^^
r..p.ctively. The grouth rate o| the vaiue added ^ uaiyis
sector outstripped the growtl, rate Qf the vajue added ta Me2zo(;iorno , s
by 0.30 percent. The growth rate Q£ the Me22ogiorno , a agrlcuUurai sec _
tor outstripped the growth rate o£ Ualy , s by um percent _ ^
rate of Italy's tertiary sector outstripped the growth rate of the
Mezzogiorno's by 0.11 percent; and the growth rate of the Mezzogiorno's
public adnlni.tr.tion again outstripped the growth rate of Italy's and
with a margin superior to the previous one by 0.04 percent. The growth
rate of the industrial sector was greater in the rest of Italy than
in the Mezzogiorno following the restructuring of north-central Italy's
industries in the 1963-1966 period, while the growth rate of the agri-
cultural sector was greater in the Mezzogiorno following the resumption
of the CASMEZ's investments under Law n. 717 of 26 June 1965. For the
first time, the growth rate of the tertiary sector was greater In the
rest of Italy than In the Mezzogiorno because north-central Italy',
tertiary sector began to acquire a greater functional complementarity
with that area's industrial sector by providing employment Lo Italy's
(especially the Mezzogiorno'.) unemployed and underemployed i by
developing increasingly Important ancillary marketable services. Ths
growth rate of the public administration renin I I greater in the Mezzo-
giorno than in i in- reel <>i the country.
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I- 1971, businesses employed an average o£ „ people ^^
central Italy
, against ln MezzogiQrno
_
92 ^
employed, !.« we re nnemp loyed 1B north-central r
in the Me2zogiorno. Industrlal Borkers ^^ ^ ^
Mezzogiorno, against 4,952,000 in north-central Italy.
94






















SOURCE: Alfredo Del Monte and Adriano Giannola, II Mezzogiorno nell
economia italiana [Th^zo^^
II Mulino, 1979, p. 232.
Between 1961 and 1970, value added in the manufacturing sector increased
by an average 7.43 percent per year in Italy but by an average 9.42
percent per year in the Mezzogiorno. 95 Between 1961 and 1971, agricul-
tural productivity increased by 7.0 percent in the Mezzogiorno but by
8.5 percent in north-central Italy.
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During the 1970s, the northwestern elite sought to improve the
quality of the return on its invests in the Mezzogiorno's unuer-
development by facilitating the location of the produce investments
of oapital in the Mezzogiorno 's most promising areas. To this end,
the northwestern elite rationalized the relationships between the
institutional mechanisms which governed the accumulation and the
investment of capital in the Mezzogiorno. Through the DC, it legi-
timized this rationalization by presenting the resultant institutional
reorganization as another px^mnlor e a p e of its commitment to the "economic
programming" concept. 97
The Italian government rationalized the relationships between
the institutional mechanisms which governed the accumulation and the
investment of capital in the Mezzogiorno by enacting Law n. 853 of
6 October 1971 and Law n. 183 of 2 May 1976. Law n. 853 provided for
the abolition, effected in November 1971, of the Committee of Ministers
for the Mezzogiorno, whose duties were assumed by the CIPE, charged to
insure that the State's interventions in the Mezzogiorno might be in
strict conformity with the objectives of national economic policy
(determined preponderantly by the northwestern elite). Law n. 853
also provided for the creation of regional and interregional "special
projects," designated the pivots of the State's interventions in the
Mezzogiorno. It obliged the parastate industries to locate 60 percent
of their total investments and 80 percent of their new investments in
the Mezzogiorno. Moreover it nln a u»• obl lged businesses whose proposed invest-ments might exceed LIT 7 biln™Ul.cn, and companies with capital assets
greater than LIT 5 bill inn *Ulxon, to submit their projects intended for the
Mezzogiorno to the judgment of the CIPE wM „, hrch under this law, approves
tacitly those projects not explicit!, rejected within three mcnthsU. n. 183 reconfirmed the provisions of La„ n . 853 and charged ^
CIPE to formulate the five-year programs which might establish the
Seneral and the specific objectives of the State's interventions in
th. Mezzogiorno within the context of the objectives of national eco-
nomic policy.
Laws n„. 853 and 183 include the Mezzogiorno's regional institu-
tions of government among the institutional mechanisms which govern
the accumulation and the investment of capital in the Mezzogiorno.
Under these laws, the Minister for Extraordinary Intervention in the
Mezzogiorno must submit to the judgment of the CIPE, assisted in an
advisory capacity by a committee of the Mezzogiorno's regional presi-
dents (Law n. 853), together with two representatives elected by each
of the Mezzogiorno's Regional Councils (Law n. 183), the "special
projects" formulated by the above-mentioned Minister, the Mezzogiorno's
regional governments, or the CASMEZ, this last charged to implement the
"special projects." In reality, the participation of the Mezzogiorno's
regional governments is inconsequential with regard both to the for-
mulation and to the evaluation of the "special projects" because the
Mezzogiorno's regional governments lack the authority to determine the
fate of the "special projects" and the resources and the technical
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expertise to formulate them. The CIPE „ k , •subordinates the Mezzogiorno
•
s
<™C*, the State . s interventlQns ln Mezzogiomo ^^^^^ ^
the best interests of the northwestern elir. i •te, politically dominant in
CASME2
'
d0mfa" ed -"«-"y the north„estern elite
through the DC) holds . vlrtual monopQiy Q£ ^ ^^^^^ ^ ^
technical expertise nppHoH +~ cP eeded to formulate the "special projects." 99
Between 1970 and 1973, 45.7 percent of Italv'. • ,p i-ctmr. r y s agricultural Invest-
ments, 39.4 percent of its indu^tri^ •strial investments, 26.9 percent of
its tertiary sector investments, 23.6 percent of its housing invest-
ments, 40.1 percent of its public administration investments, and
32.4 percent of its net fixed investments were located in the Mezzo-
giorno. in this period, the sectoral distribution of f ixed investments
in the Mezzogiorno was 9.6 percent in agriculture, 39.4 percent in
industry, 19.5 percent in the tertiary sector ?1 7d , 2 . percent in the
housing sector and 9.8 percent in public administration. At the same
time, the sectoral distribution of fixed investments in Italy was 6.8
percent in agriculture, 32.8 percent in industry, 23.2 percent in the
tertiary sector, 29.3 percent in the housing sector, and 7.9 percent
in public administration. 100 Value added in the Mezzogiorno 's manu-
facturing sectors was 13.2 percent of the value added in the national
manufacturing sectors.
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The investments of the parastate industries
equalled 39.9 percent of all the industrial investments in the Mezzo-
giorno in the 1970-1974 period against 33.2 percent in the 1965-1969
period. They equalled 17.2 percent of all the industrial investments
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m north-central Italy in the 197n iq 7/0-19 4 period against 12.4 percent in
the 1965-1969 period. 102 °
The Mezzogiorno registered th* *„n •8 e foll™ing growth rates between
1970 and 1973, in constant 1963 prices- not- Ax . et product, 3.83 percent-
agriculture, 1.46 percent; industry 6 inclustr , .10 percent; the tertiary sector,
4.56 percent; and public administration 2 90 „, . percent. At the same
time, the Italian economy registered M,« «= 11 •Y the following growth rates, also
in constant 1963 prices • *, .. Gross Natxonal Product (GNP)
, 3.52 percent;
agriculture, 0.35 nerrpnt-- i^A *.p cent, industry, 3.88 percent; the tertiary sector
4.73 percent; and public ad.inistration, 2.85 percent. 11" In 1973 ^
distribution per cent by sector of emp loyment (1) and Gross Domestic





























Between 1970 and 1974, value added in the manufacturing sector increased
by an average 5.81 percent per year in Italy but by an average 7.08 per-
cent per year in the Mezzogiorno.
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In the 1970-1973 period, in comparison with the 1966-1970 period,
the growth rate of the Mezzogiorno ' s net product and industrial sector





- ^~ ~ - * agrlcultural sect
again outstripped the gro„th rate of itaiy , s bw a^^
to the previous one by 0.71 percent. Ihe growth ra te o f ltaly . B ter
Harv sector agaln outstripped the gro„th rate of the Me^siorno's
and with a margin suDerinr t-^ <-up o to the previous one by 0.05 percent; and
the growth rate of the Mezzogiorno
' s mihHn a •public administration again out-
stripped the growth rate of Italy's but with * • .a margin inferior to the
previous one by 0.03 nerrpnt- tv.«p cent. The growth rate of the industrial sector
was greater in the Mezzogiorno than in the rest of Italy between 1970
and 1973 because the investments effected under the policies of incen-
tives and dependent industrialization nourished the Mezzogiorno
' s indus-
tries while north-central Italy's industries restructured themselves
after five years of strong, sustained growth (1966-1970). The growth
rate of the agricultural sector was greater in the Mezzogiorno than
in the rest of Italy between 1970 and 1973 because the CASMEZ's invest-
ments provoked a modest growth of the Mezzogiorno ' s agriculture while
that of north-central Italy nearly stagnated under the CAP. The
growth rate of the tertiary sector remained greater in the rest of
Italy because north-central Italy's tertiary sector continued to
acquire a greater functional complementarity with its industrial
sector. It provided employment to the country's (especially the
Mezzogiorno 's) unemployed and underemployed and developed increas-
ingly important ancillary marketable services. The growth rate of
the public administration remained greater in the Mezzogiorno than
in the rest of Italy.
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Between 1974 and 1976 A q 9, 49.2 percent of Italy's agricultural invest-
ments, 31.3 percent o£ lts Atrial investments, 28 . 8 percent o £ its
tertiary sector, housing and pub l lc administration investments, and
31.1 percent of its net fixed investments were located in the Mezzo-
giorno. In this period, the sector-, 1 H-r - -u ,toral distribution of fixed investments
in the Mezzogiorno was 11. 4 nercpnt- l n * 1p cent in agriculture, 32.4 percent in
industry, and 56.2 percent in the tertiary sector, housing sector and
Public administration. At the same time, the sectoral distribution of
fixed investments in Italy was 7.2 percent in agriculture, 32., percent
in industry, and 60.7 percent in the tertiary sector, housing sector
and public administration. 106 Value added in the Mezzogiorno's manu-
facturing sectors was 15.4 percent of the value added in the national
economy's manufacturing sectors between 1974 and 1976, 14.1 percent
between 1970 and 1976.
107
The investments of the parastate industries
equalled 26.5 percent of all the industrial investments in the Mezzo-
giorno in the 1975-1976 period against 39.9 percent in the 1970-1974
period. They equalled 17.9 percent of all the industrial investments
in north-central Italy in the 1975-1976 period against 17.2 percent in
the 1970-1974 period.
108 m i 976, the distribution per cent by sector











Mezzogiorno 26.6 14.4 29.6 29. 1 43.9 56.4 15.6 16.7
Italy 14.7 8.5 38.0 39.4 47.3 52.1 14.2 11.3
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Between 197, and 1976 , value added ^ ^
incrMsed
percent per year In the Mezzogiorno. 1 10
Sinee 1976 the northwestern elite implements the pollcies of lncen.
lives and dependent industrialization by organizing the institutional
mechanisms which govern the accumulation and the investment of capita!
in the Mezzogiorno according to Law n. 853 of 6 October 1971 and Law n
183 of 2 May 1976 so that the economic system of the northwest may
derive the greatest possible advantage and benefit from the
underdevelopment. The following statistics reflect the
subordinate position in the Italian economy in 1979:



















1 <4 5.5 3
SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from Collana Document!
SVIMEZ
>
II Mezzogiorno nell' Europa a dodici [ The Mezzogiorno in the
Europe of Twelve ] , Roma: SVIMEZ , 1979, p. 245.
'
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industrial employment in the Mezzogiorno equalled ^ ^
industrial employment ln I£aly ln 195i> against ^^ ^ ^
although the number of industrial workers may have increased in the
Mezzogiorno between 1951 and 1979, the rate of icn increase was lower
than in the rest of Italy. 111
Between 1970 and 1980, the sectoral distribution of fixed invest-
ments in the Mezzogiorno Bas , on average: U. 5 percent ln agriculture>
24.5 percent in industry, 52.0 Derrpnf *„ ^y, x*..U p ce t in the tertiary sector and 12.0
percent in public ad.inistration. At tbe same time, the sectoral dis-
tribution of fixed investments in north-central Italy was, on average:
5.0 percent in agriculture, 30.0 percent in industry, 56.5 percent in
the tertiary sector and 8.5 percent in public administration. 112 I„
this period, fixed investments in the Mezzogiorno decreased greatly
in industry, increased in agriculture and in the tertiary sector,
and remained stable (above the level in north-central Italy) in public
administration, as Table 42 shows:




1970 10.0 30.0 48.0 12.0
1980 13.0 19.0 56.0 12.0
SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from Claudio Signorile II
nuovo Mezzogiorno e 1' economia nazionale [ The New Mezzogiorno and ' the"
National Economy ], Bari: Laterza, 1982, p.~68~!
~
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Public works investments, although greater in t-h. mSw x he Mezzogiorno than
in north-central Italy in relat
as Table 43 shows:
TABLE 43.—Public work
ive terms, were lesser in absolute t erms
,




North-central Italy 22,000 11,100
SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from Claudio Signorile,
II nuovo Mezzogiorno e 1' economia nazionale [The New Mezzogiorno
and the National Economy ! . Bari: Laterza, 1982, p. 27.
In 1980, the distribution per cent by sector of employment (1) and











Mezzogiorno 24.1 12.2 28.9 30.6 28.9 39.0 18.1 18.2
North-central
Italy
8.8 5.2 40.3 42.6 34.8 40.5 16.1 11.7
In that year, businesses headquartered outside the Mezzogiorno employed
70 percent of the Mezzogiorno ' s industrial workers.
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TABLE 44. -Employment distribution per rent aeeo
in 1981






















SOURCE: My elaboration of data extracted from p. 554 of Salvatore
Vinci, "II quadro macroeconomico per lo sviluppo del Mezzogiorno"
["The Macroeconomic Framework for the Mezzogiorno - s Development"] in
Rivista Trimestrale Mezzogiorno d'Bnrnp , [Me^iorno^^^
Review. Also available in English.] October/December (N. 4) 1984,
p. 547, Napoli: ISVEIMER.)
The CASMEZ "Transformed"
In 1984, the CASMEZ underwent a "transformation" potentially
significant but, in all probability, more symbolic than substantive.
On 2 August 1984, the Italian Parliament put the CASMEZ into liqui-
dation
5
but at the same time charged it to honor its commitments
assumed to 31 July 1984 and to manage the expenditure of the LIT
15,000 billion appropriated to finance the government's three year
program for the Mezzogiorno (Law n. 651 of December 1983).
116
The
Parliament enabled the CASMEZ to honor its commitments, which extend
to 1995, by transforming the "CA<?MW7 -; -i • . ,CASMEZ-in-liquidation" into a "transition
CASMEZ" financed with an ^n^^•}„linitial appropriation of LIT 14,000 billion 117
increased to LIT 28,000 billion. 118
The CASMEZ's "transformation" ostensibly marks the beglnning ,f
a period of transforation in which the Ualian ^ ^
sumably reconsider the ways in wbicb the State lnte„enes & ^
Mezzogiorno. initial indications do not augur well for a transfor-
ation which will mark the end of the area's underdevelopment: the
government has undertaken to replace the CASMEZ with a National Pund
for the Development of the South financed with an appropriation of
LIT 120 thousand billion for the period 1985-1994 119
, and is contem-
plating the creation of an Agency for Territorial Interventions, which
would formulate and implement public works and infrastructure projects
in the Mezzogiorno, and an Agency for the Development of the Mezzoglorno,
which would induce the investment of capital in the area by providing
investors with capital grants, financing and incentives. 120 The
National Fund for the Development of the South seems nothing more
than the old CASMEZ with the new name, while the two above-mentioned
agencies seem nothing more than the old CASMEZ divided In two.
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TABLE 45.—Thp PAdMpy'r,
(valued in constant B82 iTieZTt
^
lire and expressed in millions of dollars)
-Roadworks








-Earthquake-stricken areas in Sicily
-Emergency operations in areas affected






































-capital grants 8,990.2 6,577.6








Table 6 of the Appendix to Ca£
Disbursements
-crafts and cottage industries
-fisheries









-loans for hotels and tourism
-CASMEZ loans for "special projects"
-shareholdings
-loans covered by foreign funds
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Italy's participation in an EEC dominated politically by West
Germany and France under a tempered American hegemony increased the
Italian economy's involvement in the process of capital accumulation
among the EEC States principally to the advantage and benefit of the
West German and French economies. In order to legitimize its political
230
and economic dominance in Italv th*y, the northwestern elite legitimized
a progressive intensification nf Mx r o the Mezzogiorno
• s underdevelopment
to the advantage and benefit of t-h* o*he economic system of the northwest.
It used the "economic programming" concent to 1^^ -p legitimize an ever more
rationalized implementation of the policies of incentives and dependent
industrialization so that the economic system of the northwest might
better sustain international economic competition under the adverse
conditions created by the EEC's unbalanced integration.
Beginning in 1965, the northwestern elite, through the DC, pro-
gressively rationalized the State's intervention in the Mezzogiorno.
It located the productive investments of capital in the most promising
areas and it reorganized the institutional mechanisms which governed
the accumulation and the investment of capital in the Mezzogiorno so
that the economic system of the northwest might gain the greatest
possible benefit from the Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment. Moreover,
the northwestern elite seeks to minimize the political and economic
costs of the negative repercussions created by the Mezzogiorno ' s inten-
sified underdevelopment by combining the productive expenditure of
capital under the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization
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^^Il^lLjlM^Coj^t^ Economic n I
Salvemini, Gl^squilib^
^^^i^^^











See La^epubbUca (Roma) 17 May 1984, p. 31; and 26 July 1984,
See La Repubblica (Roma) 8 March 1984, p. 27.
See La Repubblica (Roma) 13 December 1983, p. 33.
2?
See Riccardo Parboni, The Dollar and Its Rival cit., Chapter 5.
28
' ^e LaJteEubblica (Roma) 6 March 1984, p. 35; 10 November 1984,
i 27 "l^^^ " l9M « P ' ^ 26 "™*^
On 13 April 1985, in Palermo, the Finance Ministers of the EECStates, save Italy represented by its Treasury Minister strenethPnpH
the EMS and the ECU by reaching a limited agreement b^sed or"the th efollowing points. First, the Central Banks of the EEC States are nowauthorized to utilize part of their ECUs (held as reserves) to maintainthe parity within the EMS of their respective national currencies rela-tive to the other EEC currencies. Second, official ECUs will now earninterest based on market rates, not on an adjusted average of the offi-
cial rediscount rates of the Central Banks of the EEC States. Third
the Central Banks of non-EEC States are now authorized to hold offi-'
cial ECUs as reserves. See La Repubblica (Roma) 14/15 April 1985, p. 29.
29
See La Repubblica (Roma) 9 February 1985, p. 31; and 10/11








30 cSee La_Jepubblica (Roma) 9 February 1985, p. 3i .
31
See Gianni Bonvicini x-nA t~ u „





European Economy :_m,,c^„^rr-—^ Pr°«ssi integrattyj [Gove£nino_the
tondazxona Giovanni AjnriSffgflffrirgtr
Pr0<:e5ses.'^rt^
7 — — vu
l
azioni nel Mezzopinmn rTv,^ t —1 .for Foreign Investments ind f~ r FncillL.ii. L -. Leglslation
IASM (No date) .




Del Monte Adriano Giannola, II Mezzogiomo
ment in Southern Italv tt «s r •
^rcsnert, Managing Foreign Invest -
s
x o " aly. U.S. Businesses in Developing ArPao ^ ZuZ ^
—





















See La Repubblica (Roma) 5 September 1984, p. 35.
235
p _ 34
"see La^n^ (Roma) 2g March ^ ? ^ ^^ ^
44
See La_Repubblica (Roma ) 2 April 1985, p. 34.
See p. 1 of "Affari e Finan^A- Tr •
46






See La_Jepubblica (Roma) 22 December 1983, pp. 27-28.






See La Repubblica (Roma) 8 January 1985, p. 33.
53-
Ibidem . , p. 13.
M„
54see Maurizio Benetti etal., II capitale straniero nelezzogiorno , cit.
55
See Vincenzo Guizzi, Comunita' europea e sviluppp del Mezzoeiornoext.. Chapter 3; and Ali Mohammed El-Agraa, editorTl^e^^^^
the European Community , cit., Chapter 13. '
r
See Vincenzo Guizzi, Comunita' Europea e sviluppp del Mezzo-giorno, cit., Chapter 3.
' " °
57 T , .,Ibidem,
58.
See Salverino De Vito, "II Mezzogiorno e la Comunita' Europea"
[ The Mezzogiorno And The European Community"] in Rivista Trimestrale
Mezzogiorno d'Europa
[Mezzogiorno d'Europa Quarterly Review . AlscTaVail-
able in English.] October/December (N. 4) 1984, p. 481, Napoli: ISVEIMER
5
236
See European Commission o
the European ComrnunU^^ Sec t[~^^^
^Ibidem.
See Salverino De Vit-n "ti m
See CGIL-CISL-UIL, CGIL-CIST -tttt .,,11
££HHBitaria [CGIL-CISL-UIL^n^P^^^
see, JQ™"^ Agricultural Pol icy
interesse nella politica agri ^ e -nflitti di




N. 1. 1981; and Michele De Benedictis and F De
*Wa*™
della PAC: illusioni e realta'" I»lL p !\
FlllPP^. "La revisione












° GiUZZi ' SSSiiS^IHPSi^iluEpc^^
64
See Rosemary Galli and Saverio Torr^-in To *. •
itaUana alia P°li ricJL ajgici^oB^^S Ll^fSfr^
65
See La Repubblica (Roma) 3 April 1984, p. 35.
66 cSee La Repubblica (Roma) 10 May 1985, p. 33.
P inr-n
67Data
/el^ iVe t0 ™ ' S °P«ations in Italy and in the Mezzo-?9%T?^^ investimenti, LtMBE^S^
t -.
y iears i^S-1983 1. Luxembourg: Banca Euronea ner «tHInvestimenti, Information Division, Public Relations Office^ p
8
p 1





97^ million plus u
the EEC to a"22 e4q8fQ™, 25 ' 60,8 - 7 milU°^ the EIB ' S -vestments in
morp L? ECU_22, 7.9 mrllion because the investments duplicated bye than one project equal ECU 3,120.8 million, to be subtracted fromthe apparent total.
6 8






investmen ts to finance regional development projects in the
EEC, while the ECU 2,194.2 million equals 22.76 percent of the EIB's
total investments to finance projects of interest to the EEC.
69
See Alfredo Del Monte and Adriano Giannola, II Mezzogiorno nell'
economia italiana






Ibidem . , Chapter 11.
72 nbee Maurizio Benetti P t- ni ti
















My elaborat ion of
80
HlXMt Adrlan° Glannola ' S^ssHsssj^r
81
Ibidem . , Chapter 9.
82 cSee Gisele Podbielski, Venticinque anni di intervento straor
Hw'wSfg?
0^:0 avallable in Engiish - j - «°ma; ^ "
83
See Alfredo Del Monte and Adriano Ciannola, II Mezzogiornoneil economla italiana
, cit., Chapter 9.
84
See Arnaldo Bagnasco, Tre Italie: la problematic torHrnH.l.
dello sviluppo italiano
, cit., p. 59.
~
85
See Alfredo Del Monte and Adriano Ciannola, II Mezzogiorno
nell economia italiana , cit., p. 181.
1
86 TLIbidem
. , Chapter 7.
87
Ibidem . , p. 140.
Ibidem., p. 179.
89
Ibidem . , p. 204.
90
Ibidem . , p. 140.
Ibidem . , p. 359.
92
See Maurizio Benetti et- ^1 ti • ,






Ibidem . , p. 207.
96.
See Maurizio Benetti Pt nl ti j ^ -,
giorno
, cit., p. 62.




100 TL . JIbidem . , p. 179.
Ibidem . , p. 204.
Ibidem . , p. 181.
103
Ibidem . , p. 140.






. , p . 179 >
107
Ibidem
. , p. 204.
Ibidem . , p. 181.
Ibidem
. , p. 359,





See Claudio Signorile, II nuovo Mezzogiorno p Tnazionale
, cit., p. 83.
"^^o^io e 1 economia
116
1
See La Repubblica (Roma) 4 August 1984, p. 3.
See La Repubblica (Roma) 5/6 August 1984, p. 3.
117 0See La Repubblica (Roma) 11 September 1984, p. 35.
118_
See La Repubblica (Roma) 18 October 1984, p. 28.
119_
See La Repubblica (Roma) 4/5 November 1984, p 33- 18/19November 1984, p. 2; 13 April 1985, p. 8; and 17 April 198 5 ! p! 2.
120oSee La Repubblica (Roma) 5 July 1984, p. 30.
CHAPTER VI
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY'* mra«T «
and THE^r^^tZ,TrMTlm
^-^-^iitlon^^
Italy's participation in an EEC donated politically by West
Germany and France under a tempered American Wi t a hegemony stimulated the
Italian economy's development by increasing the mobility of capital,
labor and commerce between Italy and the other EEC States, ad by
inducing the northwestern elite to intensify the Mezzogiorno
' s under-
development to the advantage and benefit of the economic system of
the northwest. The northwestern elite accomplished this by means of
the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization so that
it might retain its position of dominance in Italy under the adverse
conditions created by the EEC's unbalanced integration. Although the
country's participation in the EEC may have stimulated the development
of all three of its economic systems, the development of the economic
systems of the northwest and the center/northeast, on the one hand,
and that of the Mezzogiorno, on the other, differ significantly. The
economic systems of the northwest and the center/northeast occupy
a dominant position in the national economy and, therefore, experience
positive, balanced development while the Mezzogiorno occupies a subaltern
position and, therefore, experiences negative, unbalanced development
240
241
in dependence of external exit
consequences
e economic
agencies, that is, underdevelopment. Thi
major difference results f,f from and reflects the different
of Italy's participation in the EEC for the development of th
sytems of the northwest and the center/northeast, on the one hand
and for the Mezzogiorno's development, on the other.
Italy's participation in the vvr -im EEC stimulated especially the dev-
elopment of Italian industry becaimp Mhc use this sector was (and is) Italy's
most prodnctive and, therefore, most remnnerative and most attractive
to investors, Italy's industrial development reduced greatly the
employment in the agricultural sector. This in turn ain , m , reduced the
population of Italy's rural areas by increasing the superiority of
the inches in the industrial sector over those in the agricultural
sector. Agricultural development was hindered by a land reform (law
n. 230 of 12 May 1950, Law n. 841 of 2! October 1950 and the Sicilian
Regional Government's Law n. 104 of 27 December 1950) which promoted
the mechanization of far™ (with equipment manufactured principally
in north-central Italy) more than the development of agricultural infra-
structures (for example, irrigation systems).
2
The reduction of the
population of the Mezzogiorno's rural areas, in comparison with the
rural areas of the economic systems of the northwest and the center/
northeast, was severe and disorderly because the Mezzogiorno's agri-
culture, in comparison with north-central Italy's, was already less
productive and was responsible for the employment and for the under-
employment of a relatively greater share of the population (consequences
of the Mezzogiorno's subaltern position in the Italian economy). More-




CAP-s discrimination against Mediterranean agricultural products,
indeed, Italy has aliased in this discretion hecanse, under the
adverse conditions created by the EEC's unbalanced integration, the
exigencies of international economic competition have induced the
northwestern elite to p-xr^nH n-*, • ».expa d its international markets as much as
possible at the Mezzogiorno's expense. I„ this case, the northwestern
elite realizes its goal by exchanging Italy's industrial products, manu
factored principally in north-central Italy, for Mediterranean agri-
cultural products cultivated outside the Mezzogiorno. The northwest
elite can only hope that the revenue gained from the exports of Ital
industrial products may compensate adequately Italy's agricultural
deficits
.
The population decline of the Mezzogiorno ' s rural areas hindered
the redistribution of land according to the dictates of the land
reform. It also created disequilibria both in the geographic dis-
tribution of the labor force in the Mezzogiorno, in that some of its
areas disposed of an excess of manpower while other areas had an
insufficiency
4
, and in the spatial development of the Mezzogiorno '
s
agriculture. The latter suffered in the severely depopulated internal
mountainous areas, now known as the Mezzogiorno ' s "osso" ("bone"
areas), but flourished with capital intensive plantations located
in the geographically suited coastal areas, now known as the Mezzo-
giorno's "polpa" ("lean meat" areas).
5
The reduced employment in the
nation's agricultural sector and the consequent reduction of the rural
population resulted in greater pro capite incomes for those persons
243
who reta lned employmen t ln the ^^
aeveloPmenc cm c„,PHism with earller periods)> md urbaniMtton
of the population.
The policies of incentives ~>r,A a~ jtr and dependent industrialization created
inadequate employment opportunities -in n, mPP i the Mezzogiorno for the people
who left agriculture by locating laree caD1> n i • , •g -Larg , pital intensive industries in
the Mezzogiorno 7 and hy intensifying the competition for the control of
the Mezzogiorno's internal market between the Mezzogiorno's and north-
central Italy's small and medium businesses. The location of large,
capital intensive industries in the Mezzogiorno increased pro capite
incomes by absorbing some unemployment and underemployment and by in-
creasing the cost of labor. The greater pro capite incomes in industry
and in agriculture made the Mezzogiorno a market more attractive than
ever to north-central Italy's businesses, located in more dominant
economic systems and, therefore, already more efficient and productive
than the Mezzogiorno • s businesses, unable to sustain the competition.
In effect, the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization
created in the Mezzogiorno "economic deserts," that is, areas without
or with few small and medium businesses (especially those which could
serve as the external economies of large businesses). This occurred
because the large, capital intensive industries located in the Mezzo-
giorno destroyed many of its small and medium businesses, and prevented
the development of others, by increasing incomes in the area and, there-
fore, by intensifying the competition for the control of its internal
market between the area's small and medium businesses and north-central
o
Italy's more efficient and productive ones.
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The Polxcy of ^^T-TT^r^
The northwestern elite expends capital unproductively in the MeZZ o-
giorno under the policy of social control so that the reduction of the
rural population may not result in the social disintegration of the
rural areas. An important element of this policy is the transfer of
monies to southern Italians hy means of employment subsidies, events'
remittances, unemployment Insurance and social security pensions, sub-
stitutive of the wages and the salan'pq n f jrie ries o the productive jobs lacking
in the Mezzogiorno, as Table 46 shows:
TABLE 46. -income formation in the Mezzogiorno (percentage figures)
Incomes Communes Area Population
Autonomous (1) 20.2 28.9 57.6
Dependent on External
Production (2) 15.5 12.1 6.7
Subsidized (3) 64.3 59.0 35.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Nicola Maria Boccella, II Mezzogiorno sussidiato: reddito
prodotto e trasferimenti alle famiglie nei comuni meridionali [ The
Subsidized Mezzogiorno: Produced Income and Transfers to Families in
the Southern Communes ], Milano: Franco Angeli, 1982, Chapter 2,
especially pp. 52-53 and p. 56.
(1) Income produced in loco is > 90 percent of total income.
(2) Income produced in loco is < 90 percent of total income;
emigrants' remittances are > 5.0 percent of total income.
(3) Income produced in loco is < 90 percent of total income;
emigrants' remittances are <5.0 percent of total income.
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this total was transferred between I970 and 1 973 ; t„ lt„ alone ^
transfers equalled $3 bllllon . The ^^ ^^ _
Ployed in the agricultur.! sector increased from S 27 tn l951> when
total of these transfers equalled the value of one percent of Italy's
agricultural product, to $1,612 in 1074 mti.Qlt 1974, These transfers in 1972
equalled the value of 38 oerrem- „f n i ip c nt of Italy's agricultural product and
the value of 2.5 percent of its GNP, and represented twice the value
cf the investments in its agricultural system, m 1973 , chey provlded
two-thirds of the incomes of those employed in agriculture. Of the $27
billion transferred to the agricultural sector between 1551 and 19 73 ,
80 percent, that is, 521.6 billion, was transferred to the «.MogW.
agricultural sector. The EEC Directive n. 268 of 25 May 1975, which,
by providing income supplements paid directly to farmers, attempts to
impede the mass depopulation and the social disintegration provoked in
the EEC's mountainous and disadvantaged agricultural areas by moderni-
zation and the rationalization of the agricultural systems of the EEC
States under the EEC Directives nn. 159, 160 and 161 of 7 April 1 972 ,
complements perfectly the transfer of monies to southern Italians under
the policy of social control.
9
The Rise and Fall of the "State Bourgeoisie "
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the "State bourgeoisie,"
whose power in the State apparatus had increased commensurate! y with
246
the steady increase of capital ^ a j ,x expended for the development of the
parastate industries in the MP„n •Mezzogxorno under the policies of incen-
tives and dependent industrialization Kon -l nza x beginning in 1957, contested
the northwestern elitp'c? nnn f . , ,
. political dominance by arrogating to itself
the prerogative to manage the Mezzogiomo's development. The "State
bourgeoisie" actively promoted the productive diversi £ication o t the
Parastate industries with little apparent regard for the desires or the
interests of north-central Italy's private oligopolies. 10 For this
reason, the northwestern elite disciplined the "state bourgeoisie" by
reducing sharply between 19 73 and 1978 the entity of capital invested
in the parastate industries located in the Mezzogiorno, as Table 47 shows
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TABLE 47.—Investments in the m*»*«„- (





















































































































1980 20.0 48.3 14.2
1981 19.2 46.8 14.4
SOURCE: Alfredo Del Monte, "Gli effetti della politica regionale
sullo sviluppo industrials del Mezzogiorno" ["The Effects of Regional
Policy on the Mezzogiorno « s Industrial Development"] in Rivista Tri -
mestrale Mezzogiorno d'Europa [Mezzogiorno d'Europa Quarterly Review .
Also available in English.] October/December (N. 4) 1984, p. 585,
Napoli: ISVEIMER.
(*) Heterogeneous ISTAT and Ministry of State Participations data:
old series for the 1951-1969 period; new series for the 1970-1981 period
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common
The Mez2ogior„o.s subaltern posltion ln ^^^ ^
in the International economy has produced ^
consequences: anomalous urbanizaH™,nization, anomalous consumerism, hyper-
tertkrlZatl0n
'
emlgrati°- »d ^ entrepreneurs mafla and the maU
model o£ capitalist accumulation. These consequences have a
denominator: the Me77npinrnn', ji zzog o o s underdevelopment manifests itself
as economic development without sufficient employment opportunities
for its population.
11
Its demographic development has aggravated the
problem of its "economic development without employment," in that it
has consistently registered a birth rate higher than north-central
Italy's. Moreover, the great improvements realized in its standard
of living after World War II, with particular regard to health care,
hygiene and sanitation, have produced in comparison with north-central
Italy, a longer life span, which has more than offset a higher infant
mortality rate.
12
The Mezzogiorno counted 17.7 million inhabitants in
1951, 18.6 million in 1961, 18.9 million in 1971 and 19.9 million
in 1981.
13
The Mezzogiorno 's Anomalous Urbanization
The Mezzogiorno 's urbanization is anomalous, in that the population
urbanized not because its urban areas attracted the population by of-
fering a great quantity of remunerative, secure and stable employment
250
opportunities but rather because its rura! „l areas expelled much of
the population by no lonepr nff •ge offerrng traditional (although unpro-
ductive) agricultural employment
. The ^
the rishs o £ a precarious economic £uture in the eity outweighed the
certainties of a n0re precarious economic future in the countryside
(except, of courqp f nT. ^-use, or the minor lty which retained employment in the
modernizing agricultural sector). In comparlson^ ^
opportunities offered to urhan dwellers by north-centra! urban
areas, the Mezzogiorno's urhan areas offer to urhan dwellers fewer
employer opportunities eqnally or ,„te remunerative, secure and
stable.
14
The Mezzogiorno's Anomalous consumerism
The Mezzogiorno's consumerism is anomalous, in that the value and
the volume of the goods and services consumed in the area exceed the
value and the volume of the goods and services produced there. This
situation exists because the political actors which dominate the Mezzo-
giorno determine preponderantly the composition of internal demand.
They use their political power to ensure the consumption of their
products in the area so that the real income produced there may accrue
to them as earnings to be used as investment capital. Such consumerism
hinders the accumulation and the investment, according to internal
exigencies, of the real income produced by the Mezzogiorno by draining
its real income to the economic systems of the political actors which
251
dominate the Mezzogiorno Th« m




to the Positive, bal-anced development of Che economic systems o£ _ fcS f the northwest and the
center/northeast than to th* POSltlV6
'
bSl-« d *-elopment of dominantforeign economic systems, as Table A8 indicates:
TABLE 48.-The composition of lnternal demand ^ 19?ftand m North-central Italy Mezzogiorno
Origin of the goods and
services consumed


































SOURCE: Bruno Ferrara, Nord-Sud, interdipendenza di due Prnnn^
[North-South, The Interdependence of Two Economies ], Milano: Cassa per
il Mezzogiorno/Franco Angeli, 1976, p. 89.
The Mezzogiornn ' q u-,r^~
on
The Mezzogiorno experiences hypertertiarization, ^ u ^
an °malOUS 8rOWth
°
f —— -cause this sector
, under
«- poncy o£ soclal control
, absorbs some of Mezzogiorno , s
ployment and underemployment bv nff.^y o ering unproductive jobs substitu-
tive of the productive jobs lacking in the area', "„ • ,5 aii rie s economic develop-
ment without employment 11 rh-t * uP . This hypertertiarization
, which has its
origins in the unification of t<-„ix Italy under the Kingdom of Sardinia
and is a historically mnQi-ar>i- „constant consequence of the Mezzogiorno's under-
development, was more intensive prlor to the lmplementatlon o£ ^
policies of incentives and dependent industrialization than after
because these policies have reduced the economic importance of the
area's tertiary sector relative to the other sectors by increasing the
economic importance of the industrial sector. Nonetheless, the area's
hypertertiarization remains a noteworthy phenomenon for three reasons.
First, in comparison with north-rent- 1 Tf-oi,, iuu n central Italy, employment in the
Mezzogiorno's tertiary sector increases at a rate disproportionately
high relative to the rate of increase of productivity in its industrial
and agricultural sectors. Second, unlike north-central Italy's ter-
tiary sector, the Mezzogiorno's tertiary sector has not developed
productive, marketable ancillary services; therefore, it has not
acquired a greater functional complementarity with the industrial
sector. Third, the unproductiveness of the Mezzogiorno's tertiary
sector hinders the accumulation of capital for productive investment
not only in the Mezzogiorno but in the national economy.
15
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AUhOU8h Me2Z08l^' S ™ « have acqulred
a greater functlonal complementarlty
industriai^ ^
recent initiatives undertaken bv thay e organizations and the investors
cited below indicate the development of a f„n^- ,0t actional complementarity
between the sectors. First -in q q - t^rst, m September 1984, Tecnopolis, a high
technology research city built bv thu T^in y e Italian government and the Uni-
versity of Bari, became operative in v,im Valenzano, near Bari (Puglia)
TecaopoUs, „hich links the Universuy Qf wi£h^
of various MedUe rra„ean basln c0untrles> Blll carry out research ^
jects financed bv bu<?i'npc!c 0 n 0 „jDy us esses and organizations such as FIAT, Olivetti,
IBM, Control Data Corporation, the Bank of t^.i a u
»
n Italy and the Intergovernmental
Bureau of Informatics, and will Darriri na^ •n p t c p te m projects with the research
organizations of the Silicon Valley (United States). Tecnopolis exists
ostensibly to foster the Mezzogiorno s development but currently can
provide only middle-level technological services to the vast majority
of the area's businesses because so few of them currently utilize high
technology services (a consequence of the Mezzogiorno 's underdevelop-
ment).
16
second, on 6 October 1984, Pitagora (Pythagoras), an economic
data bank, became operative in Cosenza (Calabria). Pitagora, linked
to the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) , the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), provides information about the
Italian economy, other economies and the international economy to
banks and businesses.
17
It remains to be seen whether these initiatives
will foster the accumulation and the investment, according to internal
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exigencies, of the rp^i -i^eal mcome produced by the Mezzogiorno or whether
these initiatives, undertaken >„ .. . „to sattsfy external exigencies, will serve
the best interests of the economlc systems which dominate the Mezzo-
giorno, as the initiatives to industrialize the area have done.
Emigration From The Mezzoeinmn
Emigration is a salient characteristic of the Me2ZOgiomo<s under-
development: for example, between 1951 and 1971, 4,148,517 southern
Italians emigrated, most temporarily, some permanently, to north-central
Italy and to other countries. Of this total, 2,051,872 emigrated between
1951 and 1961 and 2,096,645 between 1961 and 1971.
18
Unde r the policies
of incentives and dependent industrialization, the emigration of south-
ern Italians is more functional than ever both to the best interests
of the northwestern elite and to the positive, balanced development of
the economic systems of the northwest and the center/northeast for
three reasons. First, the Mezzogiorno • s "economic development with-
out employment" made the Mezzogiorno 's unemployed and underemployed
a work force useful primarily to the industrial expansion of the eco-
nomic systems of the northwest and the center/northeast and secondarily
to the industrial expansion of foreign states (mostly those of the
19
EEC). Second, the remittances of the temporary and permanent emi-
grants (from all of Italy to other countries) are a substantive source
of revenue for its balance of payments: for example, between 1970 and




account^ Ihird , emlgratlon u ^^^ ^ ^^ ^
socia! control, unable in and o £ itsel£ to neutralize ^
repercussions of the policies of
2
° lncentl^es and dependent industrial-
ization.
Although emigration may he a "safety valve," the northwestern elit <
cannot consider emigration a panacea for the negative repercussions of
the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization. Willi,
or not, it must contend politically with the emigrants, not only
those from the Mezzogiorno but from all of Italy, and must reali;
that the prospect of emigration does not always exist. Exc,
gration fro. the Mezzogiorno to north-central Italy saturates that
area's industrial sector with workers. It strengthens the trade unions,
allied primarily with the Left. It also obliges the northwestern elite
either to create unproductive jobs in the tertiary sector and in the
public administration or to send the emigrants back to their regions
of residence to accept unproductive jobs or some other form of welfare.
Moreover, in order to reduce their labor costs as much as possible, the
entrepreneurs of the EEC States which depend to a significant degree
on immigrant labor discriminate against intra-EEC immigrant workers
in favor of extra-EEC immigrant workers. This happens because the socio-
economic obligations toward the latter are minimal in comparison with
the socio-economic obligations toward the former, whom the host coun-
tries must treat as domestic workers according to the EEC's Social
Policy. With the passing of time, this discrimination has increased,
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Between lM , and 1971, 1>M5 , M9 Itallans ^
temporarily, some permanently; o £ this total, lMiMk left
1951 and 1961, while 565,5« left between 1961 and 1971. 22 Between
1972 and 1975, «0,340 Italians emigrated, but in each year their
ber decreased:
1 A 1.852 in 1Q77. io<s onn ,, W U72
>
l23.802 m L973J 112,020 in L974;
and 92,666 in 1975. ^
Emgiration is a delicate problem because Italians do not like to
leave their country in order to work abroad as Tables 50 and 51 show:
TABLE 50.—Views on emigration
Italy's preference to live Italians' preference to
ln Lta] y emigrate
™ 11
SOURCE: Monitorskopea Repubblica Poll , La Repubblica (Roma) 7 Feb-
ruary 1984, p. 9.
TABLE 51.—Countries preferred by would-be emigrants









Soviet Union/Central Europe 0.2
India 0 1
Other countries \ a
SOURCE: Monitorskopea Repubblica Poll, La Repubblica (Roma) 7 Feb-
ruary 1984, p. 9.
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TABLE 3,-Itallan _ their^ ^
Population (1)
_
Emigrants (2) \ & ) fa
(1)
Italy











Northwest Average 3,817,503 101 90Q O "71 .
7
Emi 1ia-Romagna 3,935,834 176 811 k . 5
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1,244,406 242 484 1 Q C
Lazio
4,921,859 169,445 3.4
Marche 1,390,388 119,029 8.6
Toscana 3,566,763 80,528 2.3
Trentino-Alto Adiae 866.377 80,343 9.3
Umbria 795,218 74,090 9.3
Veneto 4,277,501 256,726 6.0
Center/Northeast Average 2,624,793 149.932 5.7
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TABLE 52.—Continued





















SOURCE: Gianni Giadresco, "Premiato ed espulso" ["Rewarded and
Expelled"] in Rinascita , n. 4, 27 January 1984, pp. 16-17.
The Entrepreneurial Mafia and The Mafia Model of
Capitalist Accumulation
The mafia originated in southern Italy, more specifically in west-
ern Sicily, in southern Calabria and in the Naples area, when the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies suffered under the oppressive political
domination of the Kingdom of Spain (between 1504 and 1714). (The
Austro-Hungarian Empire formally controlled the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies between 1714 and 1748; in reality, the Kingdom enjoyed great
political autonomy.) The „ , . ,mafia flourished before the genesis of
capitalism, which overthrew f„„j„,
•
feudalism in southern Italy during the
reign of the House of Bourhon tv, • ub . This House ruled the Kingdom of the
T»o Sicilies from 1748 to I860, save for a few months in 1799 (the
short-lived Parthenopean Republic) and from 1806 to 1815 (the King.
dom of Naples under Napoleonic tutelage).
The oppressive domination of the Spanish created intense socio-
economic insecurity in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by producing
economic conditions so precarious that individuals and families could
rise or fall suddenly and rapidly in the social order. It also deter-
mined that external rather than internal exigencies wou!d shape the
political economic and cultural evolution of the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies.
24
Hnder these circumstances, it became a "society in per-
manent transition," whose evolution was increasingly alienated from
its traditional culture and its immanent political, economic and
cultural evolution.
The intense socio-economic insecurity created by the misgovern-
ment of the Spanish engendered the mafia, which, in its original and
truest form, was not an organization but rather a type of behavior
and power. It was the ethic adopted by a man, the "mafioso," so
that he might acquire and maintain a secure social position in an
insecure social environment. The traditional mafia ethic is "omerta ' "
,
derived from the Sicilian word "omu" (Latin "homo," Italian "uomo,"
man), that is, "the capacity to be a man." According to this ethic,
life is a "war of all against all," and a true man— the mafioso— is
one with personal honor acquired hv „c by nieans o£ lndlvidua] vlolence
a di rlspe tCo" CW of nBpact„ )t ^ u a mM c^ ^
He is a man able "to command respect" hv h «by being able to revenge affronts
and to injure his enemies by himself and with his own means. 26
The meaning of the word "mafia," and of the various epithets
which denote a similar ethic in different geographic areas, reflects
the individual's need to attempt to secure his social position in an
insecure social environment by resorting to individual violence and
to personal means. "Mafia" (which applies properly to Sicily) is
of an uncertain etymology but probably derives from the Arabic word
for protection. " 'Ndrangheta" (which applies properly to Calabria)
derives from the ancient Greek "andragathia , " a "valorous man,"
that is, a man haughty, clever, contemptuous of danger and without
scruples. "Camorra" (which applies properly to the Naples area) is
of an uncertain etymology but derives either from a word common to
the Mediterranean region "morra," that is, "pack" or "gang," or from
the Spanish word "gamurra," that is, "extortion pay-off." 27 "Omerta'"
has a concomitant meaning, "a conspiracy of silence." In the envir-
onment of socio-economic insecurity and political oppresssion which
engendered the mafia, the people refused to collaborate with the
State's organs of justice because these organs, together with their
juridical norms and the concept of justice which they purported to
represent, had minimal legitimacy. The traditional mafia ethic
affirms aggression by equating honor with superior power: justice
28




According to the traditional ma fia ethic, a mafioso's presti,
and honor (power) are _surate with his ability to display U
behavior with impunity in open violation of the Juridical norms in
force and to govern, that is, to manage the constant and open all-
against-all competition for personal honor (power). The mafioso
acquires his honor (power) by using violence and maintains it by
creating an authority which legitimizes (and enhances) it. The maf-
ioso creates his authority by combining astutely violence and tacti-
cal diplomacy. He uses violence, and the threat of violence, to
deter and to quell challenges. He uses diplomacy to delude unsuspec-
ting foes and to create the perception that he may be a protector,
mediator, counselor, judge, father figure and friend of all. More-
over, according to the traditional mafia ethic, although wealth may
at times accompany the mafioso's honor (power), wealth and honor (power)




After the unification of Italy, in the social environment cre-
ated by the Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment, the mafioso 's honor (power)
and authority gave to him substantive political autonomy. Although
this may theoretically make him a competitor and, therefore, an ad-
versary and an enemy of the State, the States which have governed
southern Italy have tolerated the mafia (save the Kingdom of Italy
during the Fascist regime, which suppressed it) and have maintained
the social order by collaborating with it (on numerous occasions offi-
30
cially). This happened because the mafia has been a covenient and
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effective mediator of fm-o-t t • .oreign political donation over southern Italy
on the one hand, and o f socia! conflict and cooperation In southern
Italy, on the other. A mafioso, assisted hy four or five close asso-
ciates, manages social ronfl-i^t- ^ ar t c nfl ct and cooperation in a given area of
southern Italy by exercizino , , k .izmg his authority over the population through
a "coses." This is a hierarchical network of people linked by family
ties and friendships. It is the fundamental mafia unit, the unit
fro, which the mafioso derives his identity, the unit in whose context
he carries on the competition for honor. He must contend constantly
with real and potential challenges from within and without the cosca
(for example, from other cosche) . He remains the "capocosca" ("the
head of the cosca") only for as long as he remains the person most
feared and respected.
31
In the twentieth century, the mafioso's authority, together with
the traditional mafia ethic upon which his authority was based, suf-
fered two severe blows. First, the Fascist regime debilitated his
authority and ethic by asserting the State's authority and by suppres-
sing his activities.
32
(On the other hand, American and English
occupation forces in World War II resuscitated his authority. They
released incarcerated mafiosi and placed them in local political
offices in the Mezzogiorno so that they might serve as anti-Fascist
,
anti-Left agents of social control.
33
Nonetheless, at the end of
the war, the mafioso's authority was very weak.)
Second, Italy's integration in the international economy under
a tempered American hegemony undermined the mafioso's already weak
authority. It modified Italv'c ». . ,y s mass social values in such a way as
to delegitimize further the traditional mafia ethic. The American
values of materialism and consumerism which accompanied Italy's post-
World War II prosperity idenrifi-Htr t ed merit and virtue not with indi-
vidua! violence hut rather with wealth and success. Between 1945
and 1965, the mafioso's prestige and authority were in crisis, and
the mafioso was socially emarginated. The Italian State asserted
its prerogative to monopoly physical violence on its territory; the
PCI and the trade unions penetrated into the Mezzogiorno and limited
the mafioso's activities. The southern Italians no longer accorded
legitimacy to the traditional mafia ethic and, therefore, no longer
admired and feared the mafioso. 34
During the 1960s, the northwestern elite became increasingly
aware that the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization
promised not only to strengthen its privileged position in Italy by
intensifying the Mezzogiorno ' s underdevelopment to the advantage and
benefit of the economic system of the northwest but threatened to
undermine its position by exacerbating the Mezzogiorno ' s disequilibria
and by provoking the area's social disintegration. This threat in-
duced it, through the DC, to make the mafioso a politically subaltern
mediator of the northern Italian, West German and American political
domination over the Mezzogiorno and an agent of social control. To
this end, beginning in the mid-1960s, the northwestern elite integrated
the Mezzogiorno's mafiosi into the DC and charged them to manage direct
according to the DCs political dictates, the area's credit market,
its job market for the nnhl-fn ~a •public administration, and the distribution
of government contracts for construction in the area.
35
The mafiosi, in order to reacquire their lost authority and
Prestige, reacted to their social emargination and to their political
subordination by creating a new mafia ethic and by adopting the capi-
talist mode of production. They created the new mafia ethic, which
adapted the traditional ethic to the socio-economic conditions of the
post-World War II Mezzogiorno, by redefining honor on the basis of
the American values of consumerism and materialism and on the basis
of the "spirit of capitalism," the "religion of accumulation." The
new ethic equates honor with wealth: life remains a constant and
open all-against-all competition for honor; however, a mafioso's
honor is now commensurate with his wealth, and individual violence
is now a means to the end of capital accumulation. The mafiosi
adopted the capitalist mode of production because it is the most
efficient accumulator of wealth and, therefore, the most efficient
"accumulator of honor."
36
In this way, the mafiosi transformed them-
selves into "entrepreneurial mafiosi" characterized by ethical irra-
tionality and by pragmatic rationality. Ethical irrationality
characterizes the entrepreneurial mafioso because he bases his be-
havior on two aggressive, animalistic and predatory concepts: honor
acquired by means of individual violence and honor defined on the
basis of the American values of consumerism and materialism together
with the "spirit of capitalism." The latter is a "religion of accumu-
lation" whose dogma glorifies the accumulation of wealth for wealth's
266
sake. Pragmatlc ratlonalUy characterlzes entrepreneurlal manoso
because he attempts to satls£y ^
desire to acquire honor (wenlt-M k„ t. • .wealth) by combining the use of violence (as
a means to the end") wit-v, •d Wlth the capitalist mode of production, that is,
by creating the "mafia model of canital i • ,,37Ui p ist accumulation.
The mafia model of capitalist accumulation provides the entre-
preneurial mafioso with three fundamental advantages relative to legi-
timate entrepreneurs. First, the mafioso discourages competition. He
overwhelms legitimate entrepreneurs by using or by threatening to use
violence against them. Second, the mafioso lowers salaries and wages.
He reduces his labor costs by evading workers' insurance and social
security payments and by refusing to give overtime pay to workers.
He also takes advantage of the Mezzogiorno ' s unemployed and underem-
ployed by offering to them illegal jobs which pay less than the legal
minimum wage. Last, the mafioso disposes of finanal resources. He
acquires capital from illegal activities, principally from international
drug traffic, arms sales, kidnappings, extortion and the theft of art
and jewels. He then overwhelms legitimate entrepreneurs—and dominates
markets—by investing this illicit capital, which need not be reimbursed
(with or without interest) to anyone, in "legitimate mafia enterprises."
These are enterprises which would be completely legitimate were their
investment capital not "dirty."
The emergence, during the 1970s, of the mafia model of capitalist
accumulation marks the mafioso 's transformation from a political medi-
ator into an entrepreneur whose private vices are not public virtues.
267
It induces him to resort t-r.o vtolence not only in his relationships with
other mafiosi hot with the rest o £ society and, moreover, to increase
the nse of violence, because capitalist intensifies the competition
for honor among mafiosi by intension™ m,censilying the competition for wealth.
Such an incitement to ever zreaf-c- ,„„ig ater violence puts the mafioso into con-
stant conflict with the Italian Judicial system. tt induces hlm to
repudiate the State's prerogative to monopolize physical violence on
Italian territory. It also promotes the organizational development of
his activities: this allows him to respond better to capitalist com-
petition and, therefore, to compete better for honor (wealth) with othe,
mafiosi and with the rest of society. 39
During the 1970s, this organizational development transformed the
mafia from a type of behavior and power without a formal organization
Into one with a formal organization, the entrepreneurial mafia, char-
acterized by a factionalized hierarchy of mafiosi always in conflict
with each other because always in competition for honor (wealth). Its
organizational and financial strength allowed the mafioso to regain
his lost political autonomy
40
and allows its model of capitalist accu-
mulation to project itself outward from the Mezzogiorno, to reproduce
and to regenerate itself elsewhere in its own image and likeness.
41
The entrepreneurial mafia's factionalism induces it to lacerate
itself and society. The cosca, which traditionally counted between
15 and 20 people but now, based on extended families, counts between
70 and 80 adult males, remains the fundamental mafia unit. It is the
unit from which the mafioso derives his identity and in whose context
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he carries on the competition f™- i /or honor (wealth). He must still contend
constantly with real and potential rh,H 0P c x c allenges from within his cosca
and from other cosche.« The entrepreneurial mafia is more en agent
of soeial disintegration (because violent and destructive) than an
agent of economic development (because capitalist and productive). 43
The entrepreneurial mafia is currently divided into two major
eompeting factions: the "Nuova Famiglia" ("New Family") g0ver„ed by
Michele Zaza and the "Nuova Famiglia Organizzata" ("Organized New
Family") governed by Raffaele Cutolo. In recent years, these factions
have been engaged in bloody conflict because Cutolo has attempted, thus
far unsuccessfully, to wrest control of the entrepreneurial mafia's
lucrative international drug traffic from Zaza, the ally of the American
mafia, the "Cosa Nostra" ("Our Concern"). 44 Although the mafioso,
by equating honor with wealth when he made himself a capitalist, may
have adopted the values and the lifestyle of cultures developed out-
side and imposed on the Mezzogiorno, his traditional values (e.g.,
manipulative friendships, family ties, personal honor acquired by
means of individual violence) still form the basis of his identity.
No socio-political agent has yet constrained him by means of insti-
tutional regulation to change his modus operandi , to renounce his
traditional values in order to be able to adopt new ones. In essence,
the entrepreneurial mafioso is a man of more than one culture.
45
Systematic relationships exist between Italy's national political
46class and the mafia's leaders. On the level of these relationships,
the so-called "third level,
,,A7
the politicians involved belong mostly
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to the DC, some to the PSI few i-/> n"1, t to the other parties, and none to the
PCI, which is not involved on the "third level."*8 They agree t„
protect from Judicial prosecution as much as possible, and thus tar
with great efficacy, those mafiosi who agree to supply votes for
elections by organizing social consensus through favoritism and in-
49timidation. Tn thi ^ t-i^~ i-^- .i s way, the politician acquires, maintains or
increases his power, while in the MeZZOgiorno the mafia, by penetrating
the State apparatus, assumes ever greater control over employment in
the public administration and over the distribution of the State's
subsidies and pensions and, in some areas, becomes the political
elite class. The politicians involved enter into alliances with
the mafia not to enrich themselves but rather to acquire, maintain
or increase their power. When they take money, they use it to defray
the ever-increasing costs of electoral campaigns.
51
Moreover, north-central Italy's private oligopolies often nourish
the mafia by offering subcontracts to the mafiosi because they use
their three competitive advantages relative to legitimate entrepre-
neurs in order to render services at lower cost. The oligopolies
conspire with the mafia to raise artificially the costs of public
works projects in order to defraud the State.
52
In comparison with the other political parties, the PCI under-
takes the most effective political action against the mafia. Pio
LaTorre, the Parliamentary deputy and the PCI's Sicilian Regional
Secretary (assassinated by the mafia in Palermo on 25 April 1982),
introduced Italy's most progressive anti-mafia bill. It became
270
Law n. 416/416 bis of 13 September 1QR9 vP 982
»
known more commonly as the
Rognoni-La Torre Law. For the fir^rst time, examining magistrates have
the authority to investigate systematically the accounts of suspected
-fiosi and -mafia-style organizations" ("organizzazioni di stampo
mafioso"). These are organizations which subordinate their associates
and which require their i-a^it- i • •q tac t complicity in the commission of crimes
through intimidation. 53
On 2 November 1984, the EEC occupied itself for the first time with
the mafia. Pancrazio De Pasquale, the President of the EEC's Regional
Policy Commission and PCI member, proposed that the European Parliament
adopt a resolution which invites the EEC Commission to investigate the
mafia's involvement in the management of the EEC's funds for Sicily.
On 14 February 1985, the Parliament adopted such a resolution. 54 How-
ever, the EEC still lacks the authority to undertake substantive poli-
tical action against the mafia. In 1983, West Germany and Denmark, in
a defense of national sovereignty, blocked the adoption of norms which
would have given to the EEC the authority to oversee the management of
disbursed EEC funds by conducting direct, surprise inspections. 55
The mafia threatens more to undermine than to strengthen the
northwestern elite's privileged position in Italy because the mafia
model of capitalist accumulation threatens to make the entrepreneurial
mafia more an agent of social disintegration in Italy than an agent




of the mafia's activities for Italian society are ever more manifest.
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6,000 businesses under its control, 57 extort,t s an average LIT 1,000 bil-
lion per year from about ten percent of Tt-al . ,
58
P ° "aly's legitimate entrepren-
eurs and commits violent crimes (see Table 53) , „± oi 3 i . Such consequences
undermine the northwestern eHi-o'= • •-,l te s privileged position in Italy by cre-
ating political disaf factions which the Left champions.
Should the politic*! costs of the mafia as an agent of social dis-
integration in Italy outweight its political benefits as an agent of
social control in the Mezzogiorno, the domestic exigencies of polltlcal
legitimation would obl lge the northwestern elite to attempt to subordin-
ate the mafia politically or even to eliminate it and substitute a more
suitable agent of social control. In the 1960s, the northwestern elite
through the DC, saved the Mezzogiorno
• s mafiosi from social emargination
because the "State bourgeoisie" together with social security pensions,
subsidized incomes, public works projects and a system of political
patronage and clientelism seemed insufficient to keep the Mezzogiorno
under political and economic control. Although the entrepreneurial
mafia may now be more costly politically than ever before, the north-
western elite does not yet consider itself able to manage the Mezzo-
giorno's underdevelopment, and therefore to govern Italy, without the
entrepreneurial mafia.
Concluding Observations
The EEC does not promote the balanced, harmonious development
prescribed by Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome for all member States,
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but promotes instead the do^iM^ u iposxtxve, balanced development of the economic
systems of the nnliHonn jpolitically dominant member staces> ek
at the expense of tha polltically subordlnate ^^ because ^
politically dominant states, and not the juridical dictates of the
Treaty of Rome, deterge preponderantly the EEC's deveiopment. Ualy's
participation In an EEC donated politically by West Germany and Erance
under a tempered American hegemony increased the Ualian economy's In-
volvement in the process of capital accumulation among the EEC States
principally to the advantage and benefit of the West Cerman and French
economies. As the data in Appendix B (The Statistical Appendix to
Chapter Six) reveal, in comparison with the EEC average, Italy registers
a lower pro capita income, a lower growth rate, a higher inflation rate
and a higher unemployment rate. Although Italy's entrepreneurs may have
responded to the exigencies of international economic competition under
the adverse conditions created by the EEC's unbalanced integration and
to the domestic pressures of Italy's trade unions for higher wages and
for greater employment in part by increasing productivity greatly (see
Table 54), the disparities between Italy and the EEC average, with
regard to the above-cited socio-economic indicators, widen over time
to Italy's disadvantage.
The EEC's unbalanced integration induced the northwestern elite
to protect its privileged position in Italy by minimizing the negative
consequences of the country's participation in tie EEC for the economic
system of the northwest. To this end, the northwestern elite intensified
the Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment: it increased the Mezzogiorno's
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United Kingdom 131.7 +31.7 228.7 +128 .
7
France 151.6 +51.6 204.0 +104.0
Italy 1 c:Q qi Jo . O +58.8 299.7 +199.7
Japan 157.3 +57.3 107.2 + 7.2
United States 127.2 +27.2 151.0 + 51.0
West Germany 133.0 +33.0 125.2 + 25.2
<*> The results of a study issued in July 1985 by the Centre di Stat-
istica Aziendale (Center for Business Statistics) and the Cassa di
Risparmio di Firenze.
involvement in the process of capital accumulation in the Italian eco-
nomy to the advantage and benefit of the economic system of the north-
west by implementing the policies of incentives and dependent indust-
rialization. Under these policies, the Mezzogiorno ' s development
results not from the accumulation and the investment, according to
internal exigencies, of its real income but rather from the infusion
of external resources, the capital intensive Italian and non-Italian
investments which cause the Mezzogiorno ' s "economic development without
employment." As the data in Appendix B (the Statistical Appendix to
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Chapter Six) reveal, ln COTparlson^ ^ ^ ^ ^
nOIth"eSt Md
st, Mezzogiorno receives . smeller
share o £ the resources of Uaiv's Co^on Regional Fund (created osten.
sibly to attenuate the disecuilihria between the Mezzogiorno and the
rest of Italy) and registers a higher unemployment rate, greater value
added and greater employment in agriculture, lesser value added and
lesser employment in industry, a lower pro ca£ite income and a lower
consumption of goods and services per family. Moreover, the dlsparltles
between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of italy, „lth regard to the above-
cited socio-economic indicators, widen over time to the Mezzogiorno's
disadvantage.
The states which dominate Italy-the United States, West Germany
and France-are not adverse to the Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment be-
cause, in comparison with an Italy whose economy is developed terri-
torially in a balanced way, an Italy with an underdeveloped Mezzogiorno
is a less threatening economic and political rival. Economically, it
is less productive and, therefore, a weaker competitor. Politically, the
dominant states can offer, with financial diplomatic and covert means,
to help the Italian ruling class to legitimize its position and, there-
fore, to retain power, provided the Italian ruling class may not assert
interests contrary to theirs; moreover, these states can threaten to
punish the Italian ruling class with financial, diplomatic and covert
means, should this class behave in a way unacceptable to them.
59
The
adherence of Greece, Portugal and Spain, all producers of great quantities
of Mediterranean agricultural products, to the Treaty of Rome could shift
277
the balance of power within the EEC fro,^ m northern Europe toward the
Mediterranean area. ShnniH t* iould Italy and the other Mediterranean States
of the EEC cooperate politically, they coul H Q7. d succeed in asserting their
Interests in the EEC, in ending the noliHr-i ag p tical and economic predominance
of West Germany and France i-n «-rx , m restructuring the PAP ^a •-LiiB "-ne ca^, and m ending the
CAP'S discrimination against Mediterranean agricultural products . Ho„.
ever, should Italy and the Qther ^ ^ ^
politically, there could be an "economic war among the EEC's weak,"
which, besides preserving the predominance of West Germany and Erance,
would, in all probability, damage most the Mezzogiorno's agriculture.
It would be unable to sustain the collective competition o£ Greece,
Portugal and Spain, especially if the northwestern elite, or another
future Italian ruling class, should forsake even more the Mezzogiorno
s
agriculture in order to exchange Italian industrial products (manufac-
tured principally in north-central Italy) for greater quantities of
Greek, Portuguese and Spanish agricultural products. 60 m any case,
for as long as the political interests of Italy's ruling class do not
coincide with greater political autonomy for Italy and with a more bal-
anced territorial development of the national economy, Italy will re-
main subordinate politically and economically to the United States,
West Germany and France, and the Mezzogiorno will remain underdeveloped.
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Appendix A
Statistical Appendix to Chapter Five
THE CURRENCIES OF THE EEC MEMBER STATES




TABLE 55. -The contribution per cent of th»states to the value of the European unL of
CUrrenC






Unt/EUr °Pean C™* ^
30/5/75 30/10/75 30/1/76
29/10/76
DM 27. 10 9 7 1 Q£ 1 . J.O 27.63 29.05 31.01
FF 21.83 9 9 IT.
22.22 22.32 20.74
L 15.72 1 ^ Q C.
15.54 14.32 12.81
HFL 9.13 9.14 9.28 9 A 7 10 . 23
LIT 13.40 13.55 12.56 11.76 11.37
T7*T>£B 8.03 7.96 7.90 8.31 8.81
DKR 3.05 J . Uj 3.05 3.22 3.32
IRL 1 .30 i • ji 1 .52 1.23 1.10
FLUX .31 ~\ i
. j i .30 .32 .34
28/1/77 21/5/11 28/10/77 26/1/78 30/5/78
DM 30 7
1
Jl . 13 31.55 31.92 32. 13
FF 20 76 20 . 57 20.47 19.82 20.37
L 13.63 13 45 1 J JO 14.02 13.17
HFL 10.13 10.29 10. 17 10.29 10.36
LIT 11.10 10.90 10.69 10.21 10.29
FB 8.84 8.98 8.96 9.11 9.08




FLUX .34 .34 .34 .35 .35
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TABLE 55.—Continued
30/10/78 29/1/79 30/5/79 30/10/79 31/1/80
DM 33.12 32.97 19 R 1;
33.36 33.20
FF 19.96 19.93 1 Q 7 9
19.80 19.70
L 12.82 13.09 1 1 Q7
J. J . O / 13.36 14.01
HFL 10.56 10.55
10.38 10.39
LIT 9.56 9.61 9.68 9.52 9 L 1
FB 9.33 9.25 9.03 9. 14 9.04
DKR 1 1 9
3. 12 3.00 2.97 2.78




. J J .35
30/5/80 30/10/80 30/1/81 27/5/81 28/10/81
DM 32.89 32.28 31 .80 19 A 5 33 .89
FF 19.62 19.45 19.17 1 q noi y . Uo 18.75
L 14.62 15.89 17.15 16 89 1 £T 1 --\15.13
HFL 10.34 10.31 10. 12 in in 10.60
LIT 9.22 8.98 8.84 8.62 8.42
FB 9.08 8.90 8.78 8.80 8. 12
DKR 2.77 2.75 2.71 2.70 2.76
IRL 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.10
FLUX .35 .34 .34 .34 .31
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TABLE 55.—Continued
28/1/82 27/5/82 29/10/82 28/1/83 30/5/83
DM 33.84 -54 . DO 35.19 36.07 36.28
FF 18.49 1 Q Ciio . 5
1
17.30 17.67 16.79
L 15 . 76 1 r r r15.55 16.16 14.44 15.70
HFL 10.66 l n o iiU . oi 11.19 11.34 11.15
LIT 8.31 8.25 8.08 ft 9/iO . <_H 8.04
FB 7.94 7.44 7.75 7.85 8.02
DKR 2.71 2.68 2.63 2.69 2.65
IRL 1 OQ






DM 3ft 7 1 36 . 7 1 37.03
FF 1ft 71 1 c r r16 . 66 16.72
L 1 S 1A 15.51 14.99
HFL 1 1 in. JU 11.26 11 .35
LIT 7.94 7.93 7.89
FB 7.87 7.80 7.92
DKR 2.66 2.65 2.65
IRL 1.04 1.04 1.04
FLUX .30 .30 .30
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TABLE 55.—Continued
DM=West German Mark: FF=Frpnrh p,.. t „ ,t e c Franc; L=British Pound; HFL=Dutch
Florin (or Guilder") • T tt-t*--, i •n , LIT-Italian Lxra; FB=Belgian Franc; DKR=Danish
Crown; IRL=Irish Pound; FLUX=Luxembourg Franc.
(N.B.: These percentages have been rounded off to the nearest hundredth
and, therefore, their totals cannot always correspond exactly to 100.0%,
i.e., the precise composite value of the EUA/ECU. My calculations are
based on the exchange rate between the EUA/ECU and the currencies of the
EEC member States on the dates indicated in relation to the coefficient
which determines each currency's contribution to the value of the EUA/ECU.
The currency's coefficient as the percentage of the exchange rate between
that currency and the EUA/ECU is the contribution per cent of that cur-
rency to the value of the EUA/ECU. The currencies of the EEC States
contribute to the value of the EUA/ECU according to the following
coefficients:
DM .828 FB 3.66
FF 1.15 DKR .217
L -0885 irl .00759
HFL .286 FLUX .14
LIT 109.0
Source for coefficients: Banca Europea per gli Investimenti , Venti-
cinque anni 1958-1983 [Twenty-five Years 1958-1983], Luxembourg: Banca
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TABLE 55.—Continued
K-pea per gll Investlnenti> Information Mvisioni pubuc
Office, 1983, p. 6.)
The exchange rate between the EUA/ECU and the currencies of the EEC
States is publlshed e„ery »eeHay ln the O^aU^i^^^
Communities. The dafpq ir, m,-*„ -,tes xn this analysis refer to the effective date
of the exchange rates upon which my calculations are based. Their
















31/5/75 Volume 18; C 121
31/10/75 Volume 18; C 250
31/1/76 Volume 19; C 22
28/5/76 Volume 19; C 118
30/10/76 Volume 19; C 257
29/1/77 Volume 20; C 22
28/5/77 Volume 20; C 126
29/10/77 Volume 20; C 261
27/1/78 Volume 21; C 23
31/5/78 Volume 21; C 126
31/10/78 Volume 21; C 258
30/1/79 Volume 22; C 26



















31/10/79 Volume 22; C 274
1/2/80 Volume 23; C 25
31/5/80 Volume 23; C 130
31/10/80 Volume 23; C 281
31/1/81 Volume 24; C 22
29/5/81 Volume 24; C 128
29/10/81 Volume 24; C 277
29/1/82 Volume 25; C 22
28/5/82 Volume 25; C 136
30/10/82 Volume 25; C 285
29/1/83 Volume 26; C 24
31/5/83 Volume 26; C 142
29/10/83 Volume 26; C 293
31/1/84 Volume 27; C 25
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TABLE 56. -The contribution per cent of th.««- bo the .afue of the Euro^ ^ZT^l^l SeptSer*
m september i 984 , the Flnance Mlnlsters Q£ ^
Italy, repressed by Us Treasury „inister) modl£led ^ contribution
Per cent of the currencies o£ the EEC^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
Beginning 18 September 1984, the currencies of these States contribute
















Source for coefficients: La Repubblica (Roma), 18 September 1984, p. 35
N.B.: The Greek Drachma (DR) now contributes to the value of the ECU
but, like the British Pound (which has always contributed to the value
of the EUA/ECU), is not included in the European Monetary System (EMS).
18/9/84 30/10/84 30/1/85 30/5/85
DM 32.05 32.24 32.35 32.03
FF 19.04 19. 16 19.28 19. 15
L 14.87 14.56 14.05 15.33
HFL 10. 13 10. 18 10. 19 10. 11
LIT 10. 15 10. 12 10.22 9.76
FB 8.13 8. 18 8. 18 8.17
TABLE 56. -continued 294
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Statistical Appendix to Chapter Six
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
AND ITALY
Mr. Wolfgang Knuppel of the Stati qH^bI
munities (EUROSTAT ) , Luxembourg! n nl,f ^ Eur0pean Com~provided me the data containedV^lelI 57, 79 and 80 ^ ^
Depart^(Sc^^ 1^ ,^!ffi^ V*^me the data contained in Table 77 anH , °^ 1 February 1985, provided
1985, provided me the data cnJJ- A ^ Pr0t " *" 016030 of 30 April
and 85. ^ COntained » Tables 58 through 76, 81, 82(*),
vator^della SpeL^Pubbffcr ? ^cumentazione , Osser-
on 3 January 198 provided ^
C °nS1
f
U° Re § io-^> Regione del Veneto,
data contained in
'
TabT 83 are £££
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Abruzzo 15 J 1 50
15
Basilicata
16 L 14 1 44 15
Calabria
13 JO 52 15
Campania 12 36 53 14
Molise 19 32 51 17
Puglia
17 35 50 14
Sardegna 13 36 K/.
17
Sicilia 14 30 58 16
Mezzogiorno
Average






















































































TABLE 61.—The sectoral di r "h



























03 48 52 09
Emilia-Romagna 10 46 47 10
Friuli-Venezia
Giulia
14 4 3 56 16
Lazio 15 32 69 19
Marche 09 42 52 1 A
Toscana 05 45 53 12
Trentino-Alto
Adige
07 40 56 17
Umbria 09 44 50 14
Veneto 09 46 48 12
Center/Northeast
Average































Puglia 16 37 50 16
Sardegna 11 36 56 18
Sicilia 15 31 57 17
Mezzogiorno
Average
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Valle d'Aosta 1.51 1.95 2.08 1.81 2 .00
Northwest Average 1 4A 1 O 11.81 1.80 1.84 1.77
Emilia-Romagna 1.51 1.90 1.84 1.91 1.81
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.28 2.00 1.75 1.74 1.80
Lazio 1.58 1.70 1.71 1.65 1.66
Marche
1 4? 1 OA1 . 80 1.80 2.02 1.74
Toscana 1.54 1.77 1.74 2.00 1.72
Trentino-Alto Adige 1.56 1.96 1.85
J- . OJ 1 o c1 . 85
Umbria 1.62 1.81 1.82 2.07 1.78
Veneto 1.55 1.78 1.86 1.96 1.78
Center/Northeast
Average









. 71I 1 .83 1 .89 1 .94 1.83
Basilicata
1 .88 1 .81 1 .88 2 12 1.84
Calabria
1 .85 1 .62 1 .90 2 25 1.78
Campania
1 .66 1 .68 1 .79 1. 90 1 7 ">1 . / Z
Molise
.391 2 .03 1 83 1. 90 1.80
Puglia
.701 1 .92 1 84 2. 05 1.83
Sardegna
1. 52 1 .73 1. 78 1. 82 1.71
Sicilia
1. 80 1 .79 1. 74 1. 84 1.75
Mezzogiorno
Average
1. 69 1. 80 1. 83 1. 98 1.78
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Northwest Average 2.39 2.19 2.45 2.54 2.32
Emilia-Romagna 2.57 2.47 2.59 2.61 2.52
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2.80 2.37 2.41 2.16 2.39
Lazio 2.14 2.34 2.53 2.78 2.43
Marche 2.51 9 7 0 2. 56 2.60 2.61
Toscana 2.25 2.57 2.51 2.56 2.51
Trentino-Alto Adige 3.02 2.69 2.64 2.33 2 6i
Umbria 2.40 2.54 2.61 2.56 2.54
Veneto 2.38 2.51 2.54 2.39 2.50
Center/Northeast
Average
2.51 2.53 2.55 2.50 2.52


















2.30 2 . 70 2 . 58 2.67 2.58
2.40 2 . 83 O CO1 . 58 2.53 2.64
2.71 2 . 18 Z .51 2.53 2.43
2.05 2.44 2.55 2.82 2.46
2.49 2.93 2.70 2.72 2.73
1.95 2.50 2.54 2.69 2.43
2.05 2.62 9 AO
2.67 2.49
2.09 2.41 2.47 2.54 2.40
2.26 2.58 2.55 2.65 2.52
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TABLE 68.—The growth rate nf6 WLn o gross value ^HHoH



































Northwest Average 1.28 1.39 1.53 1.67 1.46
Emilia-Romagna 1.28 1.51 1.56 1.64 1.50
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.19 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.53
Lazio 1.44 1 .46 1 . J/ 1 . 59 1.50
Marche 1.31 1.48 1.62 1.79 1.53
Toscana 1.23 1.40 1.58 1.66 1 .48
Trentino-Alto Adige 1.17 1.38 1.63 1.76 1.49
Umbria 1.35 1.44 1.62 1.82 1.52
Veneto 1.19 1.45 1.59 1.69 1.49
Center/Northeast
Average
1.27 1.45 1.59 1.71 1.51
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TABLE 68.—Continued
















1.29 1.47 1.62 1.77 1.52
1.15 1.38 1.59 1.78 1.43
1 . 30 1.63 1.60 1.73 1.57
1.32 1.46 1.57 1.67 1
1.28 1.45 1.65 1.85 1.52
1.51 1.41 1.56 1.61 1.49
1.18 1.23 1.53 1.60 1.39
1.27 1.49 1.56 1.61 1.50




























































































































































































































13 38 49 17
10 44 47 13
21 38 41 12
1 9
37 52 23
11 27 62 26
30 35 35 13
14 A?H — 44 14
16 31 53 20
24 37
15
16 44 40 13
18 31 H U 17
31 32 37 13
38 33 30 12
34 31 35 13
26 33 41 15
47 23 30 12
36 27 37 13
TABLE 70. -Continued
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24 32 44 17
Basilicata
34 30 36 15
Calabria
29 26 44 19
Campania
20 32 48 18
Molise
39 25 36 16
Puglia




Sicilia 23 27 49 19
Mezzogiorno
Average
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TABLE 76.—The sectoral a* +31
























































































Ab r \ 1 7 7o
19 33 48 18
Bas i 1 irata
29 32 38 17
Calabria
25 27 48 20
Campania
18 32 50 18
Molise
35 26 39 17
Puglia




Sicilia 21 28 51 19
Mezzogiorno
Average
24 29 46 19
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TABLE 77 .-The distribuUon Qf






















































EEC Average = 100
1971J- Zf / J. 1974 1979 1981
An T"l i 7 7 n
55.4 52.1 51.0 56.6
ua. o x x xc a. l a. 47.5 44.9 45.5 48.
1
(!p 1 aKn' nvjaiaUl Id 43.5 40.5 37.3 42.5
Campania
53.2 47.4 43.2 A 7 ~K
Molise
44.5 42.3 44.2 49.5
Puglia





Sicilia 53.3 48.1 43.5 47.8
Mezzogiorno
Average
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TABLE 82,-The famlly ^












































































as a percentage of Italy
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TABLE 85. -The accounts of Italv's •


















































































































































673.2 812.6 1,374.1 1,323.9
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TABLE 86. -The accounts of Italy's rP ,' i •total expenditure as a percentage of SS?
















































































FIGURE 1.—Ttalv i*-*I aly. lts reglons and their capitals
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